



The Idea of the Library in the Ancient World

YUN LEE TOO

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THE ANCIENT WORLD**

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For George

Preface

The supposition of this book is that the library, ancient and modern, is a complex and multifarious entity. The sections into which I have divided this book are thus somewhat arbitrary. The part entitled ‘Memories’ contains only one chapter, 6, but memories are also the concern of [Chapter 3](#), which is focused on the walking library; similarly, ‘Origins: The Diachronic Perspective’ contains Chapters 1 and 2, but origins is also a theme of [Chapter 4](#), which is concerned with the book as library. It is impossible to contain exclusively the concerns of each chapter, because topics necessarily overlap with each other.

This study is the result of a realization that the ancient library is an interesting topic—I have by no means exhausted it. It took over six years to bring to fruition. I would like to thank Hilary O’Shea, who thought it worthwhile, Ruth Cameron, who got me thinking about metadata, and my two readers at OUP, who made it a much better and more readable book. I would also like to thank Hilary Walford for her meticulous copy-editing.

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Abbreviation

ANRW	<i>Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt</i>
BICS	<i>Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies</i>
CGF	G. Kaibel, <i>Comitorum Graecorum Fragmenta</i> (Berlin, 1899)
CIL	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum</i>
CP	<i>Classical Philology</i>
CQ	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
CR	<i>Classical Review</i>
GLK	H. Keil, <i>Grammatici Latini</i> (Leipzig, 1855–80)
GR	<i>Greece and Rome</i>
GRBS	<i>Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies</i>
GRF	H. Funaioli (ed.), <i>Grammaticae Romanae Fragmenta</i> , i (Leipzig, 1907; repr. Rome, 1964)
HSCP	<i>Harvard Studies in Classical Philology</i>
ICS	<i>Illinois Classical Studies</i>
MH	<i>Museum Helveticum</i>
JBL	<i>Journal of Biblical Literature</i>
JHS	<i>Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>
JRS	<i>Journal of Roman Studies</i>
REG	<i>Revue des Études Grecques</i>
RhM	<i>Rheinisches Museum</i>
TAPA	<i>Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association</i>
ZPE	<i>Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik</i>

I have tried to follow standard abbreviations for the ancient texts.

Introduction: The Idea of the Library

The Idea of the Library in the Ancient World is a book about the conceptualizations of the library in antiquity—what it might be; how it might be; what it might achieve. It offers a series of explorations into the realm of possibility as far as the library in the Greco-Roman world is concerned. It proposes that the ancient library is a complex entity: it is much more than a collection of texts; it has functions other than just the gathering and preservation of literary works. The ancient concept, it claims, is rather an idea, or a series of ideas, about how individuals have conceived textual culture. As such, the ancient library has its various and diverse forms, some of which challenge and compete with each other, and others that challenge and rival our contemporary notions of library; it is an institution liable to transformation, to (self-)interrogation, and to criticism.

Approaching the ancient library in these terms marks the possibility of disrupting the current textual history. Admitting the possibility of plurality in coming to understand the ancient library marks a notable departure from the set of narratives that have structured themselves almost exclusively around one particular entity, the famed Hellenistic Museum-Library of Alexandria founded by Ptolemy II Philadelphus. The Alexandrian library has become *the* library *par excellence* of the ancient world, and its iconic role is well evidenced by twentieth-century scholarship. There have existed more or less thorough studies gathering literary material on the Ptolemaic collection: A. L. Parsons's *The Alexandrian Library* (New York, 1952), J. W. Thompson's *Ancient Libraries* (London, 1962), R. Pfeiffer's *History of Classical Scholarship from the Beginnings to the End of the Hellenistic Age* (Oxford, 1968), and P. M. Fraser's *Ptolemaic Alexandria* (Oxford, 1972), although J. Platthy's *Sources on the Earliest Greek Libraries with the Testimonia* (Amsterdam, 1968) and E. Posner's *Archives in the Ancient World* (Cambridge, MA, 1972) do not treat the Alexandrian library. These works individually

and together identified the Alexandrian ‘institution’ as deserving of scholarly attention possibly because it offered a historical paradigm for scholarship itself. In turn, as the dominant model for the ancient library as an intellectual and cultural institution, the Alexandrian library assimilated other significant book collections to itself in the ancient and modern imaginations, such that the body of literary works collected by the Athenian tyrant Peisistratus or by the philosopher Aristotle were seen as its direct inspirations or as directly influenced by it.

The Alexandrian library continues to function as a symbol of the ideal library even at the beginning of the twenty-first century. And this is despite the fact that this has been, or maybe especially because this has been, a ‘vanished library’—as the title of Luciano Canfora’s meticulous study listing all the source material on the institution shows us all too well—and after all it was purported to have been a library burned down in the Roman period, or perhaps later by the Arabs.¹ Now, the original library at Alexandria is being ‘revived’ by the construction of the ‘Bibliotheca Alexandrina’, also titled as ‘the Revival of the Ancient Library of Alexandria’, on the site of the ancient ‘Royal Quarter’, where the first library is supposed to have been, so that the original institution’s non-existence for nearly two millennia is somehow effaced. This is a library designed to serve as a public research library with emphasis on Egyptian, ancient, and medieval civilizations under the patronage of the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak with the support of UNESCO and other public and private sources.² The new institution is justified by Mubarak’s statement, ‘Egypt has initiated the idea of reviving the Alexandria Library because it believes that not on bread alone does man live, but that culture is food of thought, conscience and feelings, and this is of no less importance to man than material needs.’ The Bibliotheca Alexandrina stands as a symbol of the essentiality of culture to human existence, of the need for intellectual, in addition to material, sustenance. The new Alexandrian library is, however, far smaller in vision than its model, for the building will open with a collection of some 400,000 books in a city that is no longer a prominent cultural centre.³

One assumption in the writing of the history of the ancient library, and particularly in the writing of the history of the

ancient library as the history of Alexandria, is that the collecting of physical texts, whether the ‘scroll’ or ‘book’ or, later, the codex, is a significant *raison d’etre*. The assumption is one that proceeds in large part from the vocabulary employed to denote the Greco-Roman ‘library’. ‘Library’ translates the Greek noun *bibliothêkê*, which probably rather means ‘bookcase’ or ‘shelf’, which the Latin *librarium* also translates: so also, Greek *biblos* literally means ‘papyrus’, *biblia* means ‘books’, and Latin *liber* translates as ‘book’, respectively. In keeping with the rationale that the library is to preserve and collect texts, the book collections of the Greco-Roman world have their importance evaluated and measured in terms of the number of ‘books’ that they were thought to contain. Thus the Alexandrian library is celebrated either for its 400,000, or 500,000, or 700,000 scrolls, although scholars are careful and quick to add that the number of scrolls does not equal the number of books, which are rather comprised of several scrolls.⁴ The centrality of the book to the book collection rests on a further assumption—namely, that the library’s chief function is to protect and preserve books even to the extent of making them inaccessible to the majority of readers, who are both consumers of the works and potential destroyers of texts. The Alexandrian library again characterizes well this assumed function of the book collection to maintain its contents safely as an institution open only to a handful of learned scholars supported by royal patronage. Umberto Eco recognizes too well the paradoxical move by which the library makes texts available and desirable by withholding them from readers in his novel *The Name of the Rose*, where the blind monk and librarian Borges resorts to murder to keep the fictionally extant second book of Aristotle’s *Poetics* from the eyes of readers.

There is little doubt that the Alexandrian library should constitute a significant portion of the discourse concerning the ancient library; however, it should not come to represent the whole discourse regarding the book collection in the ancient Mediterranean world. So in this study I seek to establish the story of the achievement of the Ptolemies and their highly learned scholar-librarians as only one part, albeit a notable one, of a larger set of narratives concerning the acquisition, maintenance, and circulation of literary collections in the Greek and Roman worlds from the fifth century BCE to the late antique period. This

study, in other words, endeavours to offer a larger context for understanding the library than Alexandria and its immediate environs. It broadens the discourse on the library in antiquity by resisting the temptation to be simplistically celebratory or nostalgic about it as a receptacle of writings from the ancient world, and so for the library to be a sort of archeological site to be excavated for otherwise lost texts. Rather, this study approaches 'ancient library' as a phrase and concept that raises a series of pressing issues and problems.

First and foremost of these is whether or not the words 'ancient library' always refer to the same thing where different people at different moments in antiquity are concerned. Or, to put the problem another way, is it sufficient to understand the ancient library as a more or less fixed institution with a particular set of protocols, rules, and conventions—is the 'library' a generic idea? The scholarly emphasis on the Alexandrian library that constructs this institution as *the* ancient library suggests that 'ancient library' might indeed be a static entity. But this book aims to widen and reflect more responsively on the understanding of the text collection in antiquity, and, in surrendering Alexandria as its dominant point of reference, it becomes obliged to acknowledge that the library cannot be an uncontextualized and abstract entity and, therefore, that it also cannot be a fixed and rigid institution. Indeed, the library is not simply a building named 'library'. Rather it is a collection of texts created by people with particular ideas about what a library might be, and so is established amidst a set of intentionalities. It is inevitably founded in and for a particular set of individuals or a community—for instance, the Greek-speaking elite of Alexandria and of Pergamum, the Aristotelian school, the friends of Cicero, Augustus, the people of Rome—and so it is conceived with a particular audience in mind and representative of their and the founders' tastes, educations, and cultures—and to the exclusion of others who do not belong to these groups. The library is the product of authorships as far as the gathering of texts is concerned, and of conceptualizations, whether concordant or divergent, that themselves attest to an imagined ideal of what a library should be. The ancient library is thus a deliberate configuration of intellectual culture in so far as this is represented by texts, and it is one, in addition, with its cultural and political

significations.

A realization that the ancient library is an intentional construction furthermore entails questions about how individuals and communities understand the roles and functions of literary texts in the community. Are literary texts simply for pleasure, in which case the library becomes a vehicle of distraction from everyday life and its business? Or are texts rather receptacles and retainers of a cultural memory, as the Homeric epics were deemed to be, in which case the ancient library stands as a community's memory of, and as a guarantee of continuity with, the past? Or are books rather testimonies to the characters and actions of prominent political figures, as historical, biographical, and some philosophical texts—for example, Xenophon's *Memorabilia*—were deemed to be, so that the library becomes something of a school, providing materials to be used in the formation of society's young? Is the past, particularly the past of Athens, a mode of cultural authority and origination, as, in particular, scholars of the Second Sophistic now think?⁵ Are texts the materials of a research culture, as in the case of the Hellenistic libraries at Alexandria and Pergamum, such that the library becomes the domain of the professional scholar? Where texts have been introduced from another culture, does their acquisition denote the defeat and/or appropriation of that other culture? Or is there a more complex process involving not only the taking-over of another culture but also the host culture's counter-assimilation through the material it has received?

The extent to which the nature of the library is determined by the role granted to the book is apparent in current discussions of what the book collection and its components might be.⁶ For the contemporary scholar of the humanities, the library continues to be an institution of utmost importance and value. The modern library and its materials—books, manuscripts, catalogues, and so on—constitute the raw material of the scholar's profession. It is the source and receptacle of what she, especially as a humanities scholar, will present to her audience as knowledge, as a discovery, as a reading, and so on in a particular discipline or disciplines; it is the basis of authority for what she may claim as knowledge, as discovery, as reading, and so on. The library, in some sense, becomes the source and origin of further, newer books, which it will in turn contain. Beyond this, the modern

research library is a common meeting ground for scholars across various fields of enquiry; it is often the training ground and home of an interdisciplinary community. Library tea rooms are not to be underestimated, both as spaces of often productive recreation from formal intellectual work, and as informal spaces of discursive exchange, indeed casual seminars. In this instance, it is the presence of the physical book, rather than the book itself, that is important, for it produces a site of intellectual foment.

Beyond how individuals and their communities perceive the social and/or political role of literary culture, another significant factor in how the library might be understood has to do with its own relation to the world at large. Does the library aim to contain only a limited set of texts—say, the works of Homer, or the works of the three Athenian tragedians—which are somehow constitutive of that community's essential or privileged culture? Does it purport more ambitiously to hold all that is written in the inhabited world (*hê oikoumenê*), and does 'all' mean only what is written in Greek or Latin, or does it entail material that has been translated into these languages, as in the case of the Septuagint, the Greek translation of the Hebrew Old Testament? What are the criteria for inclusion in antiquity's libraries? Who is endowed with the authority to make the decisions regarding inclusion and exclusion of texts? Moreover, does the library's holding signify a (way of defining a) cultural domain and dominion? Or is cultural possession a merely disinterested condition? All these questions, themselves far from comprehensive, imply a set of considerations about how individuals and societies view a material reality in the sense that libraries, whatever their form (and we shall see that their forms are complex and multiple), signify an understanding of this reality. The library, in other words, becomes a textual representative of a social and political reality.

This study is concerned not simply with collections of texts in antiquity, but with collections of texts that are deliberately and purposely denominated 'library', a word that suggests a particular understanding of that collection as a textual institution. This study also attempts to extend the understanding of 'library' in antiquity, for it examines how 'library' signifies at various moments ways of thinking about the form and function of the text collection and about how the text collection might in turn come to exceed our current and admittedly anachronistic

perception of what it is. Offering a historical framework for consideration of the library, I present a series of continuities but also disjunctions with a conventional understanding of the nature of the book collection. The word 'library' signifies in multiple ways in antiquity, and the current project seeks to suggest that 'book'—at least, as the modern reader most immediately understands 'book'—is not its most obvious signification, for the physical text and its preservation are not always the primary justifications of the ancient library. The ancient library is a far more complex and multiple entity than a building, or set of buildings, its/their books, and scholars. The Greek word *bibliotheca*, literally a 'place to put books' and originally a bookshelf and perhaps still so in Hellenistic Alexandria,⁷ later becomes a building for the display and storage of books—so, for example, *Bibliotheca Ulpiana*. But the ancient library has the capacity to signify beyond itself, to exceed the building that houses it, and this is one of the recognitions and interests of this book. The 'library' (*bibliotheca*) subsequently denotes, in addition to bookcases and buildings, people who have the ability to memorize vast quantities of books and also books that have encyclopaedically drawn their material from other enormous textual corpora. (Perhaps the only constant of the library, whether as physical institution or idea, in antiquity and subsequently, is its formation of numerous and otherwise disparate texts into a 'collection'.) This study is purposely selective, for to be otherwise would constitute it as an encyclopaedic text, a book that aspires to be a library. It does not aspire to identify and study every library from Greco-Roman antiquity but rather to consider some of the manifestations of the library in the ancient Mediterranean and, in so doing, to broaden our understanding of what a(n ancient) library is.

And, if the aim of this book is to understand the ancient Mediterranean library not as a singular entity, but as a variously interpreted and enacted ideal, as a culture- and context-bound construction, as a possible representation of the larger world, it does so by exploring a nexus of issues that sustain this plurality. The iconographies of the ancient library produced by Greek and Roman writers and by their texts propose that the discourse of the ancient library is a complex one in which issues of power, authority, cultural identity, memory, canonicity, and totalization

are of central concern and are under constant negotiation. It is no accident that libraries come into being in political and cultural centres, such as Athens, Alexandria, and Rome, where resources, wealth, and the intelligentsia are present, and that the existence of libraries reinforces the perception of textual, cultural, and political power in these places. These are issues that scholars have identified as relevant to writing,⁸ and that are therefore also necessarily relevant to the library, an 'institution' constructed of literary texts.

But perhaps they are also made more complex because the ancient library, as indeed any library, is an entity that to some degree re-authors and recontextualizes the word as originally conceived and written by a poet, orator, historian, or philosopher. What Hesiod or the authors of the Homeric Hymns may have attempted to commemorate and celebrate is not necessarily what the compilers of a library collection intend when they include this work on their bookshelves. Hesiod and the Homeric Hymns become examples of archaic Greek poetry; then they become the models to be cited and reworked by the Hellenistic scholar-poets; later they become part of the Hellenic heritage that Roman culture appropriates; and so on and on. The creation of the library in the Greco-Roman Mediterranean in antiquity is a process of palimpsesting, of layering meanings and significations where texts are concerned individually and as a body.

As the title of this book suggests, this study is a history, and, as such, it is partially concerned with origins and causes. So it begins by examining how narratives concerning the foundations of libraries coalesce around power, political and intellectual. These narratives may appear to be disparate and to concern disparate and distinct establishments of libraries, but what they have in common is that they attach the formation of book collections to prominent and powerful public figures, tyrants, and kings, as in the case of Peisistratus and the Ptolemies, or intellectuals, as in the case of Aristotle, Varro, and Cicero, in order to offer aetiologies of the Peisistratean collection, the Alexandrian library (the Ptolemies), and the different Roman collections. The library becomes an expression of power. The narratives I consider also reveal the origins of the texts as a constant, continuous gathered body of writings that is passed

down from library founder to library founder as a result of inheritance, conquest, theft, and purchase. In the pervasive iconography of the ancient library, there is indeed only *one* library, and this library is not always Alexandria, which has been the traditional emphasis for the library in antiquity, even despite the simultaneous existence of many other libraries. The representation of antiquity's library dramatizes the institution as a vehicle for elite cultural definition. The library coincides with the establishment of an empowered literary canon, first Greek and then Greco-Roman, which it conveys from community to community through time and across geographical boundaries.

Chapter 2 looks at an anxiety presented to readers by the large body of textual material: namely, where to find a particular text or subject. It considers the means by which scholars and, later, authors themselves provide their audiences with indications for locating materials. Beginning with the library catalogue, the chapter goes on to investigate the development of the table of contents as a means of orientation in the works of Pliny the Elder and of Aulus Gellius in the first and second centuries CE respectively. It reads the contents list as a mnemonic device for the reader as regards the topics and sometimes the source works cited by the authors and as regards the larger body of textuality on which the authors' works draw and which they rework in their respective compendia of knowledge. The chapter also looks at the development of the contents list for individual books within larger works as the product of a change from the book roll to the codex, particularly where early Christian authors are concerned.

Chapter 3 considers the depiction of the educated man (especially *pepaideumenos* or *disertus*) as a 'breathing library' in a series of authors who inhabit Egypt in the later Roman empire—Vitruvius to Eunapius to Apuleius and Athenaeus. It explores how this figure problematizes the notion of a body of texts as a physical entity. In later antiquity, the embodied library becomes a presence required to speak for the community's textual memory, to legitimize, and to distinguish it from less authorized forms: the librarian has, in other words, become the library. If the Hellenistic Ptolemaic Library claimed as its authority a Greekness that was indistinguishable from a classical one, the 'breathing library', a phrase coined by the sophistic biographer Eunapius, speaks to an awareness that culturaltextual memory is always a

body of knowledge removed from its origins. It performs textuality as mobile—Greekness and Latinity as consciously displaced to late antique North Africa. But the embodied ‘library’ is also an individual who becomes subject to pressures to perform his knowledge in public in such a way that his authority becomes compromised and the ‘library’ becomes a figure who points to a culture that values superficial and epideictic knowledge.

Chapter 4 deals with the *Library of Mythology* of Apollodorus, and it considers the double impulse to reductionism and to totalization where the *idea* of the book collection is concerned. Apollodorus’ work purports to stand as the sum of mythological knowledge for its era, but it also displays the drive to legitimize only one ‘library’, and to construct that ‘library’ as the total sum of authorized textuality. The ‘book as library’ is one that effaces the specificities of authorship and, indeed, of text as it constitutes the whole prior body of canonical literature in its own chronological narrative. The library book is a metatext that restructures and aetiologates the community’s text culture through citation. But this work, as an amalgam of sources, is also one that reveals itself as such at moments in its genealogical narratives. Apollodorus occasionally acknowledges disagreements between his sources—for example, ‘Homer says that X is the daughter of Y, but Acousilaus declares that X is the daughter of Z...’—in such a way as to seem to allow his reader the prerogative of choosing between the options. Yet it is these fissures that, I shall argue, enable the author to wrest control from his original sources and to rewrite and restructure narratives as wholly his construction.

Chapter 5 offers a reading of the *Library of History* of Diodorus Siculus. This section of the book considers how this literary work offers a particular view of the civilized world as one where each society and each individual is necessarily connected to one another, where the cosmos is to be understood ultimately as a single, world city. It espouses a particular cosmopolitan ideal in which people are morally obliged to recognize the humanity of someone despite the fact that he is ‘other’. The writing of history is an activity, according to Diodorus, that records actions of societies that have upheld this cosmopolitan ideal and also that have disappointed this ideal: it serves to memorialize justice, injustice, kindness, cruelty, and so on despite and across the boundaries of time, geography, culture, and language. History is,

furthermore, the means by which the audience may be instructed to enact the cosmopolitan ideal and, thus, is the means by which the world city may be brought into being. With Diodorus' work, the ancient library becomes a world without walls where all barriers and borders ideally come down.

The sixth chapter contemplates the extent to which the library encompasses all textuality through memory. Surveying different accounts of mnemotechnics as a means of recalling texts, it then turns to how the *Bibliotheca* of the Byzantine patriarch and scholar Photius remembers its works. The *Bibliotheca* is a testimony to the patriarch's own memory, but it is itself a work that does not so much recall the original text as recall things *about* that text and its author. Photius' work constitutes the literary canon as a body of what we now term 'metadata'. And metadata make the memory of the library extratextual. Moreover, they transform the role and authority of the librarian in antiquity so that he no longer has to remember his whole library; what he needs to remember is *about* his library.

The seventh chapter looks at a particular feature of the physical library in order to disclose one of the ancient library's conceptual dimensions. Libraries, beginning from the Hellenistic period and, certainly, in the Roman period, are frequently collections of both texts and art—that is, statues and portraits. Visual and plastic art adorns the physical structure of the library, and symbolizes the resources and wealth that go into the construction of this institution. But it also does more than decorate. Recent scholarship has drawn attention to the ways in which text and art may function together,⁹ and this section of the book considers the ways in which the written word and visual art function together to declare that the ancient library is much more than a building containing scrolls. The portrait is a complex signifier in Greek and Roman culture, referring to the community's distinguished ancestors as models of behaviour and character, emblematising various literary themes and topics such that art provides a commentary on the library and its owner, and serving as part of a mnemonic landscape for past cultures. What art does for the library is to serve as the means by which the audience comes to encounter the ancient library as an imaginary geography of ideas, persons, memories, and alternative realities. Art ensures that the book collection makes meanings beyond its

words by juxtaposing the literary with the non-literary visual emblem.

The final chapter makes the implicit and underlying argument of this book explicit in viewing the ancient library as a social artefact. If the prior sections of the study regard the library as a product of society, this concluding portion regards the book collection as an entity that may, in turn, also transform the community that initially created it. Texts have an impact on their worlds, gathering individuals around them into an intellectual and political community that stands both parallel to and in distinction from the pre-existing society, as in the case of the Alexandrian library, or as a means of extending hospitality to Greek visitors to Rome, as in the case of Lucullus' collection, or as a means by which an individual—namely, Cicero—may retreat from the external world into his own company and contemplation. Books and libraries are makers of their own socialities and all that sociality entails.

Here I offer a brief afterword about what this study may achieve, as an intellectual and cultural history of the library. It is the case that, at present, the status and centrality of the book as idea, practice, culture, and institution to Western culture have been cast into uncertainty. Accordingly, at present the role and understanding of what a library, as the receptacle of our books, might be are also opened to scrutiny. Visual culture—first, television and films, then, video games, now, cyberculture and cybertexts—have been unfixing the book and its institutions as cultural artefacts and givens in that they have achieved or are also achieving the status of legitimate culture. Indeed, some even envision a library in which on-line texts completely displace books.¹⁰ If the book is constituted as such through its physicality (it has pages, a beginning, middle, and end), through its economic status (it is something that may be bought and sold, and, in post-Marxist thought, is a bearer of cultural capital) and its legal standing (rules of copyright and intellectual property govern the 'ownership' of the book as intellectual product¹¹), then cybertechnology calls 'bookness' into question. It denies closure to the act of authorship, as readers may intervene in the processes of writing and editing, upsets or else opens up textual presentation, and extends the domain of the book beyond its physical presence through the possibilities of reproduction, on-

line publishing, and information networks. In particular, the Internet has resulted in an explosion and proliferation of language in the public sphere, as everyone who has access to a computer terminal and modem may author, without the usual controls that exist for conventional book production, works for consumption by others who are similarly connected. These, as Bloch and Hesse observe, are conditions that may erode the community otherwise fostered by the conventional library¹² but may also create the conditions for a new, wider community.¹³

I point to these transformations because they are ones that must necessarily affect the understanding of the library as an institution that preserves and makes available books. Certainly, the phenomenon of the on-line text enables the computer to duplicate this function of the library. There is another way in which web culture has transformed our relation to the institution of the book collection at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Admittedly, people still read, buy, and acquire large numbers of books, and they continue to borrow them from public libraries, but, while they do so, another resource for the book collector has come into being, the Internet bookstore—‘bookstore’ is to be understood literally as a ‘place’ that keeps books and as a ‘place’ that sells them. The most famous of these is Amazon.com, but there are also Borders.com and Barnes and Nobles.com, the last of which advertises itself as making available no fewer than 4.6 million books for the reader to buy and own. Barnes and Noble can claim for its on-line service, ‘If we don’t have your book, nobody does’, and certainly its stock easily rivals many major research libraries in terms of amount but not necessarily subject area, and certainly surpasses in number the 750,000 titles in stock in its conventional bookstore. The Internet bookstore is interesting because it explicitly commodifies the library as a cultural institution to the point of rendering the institution a pure business concern. In order to take a book out of the Internet book collection, the reader must buy the volume, which the bookstore-librarian promises to send within 1 or 2 days; or else, for a volume that has gone out of print, within 4 to 6 weeks. Furthermore, as a consequence of being on the Internet and linked to search engines, the virtual bookstore is automatically linked to its own set of catalogues with the potential for interference and biographical information—that is, the Internet

search engine, whether Alta Vista, Google, Lycos, or Yahoo. In fact, it is the biographical catalogue that stands foremost in the virtual domain, as any search on an individual who happens to be an author inevitably links the search to a reference to one of these Internet bookstores.

The existence of texts on the web poses a series of further questions to traditional book culture. Will libraries be obliged to contain every written word that has been produced—that is to say, must they also be receptacles of web culture and therefore able to accommodate an ever rapidly growing body of materials? If so, how will this affect our understanding of the library as an institution? If not, and probably not, how will we now establish the criteria that enable us to distinguish between what must be included in and excluded from our libraries?¹⁴ How will we determine the criteria of canonicity in so far as the library determines the canonical status of a work?

The concern of this book is not to quell anxiety directly about the status and condition of the contemporary library because it demonstrates that the library has always been an institution that generates a degree of anxiety and angst. Rather the present study hopes to be an investigation that in part attempts to place the apparently radical transformations of textual culture into a historical context by showing that the library has already confronted similar and related issues in antiquity. It offers a series of investigations into the discourses of the ancient library that dispels the notion of libraries as fixed, static institutions—one that has much intellectual, cultural, and emotional baggage attached to it—for it is precisely the fixity that this book shows to be mistakenly associated with the library that gives rise to a rhetoric regarding the destruction of textuality rather than its transformation and progression. Thus the realization that intellectual institutions must change is, I maintain, one of the assumptions of this study.

Origins: The Diachronic Perspective

1

The Birth of a Library

Libros Athenis disciplinarum liberalium publice ad legendum praebendos primus posuisse dicitur Pisistratus tyrannus. Deinceps studiosius accuratiusque ipsi Athenienses auxerunt; sed omnem illam postea librorum copiam Xerxes Athenarum potitus urbe ipsa praeter arcem incensa abstulit asportavitque in Persas. Eos porro libros universos multis post tempestatibus Seleucus rex, qui Nicanor appellatus est, referendos Athenas curavit.

Ingens postea numerus librorum in Aegypto ab Ptolemaeis regibus vel conquisitus vel confectus est ad milia ferme voluminum septingenta ...

Aulus Gellius 7.17

The tyrant Pisistratus is said to have been the first to possess books of the liberal arts that were to be supplied for the public's reading at Athens. Later the Athenians themselves augmented them in a learned and accurate manner; but after Xerxes had obtained that whole abundance of books and had burned the city apart from its citadel, he took them away and brought them to Persia. Then the Seleucid king, who was called Nicanor, took care that all those books were returned to Athens a long time afterwards.

Afterwards a huge number of books was acquired in Egypt by the Ptolemaic kings and numbered nearly 70 000 volumes...

INTRODUCTION

I begin this chapter with a narrative from Aulus Gellius (who

again appears in [Chapter 6](#)) that provides a paradigmatic narrative for the birth of the library in Greco-Roman antiquity. The library originates with the Athenian tyrant Pisistratus, then it is acquired by Xerxes, returned to Athens, and possessed next by the Ptolemaic kings. In Aulus Gellius the library is a collection of texts—note that Aulus is himself a collector of texts and someone who writes precisely so that his audience will remember amidst the mass of Greek and Roman texts being produced¹—that is passed down from ruler to ruler, from society to society, and across different cultures, until it comes into the hands of the Ptolemies at Alexandria, all the while retaining the identity of ‘library’, indeed *the* library.

Athens and Alexandria are important sites in this story, and in this representation—for I am solely concerned with literary representations rather than with the material culture of the library, as being more telling of what the library means for ancient culture—it would appear that there is only *one* library in antiquity worth speaking of as the same core body of texts is passed from owner to owner, from past to present. Importantly, this is *the* authorizing narrative for the library, one that ensures that the public believes its texts are authentic and valid and that signifies power. The literary text, which in isolation might be helpless, is authorized by the fact of belonging with other texts, which originate in an earlier time, and by the patron of the library. It is this strand of the narrative concerning the ancient library that will be the concern of this chapter—the collection that transcends different owners and cultures to remain one collection even as it grows—rather than an exhaustive examination of all the evidence concerning the birth of the library. What will emerge from this story of textual adoption is the power of canonicity and the association of text collections with political power. The library’s passage is, as it would appear, a trajectory of power in the ancient world.

THE FATHER OF THE LIBRARY

A number of narratives surrounding the founding of the library are indeed concerned with identifying the adoptive father of a body of texts, but they are late and therefore tainted by an Athenocentric concern, which seeks to make Athens the

foundation of subsequent culture. The narratives concur in making Peisistratus, tyrant of Athens, the surrogate ‘father’ of the library as a public institution. Again and again, sources name the Athenian ruler as its originator. According to Aulus Gellius, who may be indebted to Varro’s now lost *De Bibliothecis*,² he was the first (*primus*) to have made a public collection at Athens of books relating to the ‘liberal disciplines’ (*libros... disciplinarum liberalium*, 7.17.1). Athenaeus mentions the tyrant in the introduction to the *Deipnosophistae* as one of the individuals celebrated for their great libraries, who include Polycrates of Samos, Eucleides of Athens, Nicocrates of Cyprus, the kings of Pergamum, Euripides, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Neleus (1.3a). Tertullian in the *Apologeticus* states that Peisistratus’ interest in libraries (cf. *studio bibliothecarum*) was the model for Ptolemy Philadelphus’ creation of the library at Alexandria (18.5), and Hieronymus will declare that the Christian martyr Pamphilus emulated Peisistratus and Demetrius of Phalerum in seeking to collect books (Hieronymus *Epist.* 34). Later in his discussion of libraries in the *Etymologies*, Isidore, perhaps owing his material to Suetonius *De Vir. Ill.* fr. 102,³ declares the Athenian tyrant the inspiration of the Alexandrian library when he proposes that in gathering texts into a library Ptolemy II (Philadelphus) was emulating Peisistratus (*Etymologies* 6.3.3—5).⁴

It appears that the ‘liberal disciplines’ that constitute Peisistratus’ library are the product of a vast synecdoche. Other sources would seem to suggest that the library is extremely limited in its scope, containing above all the epics of Homer, which admittedly had come to be representative of Hellenic culture and identity, although there is mention that the tyrant also edited the poems of Hesiod (cf. Plutarch *Theseus* XX.2).

Aelian states that when Peisistratus had collected (cf. συναγαγών) the Homeric poems, he then published the Iliad and the Odyssey (VH 13.14). Several testimonia suggest that the tyrant offered to buy individual lines of Homer at a fixed price (Bekker, *Anecdota Graeca*, ii. 767 = Platthy 18), something that resulted in forgeries because of greed (Bekker, *Anecdota Graeca*, ii. 768 = Platthy 19). According to sources, it would seem that Pisistratean book collecting is also the disciplining and authorization of particular versions of the text. The tyrant gathered together at Athens the localized texts of the epics (cf. Ps.-Plato *Hipparchus* 228b). There,

at Athens, he had them edited to remove additions and variants introduced by rhapsodes and also by the various Greek states in the service of furthering their local interests.⁵

It would appear, however, that Peisistratean editing takes place in the service of Athenian interests, for Plutarch speaks of an addition of a line into the *Odyssey* to gratify the Athenians *Ἀθηναίοις; Ἀθηναίοις*; cf. Plutarch *Theseus* 20.2). He produced an authorized—that is, an Athenocentric—edition and instituted the Panathenaic Rule, which stipulated that the poems were always to be performed in the same order and in the same way at the Panathenaic Festival, an occasion when the Greek states came together to celebrate Hellenic unity and identity through games and cultural contests so that culture and power coincide. (This first library of antiquity thus has an oral audience, rather than a reading one.) Cicero says that Peisistratus was the first (*primus*) person to order the previously confused books of Homer, and he adds that, while the tyrant was of no use to his fellow citizens, he at least was outstanding in letters and learning (*De Oratore* 3.37.37).⁶

These bald, unembellished narratives might suggest that the tyrant himself was the sole textual editor, and this may be because the authority of the political leader is the sole authority behind the subsequent library. In any case, Peisistratus had his helpers in the formation of his book collections. The *Suda* states that, if the *Iliad* was compiled and arranged particularly by the Athenian tyrant, many hands were nonetheless involved (s.v. *Ὀμηρος*). Johannes Tzetzes speaks of the four wise (cf. *σοφῶν*) men, Epiconcylus, Onomacritus of Athens, Zopyrus of Heraclea and Orpheus of Croton, who put together (*συνετέθησαν*) the Homeric writings (*De Comedia Graeca* Mb 24–5 and 32–3 Kaibel; cf. *Schol. Plaut.*, ed. Ritschl, pp. 5–6). The scholium to Plautus substitutes Concylus for Epiconcylus (*Schol. Plaut.*, ed. Ritschl, pp. 5–6 = Platthy 25a). There is, however, a competing tradition that has seventy-two scholars edit the Homeric poems (*Tzetzes De Comedia Graeca* Ma 24 and Pb 22 Kaibel). The source is late, and what one suspects is a curious contamination with the tradition surrounding the translation of the Old Testament into Greek by seventy-two scholars, six from each of the twelve tribes, for inclusion in Ptolemy's library (cf. Josephus, *Jewish Antiquities* 12.47–9).

We have to wait for a passage of 200 years as far as the narratives are concerned before we can find the next direct link to the Peisistratid founding of the library. The only notable textual event close in time to Peisistratus' creation of the library concerns Hipparchus, the tyrant's son, and his realization of Attica, and particularly of Athens, as one enormous textualized space. In the dialogue named for him, *Hipparchus*, Plato has Socrates describe how Peisistratus' oldest offspring ensured that his citizens were good and wise men. The wisest (σοφώτατος) of the Peisistratids, Hipparchus, is in this narrative credited with the literary achievements that were in large part also ascribed to his father. He displays many fine works of wisdom, was the first to bring the poems of Homer into Athens, and forced the rhapsodes to recite the epics in order at the Panathenaea. Furthermore, with huge fees and gifts he persuades Anacreon of Teios to come to the city, and has Simonides of Ceon around him. But most significant of all for the concerns of this chapter, Hipparchus erected Herms along the roads in the midst of the city and in each of the demes, bearing what he deemed to be the wisest statements that he had learned and discovered, to educate all the citizens of Attica, both those in the city itself and those in the countryside. He also put on the Herms the wise saying of the Delphic oracle, 'know thyself' (γνώθι σαυτόν, Hipparchus 228b4–229a). Each of the preserved sayings is prefaced by the statement 'μνῆμα τὸδ' Ἰππάρχου', which possibly claims ownership of the statement and affirms the defencelessness of the orphaned text. Hipparchus does not establish a library or build on that created by his father, but he engages in the violent adoption of otherwise fatherless and powerless texts, an adoption which perhaps disregards the texts' original father as libraries should not do. Political authority again lends its support to the book collection so that the 'library' is an articulation of a ruler's power.

DIADOCHÊ

There is another distinct strand of genealogy, somewhat closer to the actual events, which locates the origins of the library much later in history as the product of a private rather than a public library, and here intellectual, rather than political, authority is transmitted along with the books, which would appeal to the

narrators who are themselves intellectuals. Xenophon presents Euthydemus, presented as one of Socrates' interlocutors, as admitting to owning many books (πολλά γράμματα) of so-called wise men and as saying that he continues to add to his collection (*Memorabilia* 4.2.8). Euthydemus' library, however, does not feature in any way in the development of the library. Several anecdotes from antiquity also portray the philosopher Plato as a book collector, a curious fact in the light of the antipathy he displays towards the written word in, for instance, the *Phaedrus*. Aulus Gellius informs us that the satirist Timon criticized Plato for acquiring a text on Pythagorean philosophy and for using it as the basis for his dialogue the *Timaeus* (Aulus Gellius 3.17). In this same section of his work he also states that the philosopher purchased three books of Philolaus the Pythagorean even though he had very little money (cf. also Diogenes Laertius 8.84). Diogenes Laertius reports another tradition, which has Plato receive a work of Philolaus as a present after he has helped to obtain the release of one of the philosopher's students from Dionysius of Sicily (Diogenes Laertius 8.85). Elsewhere, he tells his reader that Plato was the first person to bring the mimes of Sophron to Athens and, it is reputed, that he kept a copy of these works under his pillow (Diogenes Laertius 3.18).

But others present the book collection of Aristotle as a genesis of *the* ancient library, and they offer a very different construction of library, divorcing its foundation from political power and constituting it instead as the body of privileged knowledge to be passed down in a line of teachers and intellectual leaders, who are significantly described as *διάδοχοι* in the Vita Hesychii 9 (cf. *διάδοχοι δ' αὐτοῦ*

τῆς σχολῆς κατὰ τάξιν ἐγένοντο οἷδε Θεόφραστος, Στράτων,

Πραξιτέλης, Λύκων, Ἀρίστων...). And it may be the exclusive nature of intellectual power that determines that this is a private, rather than a public, library. Diogenes Laertius preserves in his *Lives of the Philosophers* the wills of six leading philosophers, Plato (3.413), Epicurus (10.16–21), Aristotle (5.11–16), Theophrastus (5.51–7), Strato (5.61–4), and Lyco (5.69–74). The wills of the last four individuals are wills of the heads of the Aristotelian school, and, through them, it is possible to chart the descent of the 'books of Aristotle'. In the first of these reported texts, Aristotle names among his executors Theophrastus as the

individual who took charge of the philosopher's children, Herpyllis (the philosopher's second wife), and his remaining property (cf. *περὶ τῶν ἄλλων*, Diogenes Laertius 5.12). There is no explicit or separate mention of any books in this account, although the *Vita Marciana* and its related Latin life makes the 'library' one of the concerns of the will. The *Vita* states that, when Aristotle died, he left a written testament (*διαθηκὴ ἔγγραφον*), which was (to be) 'published' by Andronicus (of Rhodes) and Ptolemy with the catalogues of his writings. The will concerned Nicomachus and Pythias, the philosopher's children, his legitimate pupils Theophrastus, Phania, Eudemos, Clytos, Aristoxenus, Dikaiarchus, and his treatises (cf. *συντάγμασι*), which numbered a thousand.⁷

Diogenes proceeds to provide a catalogue of the philosopher's writings at 5.22–7, which includes books that suggest what might have been amongst the contents of Aristotle's book collection. *On Poets* in three books attests to poetic writings (5.22); there is a *Compendium of Arts* (*Τεχνῶν συναγωγή*) in two books, which perhaps deals with rhetorical writings (5.24); while the various works naming Archytas, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Melissus, Alcmaeon, the Pythagoreans, Gorgias, Xenophanes, Zeno, and Democritus (5.27) suggest that Aristotle had the writings of all these individuals in his possession, or at least at hand (5.26). Favorinus, as cited by Diogenes Laertius, states that Aristotle bought the works of Speusippus for three talents (Diogenes Laertius 4.5). While the individuals named in most of these titles are philosophers, it is also the case that there are other titles on politics, ethics, rhetoric, and so on that propose a broader reading base for the philosopher and suggest his relationship to the state.

Elsewhere, Diogenes presents the Aristotelian library with the beginnings of an archeology. Citing Favorinus as his source, he reports that for three talents the philosopher had bought the works (*τὰ βιβλία*) of Speusippus, which are to be regarded as distinct from (but also inclusive of) the latter's compositions, which are described as reminiscences (*ὑπομνήματα*) and dialogues (*διαλόγοι*) (4.1; cf. 4.5; Aulus Gellius 3.17). And perhaps here is the basis for further recovery of the origins of Aristotle's library, for Speusippus is also named as one of Plato's executors by Diogenes Laertius (3.43), implying his management

of the contents of the Platonic library, while among other sources the *Vita Marciana* of Aristotle names him the successor to Plato (13). There is no explicit evidence linking Speusippus' book collection to that of Plato, and that may well be due to Plato's reputation as an enemy of the written word (cf. *Phaedrus* 275d-e). Yet, if becoming head of the philosophical school is accompanied by possession of the former head's books, which perhaps emblemize Speusippus' knowledge, then the Speusippean library might be assumed to encompass the Platonic library. According to a variety of sources, this included Pythagorean texts (Aulus Gellius 3.17; Diogenes Laertius 3.9, 3.17, 8.84), the mimes of Sophron (Diogenes Laertius 3.18), and the poems of Antimachus (Proclus *In Platonis Timaeum comm.* A 28 C).

The will of Theophrastus, as reported by Diogenes Laertius, makes provision for the rebuilding and decoration of the Museum, which was in the Lyceum, with the replacement of the bust of Aristotle (Diogenes Laertius 5.51). Beyond this the pupil of Aristotle bequeaths his whole library (cf. τὰ δὲ βιβλία πάντα) to Neleus, his nephew. The phrase τὰ δὲ βιβλία πάντα suggests to me that Diogenes Laertius is referring to the collection as one that contains Aristotle's own books as well as those by other individuals that he possessed (cf. 5.62). In favour of this view are the appearance of titles such as *Prior Analytics* (3 books), *Posterior Analytics* (7 books) (5.42), *Of Pleasure according to Aristotle* (5.43), which suggest the Peripatetic library had grown in size with a series of additions and further acquisitions in the process of being inherited. Moreover, he makes available his garden, the walk (περίπατον), and the houses to named associates who wish to study (συμφιλοσοφεῖν) and to do philosophy (συμφιλοσοφεῖν) there (5.52), and those he names as having right of access of his property are: Hipparchus, Neleus, Strato, Callinus, Demotimus, Demaratus, Callisthenes, Melantes, Pancreon, Nicippos (5.53). If Gottschalk's view is to be preferred and if Diogenes Laertius is to be believed (5.52), Theophrastus in turn makes Neleus his literary executor and inheritor, a figure who is to be regarded as parallel to the literary executor, namely the scholarch Callinus.⁸

The will of Strato (head of the school 286–268 BC), one of the scholarchs mentioned in Theophrastus' will at 5.53, names Lyco among its executors and singles him out as the inheritor of the

school (cf. τὴν . . . διατριβήν) and all the books (τὰ βιβλία πάντα) except those that he himself wrote (Diogenes Laertius 5.62). The collection that Lyco inherits is one bigger than his predecessor's own writing and thinking, increasing the size of the private library. Diogenes Laertius also notes that Strato provided Ptolemy Philadelphus with instruction for which he received eighty talents (5.58). This detail provides what might be construed as a link between the Peripatetics and the great Alexandrian library. Inheritance of the Peripatetic library means inheritance of the Peripatetic school, and Strato's will is thus an election of the next scholarch Lyco (299–225 BC) (5.65). Lyco's own published works (τὰ μὲν βιβλία τὰ ἀνεγνωσμένα) are given to Chares, who is also emancipated in the will, while his own unpublished works (cf. ἀνέκδοτα) are in turn passed on to Callinus for editing (5.73). It is with Lyco that the Peripatetic library disappears in the narrative of Diogenes Laertius, and what exists for transmission is a personal library consisting of this scholarch's own writings and researches.⁹

But there is another direct line of transmission for the library into later antiquity, which sees the Aristotelian texts more widely disseminated in the Greco-Roman world as the line of descent within the Peripatetic school is disrupted. For Athenaeus, who was the author of the large *Deipnosophistae*, which (as we shall see in [Chapter 3](#)) attempts to make public the private world of literary learning through parody, Aristotle is, like Polycrates of Samos, Peisistratus, Eucleides, Nicocrates of Cyprus, the kings of Pergamum, Euripides, and Theophrastus, an individual to be known for his large book collection, one that presumably takes up and enlarges the Platonic library. The author of the *Deipnosophistae* succinctly narrates the afterlife of the Aristotelian library. Neleus preserved the books (βιβλία) of both Aristotle and Theophrastus, and sold them to Ptolemy Philadelphus, who then amalgamated them with the texts he obtained at Athens and Rhodes for the Alexandrian library (1.3a-b). At this point, the story of the library becomes the narrative of the Hellenistic library (which is to be continued later in this chapter).

Another strand of this narrative thread has Strabo, who sought to provide a description of world with ethnographical, historical, and topographical details,¹⁰ relate how Aristotle first collected

books, establishing the ‘first’ library, which he passed to his pupil Theophrastus, and how he also taught the Egyptian kings to gather and collect books. He continues his account, telling his reader that Theophrastus then bequeathed his own and Aristotle’s libraries to (possibly the master’s last living¹¹) pupil, the philosopher Neleus, who took it to Scepsis, where his non-intellectual descendants (cf. *ιδιώταις ἀνθρώποις*) put the books away carelessly. A worse desecration is to befall the texts in Strabo’s narrative, which tends to assume a moralistic purpose at points, as it does here¹² although in a curious way this subsequent desecration ensures the library’s dissemination. When Neleus’ descendants hear that the books from their collection are being sought by the Attalid kings—that is, Eumenes I (197–159 BC)—for the library at Pergamum, they bury them in a trench, causing them to be exposed to the damp and to moths. (Scepsis was a city in the Troad, and became a centre of learning under the Attalid dynasty of Pergamum.) The descendants of these desecrators then dig them up—some 200 years later, as it would appear¹³—and sell them to Apellicon of Teos (d. 84 BC). Strabo declares that the collection includes the books (*τὰ . . . βιβλία*) of Aristotle and Theophrastus, suggesting that the Peripatetic library consists largely of the writings of the master. Being a bibliophile, Apellicon restores the texts, making new copies of them and incorrectly filling the gaps. After Apellicon’s death, Lucius Cornelius Sulla took the library to Rome, where the grammarian and admirer of Aristotle (*φιλαριστοτέλης*) Tyrannio and booksellers acquire and then circulate poorly edited copies of these works after acquiring them (13.1.54; also Plutarch *Sulla* 26.2).

Book 5 of the *Deipnosophistae* informs us that Apellicon of Teos was a very rich individual who had bought up the library (*βιβλιοθήκην*) of Aristotle amongst many other books when he was a Peripatetic philosopher—other sources inform us that he was a mint magistrate under Athenion, tyrant of Athens. ¹⁴ Apellicon, furthermore, secretly acquired—that is, *stole*—the original documents (cf. *αὐτόγραφα*) from the Athenian Metroon, the building that housed the city’s public documents (Athenaeus 214d-e). Particularly significant in this passage is the precedence given to Aristotle’s books, one that eclipses other writings and documents acquired by the Peripatetic. Considering that

Apellicon appears to have been something of a rogue from the sources, there is reason to believe that he may have fabricated the account of how he acquired the library in order to enhance its reputation.¹⁵

In the life of *Sulla* Plutarch, who largely agrees with Strabo¹⁶ supplies some further details in the narrative concerning the library of Aristotle. Sulla seized the library (βιβλιοθήκην) of Apellicon of Teos, which, as Strabo also says, contained most of the books (cf. βιβλίων) of Aristotle and Theophrastus, and these were still largely unknown to the public. After the library was brought to Rome, Tyrannio the grammarian arranged (or further confused¹⁷) most of the works; Andronicus of Rhodes, the tenth or eleventh scholarch of the Peripatetic school (Brink in Pauly-Wissowa, suppl., vii. 930), published them from Tyrannio's

copies, and drew up the catalogues (πίνακας) of them (Plutarch *Sulla* 26.1–2 and *Vita Marciana* 43). (Mention of the neglect that the library suffered at the hands of Neleus of Scepsis is added as an afterthought in this account.) In his *Life of Plotinus* Porphyry states that, as he had previously done with the works of the comic writer Epicharmus, Andronicus significantly restructured the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus, bringing them together and grouping them by subject headings, or by problem (εἰς πραγματείας διείλε τὰς οἰκείας ὑποθέσεις εἰς ταῦτόν συναγαγών, 24).

18

Strabo's narrative is one that relates the aetiolation of knowledge. Following Theophrastus, the earlier Peripatetic school is without books apart from a few exoteric works, and able to speak only about commonplace issues (cf. θέσεις ληκυθίζειν, 13.1.54). The library becomes the library of Aristotle and Theophrastus' writings; the texts are left to rot and decay at the hands of mere laypersons. The library of Pergamum is denied access to the books, ensuring, as it would seem, the supremacy of the competing Alexandrian library. Nonetheless, the narrative as received by some modern scholars, including Jonathan Barnes, grants priority to the Aristotelian corpus as the writing of Aristotle, perhaps with the interventions of subsequent peripatetics: Andronicus' editorial project is the basis for Immanuel Bekker's edition of Aristotle—that is, the twentieth-century text of Aristotle¹⁹—while Gottschalk argues that Andronicus lied about the origins of the books, which probably

remained at Athens to form the nucleus of the Peripatetic collection.²⁰ Grayeff, however, regards Strabo's narrative as a fabrication in the light of the relatively good state of the Aristotelian corpus, arguing that Tyrannio and Andronicus gathered Peripatetic lectures from various sources, probably in Rhodes, Athens, and Alexandria, as a ploy to gain support for Andronicus' claim to the scholarship of the Peripatetic school.²¹

The Aristotelian school endows its library with the lineage of intellectual authority so that knowledge and learning authorize the book collection, but it is also the case that the title 'scholarch' implies the presence of a political authority. The ruler of the scholars in the Aristotelian school was a veritable leader, and the founder of this school, Aristotle, was himself viewed as a figure who gave validity to Alexandria and its kings. What this affirms is that there was something of a confluence between intellectual and political power in antiquity.

ALEXANDRIA

The Alexandrian library is the text collection that has occupied most of the history of the ancient library, even to the extent of occluding the significance of other libraries, and that indeed had a considerable life of nearly a millennium.²² What I want to stress here is that the Alexandrian institution does not arise *ex nihilo*, according to the various narratives that concern its founding. Rather it is the product of a cultural assimilation of pre-existing book collections, so that it is a Greek concept refounded on Egyptian soil. And this is important, because the refounding helps to authorize Ptolemaic Egypt and Alexandria as a Greece transformed, albeit by the very authority of the Ptolemies.

In one tradition, the Alexandrian library consciously reaches back in the first instance to distant Athenian origins, citing Peisistratus as the individual who, intentionally or not, constructs the library as an object of desire in antiquity, and who, again intentionally or not, introduces desire as one of the rationales for the creation of a library: Tertullian and Isidore speak of Peisistratus, the first father of the book collection, as the inspirer of the Alexandrian institution, proposing that the Ptolemaic library is conceptualized as the text repository for what is at that

time the foremost city of the Greek world, the new Athens, Alexandria (see above, Tertullian *Apologeticus* 18.5 and Isidore *Etymologies* 6. 3. 3–5). For Isidore, the tyrant Peisistratus is in particular the individual who subsequently inspires zeal in the Hellenistic kings to possess their own library/ies (cf. *Etymologies* 6.3.3–5). Moreover, the desire to possess a text collection causes the Hellenistic kings to compete with another in the construction of their libraries. Pliny notes that it is difficult to say whether it was the kings of Pergamum or of Alexandria who first created a library, since they were engaged in a great struggle, one that involved a significant cultural capital (*NH* 35. 2. 10). Following Varro, Pliny elsewhere remarks that competition between kings Ptolemy and Eumenes caused Ptolemy to suppress the export of paper, with the result that parchment was invented at Pergamum (*NH* 13.21.70). Competition, both hostile and friendly, is responsible for the foundation of book collections in another account. Vitruvius relates how jealousy and competitive greed stirred Ptolemy to copy the Attalid king in establishing his own library at Alexandria (7, pref. 4). He also established games in honour of the Muses and Apollo and awarded prizes so that authors had equal status with athletes.

The Peisistratid collection very directly becomes a cultural desideratum, not as something that may not itself be acquired but as something that is always potentially within reach—at least, until the books themselves are destroyed with the destruction of subsequent libraries. The Greek tyrant's library is presented as the basis for the subsequent collections of Greco-Roman antiquity, so that the birth of the library is in many senses the birth of a library owned and shared in common by the ancient world. Aulus Gellius and later Isidore inform us that, when the Persian king Xerxes gained control of the Greek city and burned it apart from the citadel, he took away and transported the Peisistratean book collection to Persia. Considerably later, the Seleucid king Nicanor returned the books to Athens, which, according to Isidore, gave rise to an interest in collecting texts in other nations. Later, in Egypt, Alexander the Great and his successors were interested in gathering books, and the Ptolemies gathered some 700,000 volumes (cf. Aulus Gellius 7.17 and Isidore *Etymologies* 6.3.3–5). As one story tells it (cf. Isidore *Etymologies* 6.3.5; Ammianus Marcellinus 22.16.15–22), these were destroyed by the Romans

during their first war with Alexandria (48 BC; see below).

Isidore foregrounds the way in which the foundation of the Alexandrian library is a conscious link to the Greek and Macedonian past and the power they had come to signify. He proposes that the idea of the library, if not the library itself, is transferable across cultures, going on to observe that Xerxes later took Peisistratus' library to Persia, while the Seleucid Nicanor subsequently returned it to Greece. After this many other states sought to acquire texts and to translate them into Greek, with the result that Alexander or his successors sought to collect all existing books in libraries. Other sources pluralize the origins of the Hellenistic library. Athenaeus informs his reader that the Ptolemies collected texts from the book trade conducted at Athens and at Rhodes (Athenaeus 3b), while Galen says that Ptolemy copied all books that arrived at Alexandria by sea and had these copied texts inscribed with the phrase 'from the ships' (Galen *Comm. in Hipp. Epidem.* 17.1.606 Kühn).²³

Another, albeit complementary, tradition suggests many direct and indirect links between the Aristotelian corpus and the Hellenistic collection, so that the Hellenistic, and particularly the Alexandrian, library is in some senses to be regarded as the refounded and enlarged Aristotelian-Peripatetic library. R. G. Tanner suggests that Aristotle's works may have been copied for Alexander's education at Mieza, proposing a direct link between the philosopher and Alexandria.²⁴ Aristotle is a figure associated with systematic, scientific, and technical knowledge, such that he offers an important model for subsequent scholarship of the Hellenistic age. If Aristotle is an individual to be identified with book culture and with a library that is passed down from generation to generation, then, perhaps, this is the legacy that he offers to the post-classical period in Egypt. Strabo declares that the Alexandrian library was founded in imitation of Aristotle's own book collection (13.608). The biographical tradition concerning Aristotle declares him to be the instructor of Alexander the Great, whose body was brought to the capital and around whose tomb a cult was established (cf., e.g., *Plutarch Alexander* 8–9; *Quintilian* 1.1.23; *Vita Vulgata* 21; *Vita Marciana* 8, 14, 21), and, as such, partly responsible for the latter's literary instruction. Plutarch says that Alexander employed Aristotle's own recension of Homer's *Iliad* as a travelling companion for war

(*Alexander* 8 and 26).

Elsewhere, the line of descent between Aristotle and the library at Alexander is more directly articulated. According to Athenaeus, the library's descent within the Peripatetic school is broken as Neleus of Scepsis sells the books of Aristotle and Theophrastus to Ptolemy Philadelphus, who then transfers them, together with the books acquired at Athens and Rhodes, to Alexandria (1.3a). Ptolemy acquires cultural capital from three different sources. The convergence of the Peripatetic and Ptolemaic library is elsewhere reinforced in the biographies of Aristotle, which in their citation of the philosopher's will note that Andronicus of Rhodes and Ptolemy drew up catalogues of the philosopher's treatises (cf. διαθήκην ἐγγραφὸν καταλιπόν, ἣ φέρεται παρὰ τε Ἀνδρονίκῳ καὶ Πτολεμαίῳ μετὰ τῶν πινάκων τῶν αὐτοῦ συγγραμμάτων, *Vita Marciana* 43; cf. *Vita Vulgata* 46). By this, one might understand that the Ptolemaic project of categorizing the works, undertaken by Callimachus, served as the model for Andronicus' own labelling and ordering of the works. As the texts concerning the acquisition of texts by the Ptolemies suggest, the Peripatetic library is enlarged, unwriting the implicit metonymy that proposed that the books of the philosophers might be regarded as *the* library of antiquity and also, one might observe, resisting the Platonic banishment of the poets from the ideal state.

Pfieffer notes that the pupils of Aristotle assisted the poets and critics in the Egyptian city, bringing to it collections of material while stimulating antiquarian and literary research so that there is a direct link between Aristotle and the Ptolemaic library.²⁵ Intellectual power is transformed into an expression of political power. If Strato had stayed only for a short time in Alexandria and then returned to the Lyceum in Athens, one of Theophrastus' prominent pupils, Demetrius, left Athens for Alexandria after 297 BC and stayed there as a political refugee (cf. Plutarch *De Exil.* 7Q, 601F). Demetrius of Phalerum becomes one of the important links between the Peripatetic book collection and the Ptolemaic library, although there is relatively little concerning him in the literary sources, possibly because of subsequent loss of favour.²⁶ The Letter to Aristeeas (9–10), as reported in Eusebius *Preparatio Evangelica* 8.2.1–4, declares that the Peripatetic scholar worked to bring together 'all the books of the civilized world' (cf.

ἅπαντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην βιβλία) for Ptolemy II. Tertullian states that Ptolemy Philadelphus appointed as librarian Demetrius of Phalerum, who in turn acquired from the Jews their literature so that they became the messengers and prophets of the Jewish Scriptures (*Apologeticus* 18.5).

Other sources, however, belie the establishment of the Alexandrian library through an inheritance or passing-down of texts from a single source. The Ptolemies actively sought out works for their collection. Plutarch writes as follows: ‘Ptolemy the First brought together the Museum’ 27 (*Moralia* 1095d). The participle ‘brought together’ (συναγαγών) has been the object of scholarly speculation. Pfeiffer argues that the participle is suitable in the light of Strabo’s description of the Museum as an ‘assembly’ (σύνοδος) (of scholars),²⁸ but *sunagagōn* is, of course, also appropriate for denoting the gathering of books and might appear to refer to establishment of the Library.²⁹ Strabo uses the phrase ‘bringing together [*συναγαγών*] books’ (13. 1. 53) to denote book collecting, while Athenaeus speaks of ‘the multitude of books ... and the gathering in the Museum’ ³⁰ (203e).

In the *Jewish Antiquities* Josephus notes that Ptolemy II was so taken with learning (παιδεία) and the collecting of books—the phrase ‘collection of books’ (βιβλιων συναγωγή) significantly recalls the creation of the library—that he had the Jewish laws and constitution—namely, the Hebrew scriptures—translated into Greek (1.10 ff.). The author is attempting to gain the respect of non-Jews for the Jews and their culture. In the *Letter to Aristeeas*, as cited in book 12 of the *Jewish Antiquities*, Ptolemy is reported as declaring his intention to have the Old Testament translated into Greek by seventy-two scholars, six from each of the twelve tribes, and deposited in his library (βιβλιοθήκη) (12.47–9). Ptolemy is not simply an admirer of Hebrew scriptures. Epiphanius in his *Weights and Measures* declares that the Egyptian monarch wished to collect and translate all the works of all the different nations into a library, and this included Ethiopian, Persian, and Hindu writings (*Weights and Measures* 9; cf. ὁ γὰρ Προλεμαῖος φιλολογώτατος ὢν... ἅπανταχόθεν τὰς βίβλους εἰς Ἀλεξάνδρειαν συνήθροισεν, CGF 1 (1899), ed. Kaibel, p. 19). Culture is power, and it would seem that the collecting of other nations’ writings, particularly their political

writings, marks a subjugation of these nations by Alexandria.

Furthermore, the Alexandrian library both invokes and palimpsests prior library traditions in such a way as to establish itself as deriving originary authority from the texts of the Hellenic world. That this is the case becomes obvious from the obsession for the ur-text, or, at least, the text in its Attic form. Galen tells a story that illustrates this. Ptolemy III (Euergetes, 247–222 BC) borrowed texts from Athens in his zeal to acquire all the ancient books (ἀπάντων τῶν παλαιῶν βιβλίων). The texts are to be understood as the authorized editions of the great dramatists Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, which the wealthy Athenian orator Lycurgus had required by law to be written out and kept in a public depository for consultation by actors (see Plutarch *Moralia* 841E–842A). Giving as a deposit fifteen silver talents, he acquired the texts of the dramatists for copying. The king had splendid copies made on the finest paper; then he kept the ‘old’ (τὰς παλαιάς) books, sending back the deposit and the ‘new books’ (καινὰς . . . βιβλους). Galen observes that the Athenians are bound to accept the copies, for, by returning the fifteen silver talents, Ptolemy deliberately forfeits his guarantee as the penalty for failing to return the original texts (*Comm. II in Hipp. Epidem.* 3.239–40). This narrative demonstrates that having the ancient texts means owning the original texts in so far as this is possible—and, in the case of the Attic tragedians, this was possible. Athenocentrism is an authorizing move for the Alexandrian empire and originality is a mark of power.

In other respects, this concern to acquire the original copy is precisely what jeopardizes the descent of antiquity’s library. Just as Peisistratus had paid for lines of Homer, the libraries at Alexandria and Pergamon offered financial rewards to individuals who supplied them with volumes of old books (παλαιῶν βιβλίων), and thus the falsification of works from an earlier age became a lucrative business (cf. *Comm. in Hipp. De Nat. Homin.* 1.44.105³¹). Slightly later in the same work Galen notes that there were no forgeries prior to this time (*Comm. in Hipp. De Nat. Homin.* 1.127). Accordingly, criticism as practised at Alexandria had thus to serve as a strategy, not just for establishing authenticity of individual texts but also for asserting the priority and privilege of the Hellenic, and ideally the Athenian, culture that produced them. The concern to

discriminate what was originally composed by Homer from the adulterations and additions produced by subsequent poets and performers of the epics was in large part the worry that imitations should be (mis)taken for the original voice and that the voice of authority, Homer's, should be disseminated amongst pretenders. To this end the first librarian and editor of Homer, Zenodotus, engaged in what a modern scholar would recognize as textual criticism—although it is important to bear in mind that textual criticism was only one dimension of the critical project at Alexandria. His work on the *Iliad* revealed a tendency to omit altogether from the text suspected or spurious passages.³² Apart from outright excision, Zenodotus identified specific bits of a text as being spurious or unacceptable by markings. He invented 'athetization' (*athetismos*), the marking process by which a passage of text is declared illegitimate. Significantly, *athetismos* derives from the verb *atheteô*, which later authors understand as meaning breaking faith with a treaty (cf. Polybius 8.36.5) or as denoting deletion from public documentation.³³ This subsequent understanding of *atheteô* locates *athetismos* in a political context: it proposes that the scholarly marking of spurious lines might originally be seen to be a denial of the status of the passages in question as public, civic discourse.³³

THE END OF ALEXANDRIA

Alexandria either becomes the foundation of a subsequent library or it does not. Following the line of descent in which it does not serve as an antecedent, Christianity offers the Alexandrian library a history and life that continue well into the seventh century AD. According to J. H. Ellens, the library has four distinct stages: the first from its founding to the Roman Republic (306 BC-30 BC), the second, Philonic Age named for the Jewish theologian Philo (30BC-AD 150), the third, under the Catechetical school headed by Pantaenus, Clement, and Origen, who fashioned the doctrine of the Trinity and the Christian creeds (AD 150–350), and, finally, the Alexandrian school (AD 350–642).³⁴ In this narrative, the library eventually meets its demise at the hands of the Muslims, when Amir ordered the books from the library to be burned so that the city baths could be heated (from Ibn Al-Qifti *History of Wise Men*).³⁵ But this thread takes us far away from the pagan

library of Greco-Roman antiquity, which is rather more our concern, and it may in any case be the construction of a contemporary theology that is striving to see a connection between antiquity and Christianity.

In another tradition in which the library meets its demise, it would appear that antiquity's most famous library disappears after the Hellenistic age, for, according to it, the Alexandrian library meets its end at the hands of Rome. As the story goes, parts of the Egyptian city, including the palace compound (which housed the Museum-Library), were consumed by fire ignited following street fighting when Julius Caesar had captured the city in 47 BC.³⁶ Seneca writes of the loss of 40,000 books (*quadraginta milia librorum*) at *De Tranquillitate Animi* 9.5 (AD 49), which E. A. Parsons notes to be the earliest extant source referring to the calamity.³⁷ Plutarch (c. AD 117) later speaks of the destruction of the library at Caesar 49, as do Aulus Gellius (AD 123–69), who declares that 700,000 volumes were burned (NA 7.17), Dio Cassius (AD 155–235), who says that warehouses containing grain and books were consumed by the conflagration (42.38), Ammianus Marcellinus, who speaks of the loss of 70,000 volumes (*septaginta voluminum milia*, 22.16.13), which J. C. Rolfe regards as a vast exaggeration,³⁸ and Orosius (c. AD 415), who says that 40,000 books were destroyed (*Historiarum adv. paganos libri septem*).³⁹ In his *Life of Mark Antony* Plutarch states that Cleopatra was presented with 200,000 volumes from the Pergamene libraries by Antony according to a charge made by a certain Calvisius (58–9). Modern scholars make sense of this text by understanding that Antony and Cleopatra compensated for the fire at Alexandria, making a gift of the library of Pergamum to the city.⁴⁰ The meeting of Greek and Roman authority results in the ascendancy of the latter.

Yet this is only one strand of the tradition, for numerous other sources that recount Caesar's visit to Alexandria make no mention of the burning of books, or of the destruction of the library: see Caesar *Civil Wars* 3.111; Strabo 17.1–6; Lucan *Bellum Civile* 10.491505; Florus *Epitome of Roman History* 2.13; Appian *The Civil Wars* 13.90; and the overall silence of Athenaeus on the supposed destruction of the Library in the *Deipnosophistae*.⁴¹ Considering the textual evidence available, Parsons suggests that doubt be cast upon the tradition concerning the destruction of the

Alexandrian library. Apart from Plutarch, who writes a century and a half after the Alexandrian War, no other author actually speaks of the burning of the institution, although other individuals speak of books/volumes burning. Books are not necessarily to be equated with the library itself, which from Strabo's description of Alexandria in book 17 of the *Geography* one might assume to be fireproof,⁴² and so scholars including Ritschl, Parthey, Dziatzko, Harvey, Sandys, and Bevan conclude that the books or volumes destroyed by fire were either those that the Alexandrian themselves had prepared for export, or else those that Caesar had prepared for transport for his library at Rome.⁴³

PRAEDA BELLI

Following the destruction of Alexandria by Rome, there are individuals who provide a connection, rather than a conflict, between the now 'old' Hellen(ist)ic world and the new Roman one. The figures Tyrannio and Andronicus, who feature so prominently in the biographical tradition of Aristotle, help the books of the Hellenic world make their way into the Roman one. Strabo, the geographer and one of the most important sources for the Alexandrian library (cf. 13.1.54), states that he was a pupil of (literally 'heard') Tyrannio, the grammarian (12.3.16 and 14.5.4) and also a geographer,⁴⁴ while at 14.2.13 he mentions Andronicus of Rhodes. Through Tyrannio and Andronicus, Strabo becomes a link to Alexandrian learning, and indeed his *Geography* has as one of its subtexts the research of Eratosthenes, one of the librarians of the Ptolemaic library.

Furthermore, once the ancient world has Rome as its centre, there is no longer a library in antiquity; there are instead *two* libraries, marking a continued recognition of Athens as the origin of cultural power and an endeavour to articulate Rome as a political centre. Indeed, Caesar's idea for the first public library and his actual commission to Varro was for the creation of a Greek and a Roman library (Suetonius *Iulius* 44.2), which were never completed. Asinius Pollio fulfilled this dream through the creation of his library in the Atrium Libertatis (Pliny 35.10; 7.115; Isidore *Etymologies* 6.5.2). A century before Cicero, Scipio Aemilianus inherited from his father Aemilius Paullus a private library, which came from the palace of the defeated king Perses

of Macedon in 168 BC and which Elizabeth Rawson calls ‘the first great Greek library’ (Plutarch *Aemilius Paullus* 28 and Isidore *Etymologies* 6.5.1, ‘Romam primus librorum copiam advexit Aemilius Paulus’).⁴⁵ We read that Aemilius had permitted his sons, Fabius and Scipio, to take whichever books they wanted from the library of Perses (cf. Plutarch *Aemilius Paullus* 28.11). Books were the only inheritance granted to the sons of the great general, since they were devoted to learning (Plutarch *Aemilius Paullus* 28.6), and, indeed, Velleius Paterculus describes Scipio Aemilianus as the ‘author and admirer of liberal studies and all teaching’ and, furthermore, as ‘conversant with both war and studies’ (*inter arma ac studia versatus*, 1.13.3).

Scipio’s library blurs what is for antiquity the inherently dubious distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ collection, appropriating a library of a nation’s ruler into what might otherwise be regarded as the private domain and ensuring recognition of its owner as a powerful figure. But it is also the case that ownership of the library, as the spoils of war, becomes symbolic of power, instantiating once more the overlap between political and cultural power that was evident in the Aristotelian library.

This book collection, one that has its origins in the birthplace of Alexander, becomes the focus for a gathering of intellectuals named by literary historians as the ‘Scipionic circle’. While the ‘circle’ may not have had anything like a unified artistic outlook,⁴⁶ it was one that was commonly resourced by the literature and knowledge of the Hellenistic world. Its members, who included C. Laelius, C. Lucilius, Panaetius, Polybius, and Terence amongst others, had a cosmopolitan outlook, one that stood in opposition to Cato’s more exclusively Latin one.⁴⁷ Indeed, with Panaetius, one sees the introduction of Hellenistic philosophy to Rome, with Polybius, the writing of history in the Greek language and a recommendation to Scipio Aemilianus that he be educated by Greeks at Rome (cf. Polybius 31.24), and with Terence, the use of literary models directly borrowed from Greek New Comedy. What this emblemizes is the Horatian observation that, while the city took Greece captive, the latter in its turn culturally conquered the victor (*Epistle* 2.1.156). The library’s status as a marker of power is once more affirmed.

Lucullus, consul with Aurelius Cotta in 74 BC and later *princeps* with Q. Lutatius Catulus and Q. Hortensius, transported to Rome the book collections of the kings of Pontus after defeating them (Plutarch *Lucullus* 42 and Isidore *Etymologies* 6.5.1);⁴⁸ this time military supremacy coincides with ownership of the library. Plutarch celebrates him precisely for establishing a library (cf. τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν βιβλίων κατασκευήν), stating that he gathered many well-written works. He also insists that for Lucullus the use of the books was more honourable than their acquisition, perhaps suggesting that Plutarch had found some indication of a controversy about the library's acquisition. Consequently, Lucullus' libraries were open to all who wished to use them, while his house became a 'prytaneion' to visiting educated Greeks (*Lucullus* 42.1–2). Plutarch portrays the consul as an explicit Hellenophile, and in particular an Athenophile. Cicero praises Lucullus, who was not incidentally his friend, as a devotee of philosophy in the *Academica* (2.2.4; although see *Ep. ad Atticum* 13.19). He also writes of going down to Tusculum to consult the commentaries on Aristotle from Lucullus' library and of finding Cato there surrounded by Stoic works (*De Fin.* 3.2.7–8 and 10).

Cicero, the great book collector and author of his generation, is, perhaps, more than any other individual the one who mediates the entry of the library of the Greek world into the Roman one. The nucleus of Cicero's library came in 60 BC by a gift from—actually an importunate request to—his friend L. Papirius Paetus, whose cousin, the grammarian Servius Clodius, died at Athens leaving Greek and Latin collections (*Ep. ad Atticum* 1.20.7)⁴⁹—*Ep. ad Atticum* 2.1 has Cicero asking Atticus to bring Paetus' books, both Latin and Greek, to him. Clodius was the son-in-law of Stilo, whom Rawson speculates was an antiquarian and regards as accounting for the antiquarian character of the former's book collection.⁵⁰ Antiquarianism, however, may also be understood as a desire for connection with the past such that continuity with it is established. But this is not the only source of the Ciceronic library that speaks to the collection as one with significant Hellenic origins. After the conquest of Athens in 85 BC, an event that again marks the coincidence of power and book acquisition, Sulla acquired from Andronicus the esoteric library of the Aristotelian school, which contained Aristotle's rhetorical

writings among other works. This library was one that passed to Cicero's friend Faustus Sulla.⁵¹ Cicero was also an admirer of the Scipionic circle, and a number of its central figures featured in his works. Notably, Scipio Aemilianus is the hero of the *De Republica*, portrayed just before his death, while Quintus Mucius Scaevola and Gaius Fannius, the sons-in-law of Laelius, appear in *De Amicitia*, and Scipio and Laelius in *De Senectute*.⁵² Cicero acquires his book collection by bequest and by request, importuning friends to give and sell him volumes. The writer had asked Atticus to obtain a library for him in Greece so that he may purchase it (*Epp. ad Atticum* 1.10 and 2.1).

Moreover, the author has Tyrannio, through whose hands the Peripatetic library passed, as an acquaintance, but not quite at his beck and call. In the *Ep. ad Quintum fratrem* 3.4.5 he writes that he would like to see his brother's Greek and Latin library (cf. *bibliotheca*) replenished, since this would be of use to him; he had no one who might help him in book transactions. Cicero then states that he will give orders to Chrysippus, and speak with Tyrannio. In the following letter, *Ep. ad Quintum fratrem* 3.5 and 6, exasperation is apparent, as Cicero labels Tyrannio a proscrinator in the matter of books, and announces that he will speak to Chrysippus. It would appear that the available Latin books leave much to be desired as they are full of errors (3.5; 6.6). Elsewhere, Tyrannio is sought out as someone who might assist in reading Eratosthenes (*Ep. ad Atticum* 2.6.1; 59 or 58 BC). Tyrannio is in addition the individual who helps to arrange his books in such a fashion that intellect and sense (*mens*) seem to have been added to his house (*Ep. ad Atticum* 4.8.2; 4.4a.1⁵³); and Cicero requests that Atticus sends two of his library-slaves whom Tyrannio might use as book-binders. He is generally someone with whom Cicero would spend time (*Ep. ad Atticum* 12.2.2).

IMPERIAL (RE)FOUNDATIONS

Alexandria had set a precedent for the formation of the library through methodical theft, as in the example of Ptolemy II keeping the originals of Athenian tragedies he had borrowed in exchange for money and the copies of these works (cf. Galen *Comm. in Hipp. Epidem.* 17.1.607–8).⁵⁴ This Alexandrian technique of book

acquisition is one that enables the transfer of books across different cultures, from classical Greece to the elite world of Hellenistic Egypt, and it was one also assumed by the Romans. Richard Talbert observes that ‘in imperial Rome knowledge reflected the power wielded by emperors and should be properly validated and controlled by them’.⁵⁵ The library is the knowledge that Roman emperors are using and controlling to articulate their authority.

Julius Caesar attempted to establish a public, state library, following the rulers Peisistratus and the Ptolemies as rulers who established text collections along with their polities.⁵⁶ He commissioned Varro to acquire the collection and then to serve as its head librarian (Isidore *Etymologies* 6.5.1). He followed Pollio’s original plan for both Greek and Roman sections, thereby acknowledging the political authority of both Athens and Rome (see, e.g., Suetonius *Divus Julius* 44⁵⁷ and Isidore 6.5.2). The library may have inspired Varro’s writing of the lost *On Libraries* (*De Bibliothecis*) in three books, although the institution itself did not come to completion because of the scholar’s death.⁵⁸ But it was with Lucullus’ booty that the foundations were laid for the first public library at Rome, which was established by Asinius Pollio (76 BC-AD 5) in the Atrium Libertatis in 37 BC. Pollio follows Cicero’s friend Atticus and Varro in erecting portraits of great writers, although only of Varro among living writers, in the library (cf. Pliny NH 35.2.10–11). The first imperial library was the Palatine library of Augustus (Suetonius *de gramm.* 21), located in porticoes attached to the Temple of Apollo, which became more formally known as the ‘library of Apollo’ (Suetonius *de gramm.* 20 and *Augustus* 29.3; *CIL* vi. 5189, 5191, 5884). Here Augustus adds a portico that contains a Latin and Greek library (cf. *addidit porticus cum bibliotheca Latina Graecaque...*, Suetonius *Augustus* 29). In *de grammaticis et rhetoribus* Suetonius informs us that Gaius Iulius Hyginus was placed in charge of the emperor’s library (28 BC; cf. *praefuit Palatinae bibliothecae*), while teaching many students. Political authority is once more instrumental in the formation of antiquity’s library.

The author provides us with further details about the librarian that feed into the myth of the birth of a library for Greco-Roman antiquity. Hyginus is a freedman of Augustus, a Spaniard by birth, although others supposed that he was an Alexandrian

whom Caesar brought to Rome after the capture of the Egyptian city. We are also told that he studied under and took as his model the Greek grammarian Cornelius Alexander (20.1–2). This alternative biographical strand for Hyginus seeks to connect him with Alexandria, a place that in intellectual history emblemizes book culture, its institution, and at a greater distance its Hellenic subtext.⁵⁹

Among subsequent libraries of the imperial age,⁶⁰ it is worth noting that Claudius, an ardent follower of Greek and Latin studies together, had a new museum built beside the original one at Alexandria in which were housed his own Greek histories, an Etruscan history in twenty books, and a history of Carthage in eight books. The emperor saw to it that the Etruscan history was read from beginning to end each year, and that the Carthaginian history was read by different readers as if at a public recitation (Suetonius *Claudius* 42) in a nod to Peisistratus' Panathenaic Rule, which ensured that the Homeric epics were always performed in the same fashion. Claudius' construction of a new Alexandrian museum is an attempt to appropriate, and reauthor as Roman, the Hellenistic literary institution and, in the light of the recitation of his works, to make it speak to his own military achievements, which the history of the library at Rome attests to in any case. This is not the only example of imperial invocation of prior library origins. According to Suetonius, the emperor Domitian neglected the liberal arts (*liberalia studia*) at the beginning of his rule, although he took the trouble to repair at great expense the libraries (*bibliothecas*) that had been destroyed by fire. The restoration of the Roman libraries is a process that once more dramatizes the genealogy of the book collection and its authorities in Greco-Roman antiquity. The emperor seeks out master copies of works and he sends individuals to Alexandria, the home of the great Hellenistic library, to describe and emend the texts (*Domitian* 20). The story of Domitian's contribution to literary culture shows the emperor's regard for Alexandria as the paradigm for the imperial library over and against any number of texts that might exist in private book collections.

It is possible to trace the descent of the library into late antiquity, into Byzantium, and beyond. Endings are, like beginnings, arbitrary, and so I bring this chapter to close somewhat arbitrarily by pointing briefly to the subsequent

founding of a library that is an implicit refounding in order to confirm that there is only one library in antiquity. The *Historia Augusta* informs us that the emperor Hadrian was a learned and cultured individual. He was especially interested in poetry and letters ('fuit enim poematum et litterarum nimium studiosissimus', *Hadrian* 14.8), and he was also an expert (*peritissimus*) in arithmetic, geometry, and painting, although Ammianus Marcellinus says that he hated well-dressed, learned, wealthy, and noble men (30.8.10). It would seem that Hadrian liked knowledge but not its purveyors. As an advocate of learning, the emperor establishes a library at Athens, an event that deliberately takes book culture back to its Hellenic tradition and the book collection back to its Peisistratean origins, in so far as the Athenian tyrant had himself founded a library. Aristides speaks of the unrivalled 'storage house of books' (βιβλίων ταμεία) built at Athens by Hadrian, describing it as a proper κόσμος—a word that might mean 'ornament', 'order', 'wealth'—for Athens (Panathenaicus 13.188). Pausanias discusses Hadrian's building programme for the Greek city, mentioning the temple of Hera and Zeus Panellenios. The temple is the repository for books, and it is also decorated with statues and paintings (*Description of Greece* 1.18.9). Much later, Eusebius speaks of the remarkable buildings that Hadrian erected at Athens, including the library (*bibliothecam*) with its craftsmanship (*Chron.* Ol. 227). The location of Hadrian's library is thus the feature that constitutes the palimpsest of the library in prior antiquity. Here Rome asserts its supremacy over Athens.

CONCLUSION

The birth of the library in the archaic period may in reality be a prolific and profuse one. According to the literary representations, however, it is a birth that results in a succession of heirs during the classical Greek and, then, the Roman periods, until in the later imperial age it produces such numerous offspring as wealthy, cultured, and powerful individuals' and rulers' own notable book collections and it leads intellectuals to expect to find libraries in major centres and sometimes even smaller towns.⁶¹ Indeed, Jeno Platthy's work *Sources on the Earliest Greek Libraries*⁶² attests to libraries at Delphi, Epidaurus, in

Macedonia, the Peloponnesus, the Greek islands, and Asia Minor. The library comes of age to generate further book collections. Nevertheless, while offering this acknowledgement of plural and multiple libraries, throughout this chapter I have spoken of *a*, or of *the*, library, despite the coexistence of numerous libraries in Greco-Roman antiquity. So, for instance, I might have discussed here the formation of the Pergamene library as one that competed with the Alexandrian museum, and, as far as the collection of the texts of Demosthenes were concerned, surpassed it or the famous library housed in the villa at Herculaneum, owned by Piso and containing the works of Philodemus.⁶³ I might also have discussed the various other important collections identified with individuals, such as Polycrates of Samos and Euripides, but my interest is not here to identify or even to discuss *all* the significant libraries in the pre-modern period and furthermore, by refusing to do so, to deny the significance and interest of these other book collections. It is rather to demonstrate the relationship of the library to power, political, intellectual, and military.

The narrative of the birth of the library is one that seems to take the library's existence for granted, as something that was bound to come into existence, as something that was certain to evolve out of a variety of social, political, cultural, and intellectual conditions. Yet the identity of a text collection as a 'library' should be recognized as the product of a particular construction. The concern of this chapter has been specifically to illuminate this process. What has been disclosed in the narratives of the library's birth is a realization that the library is not a body of isolated texts, but is rather connected to a larger body, especially to antecedents—and this may be a truism of literary textuality in general, that it is necessarily related to earlier bodies of work. Tim Whitmarsh has stated that the Greeks were perceived as the originators of culture in the period of the Second Sophistic,⁶⁴ and the foundation narrative of the library suggests that the Greeks were perceived as the initial creators of, and so as the authority for, textual culture. This is authority in all senses of the word where the book collection is concerned.

The aim of this chapter has been to argue that narratives concerning the establishment of the ancient library engage in continuing and consistent reference to prior 'origins', whether

Athens (for the Hellenistic period) or Alexandria (for the Roman period). They are narratives that imply that the ancient library is a genealogical institution that grounds its foundation and its authority in the past as constituted by a set of literary texts. War and the transportation of booty is one of the ways that antiquity's library travels from culture to culture—from Athens to the East, back to Athens, then to Northern Egypt, and, finally, to Rome. But the ancient library is not just the by-product of military victories and of cultural conquest. The stories concerning the afterlife of Aristotle's collection show how its passage after the philosopher's death comes to signify intellectual heritage and lineage: possession of Aristotle's books is a mode of philosophical *diadochê*. The double Greek and Latin library in the Roman period marks an attempt to allow the Romans a subsequent role in the process of origination where literary culture is concerned. Thus what constitutes the library are books canonically selected, because they come from a notable and empowered lineage, and are preserved for posterity.

Library Catalogues: From Literary Description to Literary Self-Description

τοῦτο γὰρ τῶν μαθόντων λήθην μὲν ἐν ψυχαῖς παρέξει μνήμης
ἀμελετησίᾳ, ἅτε διὰ πίστιν γραφῆς ἐξωθεν ὑπ' ἄλλοτρίων τύπων,
οὐκ ἔνδοθεν αὐτοῦς ὑφ' αὐτῶν ἀνμνησκομένους· οὐκ οὖν μνήμης
ἀλλὰ ὑπομνήσεως φάρμακον ἡδρες.

(Phaedrus 275a2–6)

Lack of practice will produce forgetfulness in the souls of those who have learned it because through faith in writing they forget because of the external signs not being reminded from inside. Thus you have discovered a cure not for remembering but for reminding.

INTRODUCTION

So King Thamus rebukes Theuth for his invention of writing. Theuth has produced something, namely writing, that impairs true remembering, because it superficially aids in the recollection of the text through external, rather than internal, signs. But this Platonic account of the written word is not one that antiquity accepts, for the book assists first in recollection where recitations are concerned, as Giorgio Camessa has observed,¹ and, as is the concern of this chapter, it furthermore assists in the process of remembering what has to be recalled.

This secondary memory is of particular concern where the library is concerned, for modern fictions about the library imagine it as a place of chaos, of control lost, of futility, as the individual loses both control and self amidst the mass of literary material—for example, Flaubert's novel *Bouvard et Pecuchet*² and Borges' 'The Library of Babel'. By contrast, ancient libraries are conceived of as places of structure and order, because of the

power of memory, despite what Plato has to say about writing as a *φάρμακον*, or drug, for forgetting (cf. *Phaedrus* 274c5–275b4). The library is a form of artificial memory, a form of memory (–aid), which is distinct from the mnemonic techniques used in natural memory precisely because it is written—that is, a series of external signs. One might ask how, if there were no means to navigate the body of knowledge contained in the library, one would find anything amidst the mass of texts. So my concern in this chapter is to demonstrate that, in response to this recognition, authors of compendious works and keepers of ancient libraries developed techniques to supplement the written word as a medium of memory and in effect to map knowledge for its consumer, devising what becomes a supplemental mnemonics.

I am interested in literary description as varying and evolving phenomena that become a means of mapping knowledge in Greco-Roman antiquity. This chapter proposes that the catalogue (πίναξ) from its status as a scholarly project produced by someone other than the author himself and thus as an artefact external to the original authorial project in the Hellenistic period is succeeded by literary self-description as an activity subsumed within the composition of the text by the author himself. It explores how the Alexandrian catalogues for subsequent authors become a means to constitute the writing of textual description and biography as an authorial concern (as in the case of Diogenes Laertius *Lives of the Philosophers*), and how subsequently and distinctly authors incorporate textual selfdescription in the form of the ‘table/book of contents’ within the framework of a larger composition (as in the case of an encyclopaedic work like Pliny’s *Natural History* or the *Noctes Atticae* of Aulu Gellius). This aetiological narrative is one that ventures to see the summing-up of an author’s literary production or else of a work’s contents as the consequence of the library catalogue being subsumed into the production of the text, as what was initially a third-party activity (the library scholar-critic’s) being assumed into the authorial realm, and as the author reserving the rights of textual designation for himself rather than for a subsequent reader.

I

The earliest literary texts in Hellenic culture offered directions to

their audiences as to what they might expect to encounter in the work that was being read through proems or prologues. Homer's *Iliad* commences with the poet asking the goddess to sing of the anger of Achilles, which results in the deaths of many heroes, such that the plan of Zeus is fulfilled after Achilles and Agamemnon begin to quarrel with one another (*Iliad* 1.1–7). The *Odyssey* starts with a request to the Muses to sing of Odysseus as the complex man who wandered far, sacked the citadel of Troy, and suffered many pains without being able to help his men (*Odyssey* 1.1–10). Then Hesiod, after stating that he begins to sing from the Muses who praise Zeus and the other Olympian gods (1–21) and after giving the account of his poetic initiation, which serves to authorize his narrative (22–35), declares the concern of the *Theogony*: the praise of Zeus, which will delight his mind, in the context of a story about what has been, what is, and what will be (τά τ' ἔόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἔόντα, 38). The poet states the theme of the epic, which concerns itself with the rise of Zeus to power through the defeat of the various obstacles that stand in his way or that threaten his absolute rule. Similarly, in the *Works and Days*, Hesiod's proem is one that affirms the concern to praise Zeus, but this time by placing emphasis on the god's capacity to create difficulties for individuals, to diminish what is distinguished or to increase what is unseen, to straighten what is crooked and to benefit the individual who is heroic (1–10). The introductory lines to the poem thematize the work as one about Zeus' albeit arbitrary justice. Among early prose works Herodotus' *Histories* begins by declaring that the present work is a demonstration of the author's enquiry such that great and wondrous deeds whether done by the Greeks or the barbarians are not forgotten or become inglorious. In particular, it states that its concern is to reveal why the Greeks and the barbarians went to war with one another (*Histories* proem).

These introductory passages make apparent to the works' audiences their overall content, but none of them actually reveals how the plots of the works will be articulated and where in the work each part of the plot will be presented. They are summary statements about *what* each of the literary works as a whole concerns itself with rather than plans that will enable the audience to find its way around the work. It would appear from these proems that the issue of how to locate elements of their

works had not yet become an issue of such importance, and, as we shall see, it does not become a prominent issue until the first century AD. In fact, it does not become a concern for authors until after the ancient library and its owners become involved in questions of knowing where to find texts and knowing which texts are stored. Writing is a memory aid for mankind, recording and fixing what has been said and thought. Yet Plato's Egyptian king Thamus/Ammon criticizes it as a poison for memory (*Phaedrus* 274d–275b), and it is certainly the case that writing in quantity presents a problem for the human memory as the issue is how to remember where to find something, a fact, a story, a detail, amongst the large body of words, texts, and authors. If writing is a memory aid, it nonetheless requires a further mnemonic device, an additional memory supplement, not only to make up for any deficiencies of writing itself where recollection is concerned but also to deal with the quantity of written materials that is precisely constitutive of a library. Writing thus needs to be written over, or perhaps it requires a set of directions, a literary map of sorts, to help locate its readers.

The question of how to locate works in a collection is to some degree highlighted by Vitruvius' narrative concerning the election of Aristophanes of Byzantium to the position as head librarian at Alexandria. When called to adjudicate a poetic competition, Aristophanes is able to identify and prove that a number of the entries are plagiarisms by matching these to texts in the library, displaying his knowledge of where the rolls are in the Alexandrian collection (Vitruvius *De Architectura* 7, pref. 5–6). The problem of locating text is addressed in part through titlature, and titlature is interpreted in different ways at different times. Early Mesopotamian book collections held library catalogues with *incipits* or the beginnings of the texts, which served as titles of works.³ In the pre-Alexandrian period in Greece, 'titles' of works, almost certainly added by a later hand than the author's, were written on the outside of rolls.⁴ The normal external indication of a title was the

σίλλυβος, or *σίλλυβον*, a strip of papyrus or vellum that hung outside the roll as it lay on the bookshelf. It contained the author's name and the title of the work—that is, the *incipit*—of which only three examples survive: *POxy.* 301 (I/II); 1091 (II); and *PAntinoö*p 21 (III).⁵ It might also be the leather strip used for

identification on a roll of official documents.⁶ In the absence of a *σίλλυβος*, the reader had to unroll the work to the end to learn its author and title.

In the Alexandrian library, the title of a work was placed at the end of the scroll or tablet, and, furthermore, the number of lines in the scroll might be counted and placed at the end of the scroll or in its margins. Pfeiffer points to a copy of Menander's *Sicyonius* as the earliest example of the end of a roll bearing title and line count, as well as a personal comment of the scribe in verse.⁷ This way of marking texts persisted into the Roman period. In the context of a boast about the way in which Tyrannion has organized his library, Cicero speaks of *sillybae* made out of parchment that are attached to his books (cf. *ut sumant membranulam, ex qua indices fiant, quos vos Graeci, utopinor, σιλλύβους appellatis*) in his letters to Atticus (cf. *Epp. ad Atticum* 4.4a.1; cf. 4.8).⁸ Cicero comments that Atticus' men have beautified his library by binding his books and affixing *syllabae* to them (*Ep. ad Atticum* 4.5), while at *Ep. at Atticum* 4.8 he observes that his house now has a *mens*—that is, a mind—now that Tyrannio has arranged his books; the *sillybae* help much. This statement suggests that the organization of books is significant in that knowing how and where to find one's texts gives meaning and sense to one's home. Later, Ovid makes reference to the 'displayed titles' (*titulos... apertos*), no doubt the *sillybae*, visible on bookshelves at *Tristia* 1.1.109.

But the major development as far as the listing of a library's contents was concerned was the creation of the library catalogue. The poet and scholar Callimachus (c.305–c.240 BC) produced the *Pinakes*, or Catalogues, which was a record of the holdings of the Museum-Library at Alexandria. The *Pinakes* ran to 120 volumes and purported to catalogue the entirety of Greek literature (*pasa paideia*) and the sum of knowledge.⁹ According to Pfeiffer, the classification of authors, especially prose authors, was a significant concern for Callimachus. He divided his *Catalogues* into several generic classes—for example, rhetoric (frs. 430–2, 443–8), laws (frs. 433), treatises of all kinds (frs. 434–5), epic (frs. 452–3), lyric (frs. 441, 450), tragedy (frs. 449?, 451), comedy (frs. 439–40), philosophy (frs. 438?, 442), history (frs. 437), medicine (frs. 429?), and varia (frs. 434–5, 436?)—and seems to have organized authors within each of these classes

alphabetically with brief biographical notes.¹⁰ (Other evidence exists to suggest that the comedies of Aristophanes were also catalogued alphabetically.¹¹) Works of individual authors may have been further subdivided, and works were in any case listed alphabetically within their classes; the number of lines was added (frs. 433–4) and disputes about the author were noted if there was any uncertainty (frs. 437, 442, 444–6).¹² In his *Pinakes* Callimachus included both biographical and bibliographical information for each of the authors he listed, such that Rudolf Blum attributes to him the invention of ‘biobibliography’.¹³ He also employed the *incipit*, which in the absence of titles for works would identify a text by its initial line, as it does at fragments 436, 443, 444, 449.

The *Pinakes* suggests the totalizing aim of Hellenistic literary scholarship. There are references to the ‘table of various (or miscellaneous) things’ (cf. ἐν τῷ τῶν παντοδάπων πινάκι, fr. 434 = Athenaeus 244a) and to a ‘table of various (or miscellaneous) compositions’ (cf. ἐν τῷ τῶν παντοδάπων συγγραμμάτων πινάκι, fr. 435 = Athenaeus 643e). The titles of Callimachus’ Catalogues acknowledge the ‘manifold’ (*pantodapa*) as a legitimate category, but there is a sense in which the *Pinakes* constitute a synopsis of Greek literature, like the Epitomes of Zenodotus, which stands for the totality of Greek mythology (Athenaeus 412a), and, indeed, of other literature, such as the Hebrew scriptures. The catalogues of Callimachus are an important work in providing a key to the contents of the Alexandrian library. They classify the works of this institution, dividing them into poetry and prose works and according to genre and listing their authors alphabetically. Moreover, the *Pinakes* became a reference work for anyone who required biographical material or was working on literary topics. Pfeiffer asserts that they were never superseded by a more comprehensive work, and that the anonymous *Pinakes* of the library at Pergamum did not compare with Callimachus’ compilation.¹⁴ Aristophanes of Byzantium published a work *Πρὸς τοὺς Καλλιμάχου πίνακας*, which means either *Against the Catalogues of Callimachus* or the less hostile *Concerning the Catalogues of Callimachus*, suggesting that the *Pinakes* were a work to be reckoned with. Certainly, the evidence shows that everyone who required biographical material had to take Callimachus into

account.¹⁵

Aristophanes and Aristarchus of Samothrace, who followed him as head librarian around 153 BCE, engaged in a somewhat different project from the *Pinakes*. Together they devised canonical lists of literature, including the epic poems, tragedy, and also lyric poetry, although it may be argued that the Callimachean indices also canonized Greek literature. Their lists excluded everything contemporary in the belief of these scholars that great literature was the product of the past.¹⁶ Nonetheless, together with Callimachus, these librarians display the need to make sense of and order the literary world that they have inherited from classical Greece by identifying and classifying works into particular categories.

The importance of listing an author's works as part of a biographical project is apparent later in the work of Diogenes Laertius on the philosophers. Striking in the ten books of 'lives' is Diogenes' interest in listing the works produced by his various subjects. So at book 2.6.57 the author completes his life of Xenophon by naming forty books produced by the latter; at 2.8.83–4 he completes the life of Aristippus by naming the books in circulation in his name and at 2.8.84–5 those of uncertain authorship; at 2.10.108 the life of Euclides closes with a list of this individual's writings; at 2.12.121 Diogenes gives the seventeen extant dialogues of Crito; at 2.13.122–3 he provides a catalogue of the thirty-three dialogues of Simon; at 2.14 he offers titles of Glaucon's nine dialogues, and at 2.15 he lists the twenty-three extant dialogues of Simmias. In subsequent books he gives evidence of concern with issues of categorization as far as works are concerned. At book 3.50 Diogenes Laertius discusses the classification of Plato's dialogues, and at 3.59–61 he identifies the tetralogies. In book 6 he divides the works of Diogenes into dialogues and tragedies, while offering the caveat that some believe this Diogenes to have written nothing (6.2.80). There is a moment of self-consciousness in book 9, where the author observes that Thrasyllus had made catalogues of the works of Democritus and Plato and reveals that he himself works within a particular bibliographical convention (9.7.46–9).

It might be argued that Diogenes Laertius does a service for philosophy by functioning as its self-appointed librarian. The

author preserves the titles of the writings from the early Ionian philosophers down to Epicurus and his followers in book 10, and provides later periods with crucial information about the range and quantity of material produced by the thinkers that Diogenes treats in his work.

II

Up to this point naming and identifying an author's works is a scholarly activity that takes place *after* the production of the works, and almost always at the hands of someone other than the author. But considering this issue raises another, related one, that concerns the location of passages within single works, especially those that are large or encyclopaedic in character or draw on many sources. F. G. Kenyon notes the absence of aids to assist readers with the task of reference, by which he means the capacity to point to particular passages within individual works or collections of works.¹⁷ This is a significant problem if the book's function is to aid in the task of memory.

Yet Kenyon overstates his point. There are a few examples of passages being located by *stichoi*, by line number, where one might count how many lines a portion of text occurred from the beginning, or, occasionally, the end of a work. Roberts and Skeat observe, however, that stichometry was hardly used even when it seemed an obvious form of reference, as in the case of poetry or drama.¹⁸ Stichometry apart, Kenyon also does not pay attention to structural elements in works—for example, the prefatory statements in which authors might indicate the contents of their works. For instance, the proems of epics indicate their major themes, with the *Iliad* announcing as its theme the anger of Achilles (*Iliad* 1.1–7) and the *Odyssey* presenting as its concern Odysseus and his wanderings (*Odyssey* 1.110). In Plato's *Symposium* the tragic poet Agathon offers evidence that the itemization of a work's contents was a particular strategy used in the composition of prose speeches in a text that might be regarded as a parody of contemporary rhetoric. Agathon begins his speech in praise of Eros with an elaborate preface in which he announces first how he must speak, and then proceeds to state that he will praise Eros for the sort of being he is and then that he will laud his gifts (194e4–195a5).

In the first century CE authors begin to assume for themselves the task of identifying the contents of their works. They produce tables of contents, which are distinct from the catalogue that imposes its own structure on previously written works, and I suggest that this internal reference aids the reader in retrieving the material that their works, particularly encyclopaedic ones, hold. They take the prefatory statement of the work's themes and topics and develop it into an explicit device of reference within their texts such that the reader knows where he will find a particular topic.¹⁹ Two authors devise tables of contents that they place at the beginning of their own works as an integral part of the work, and my concern in this part of the chapter is to consider them. And it is interesting that both these works are encyclopaedic in nature, which is a literary characteristic that the existence of the library nurtures.²⁰

The elder Pliny's *Natural History*, which scholars identify as the earliest encyclopaedia²¹ is a massive work that contains a vast body of knowledge about the natural world and its uses for mankind. It is a text that is self-conscious about its size and its coverage of material. In the preface addressed to the dedicatee of the work, the emperor Titus (pref. 12), Pliny characterizes the *Natural History* and its subject matter. He begins by observing that his topic does not permit digressions, or speeches, or accounts of miraculous occurrences, or of unusual happenings, which are pleasant to speak of and are entertaining for readings. His subject, nature, is described somewhat ironically as barren (*sterilis*), surely an ironic comment in the light of the richness of his text, and it is treated with rustic or foreign works. Furthermore, it is not a topic that is well trod or one that the mind seeks to travel over, and, in fact, no Roman or Greek author has ever treated it before (pref. 12–15). Pliny proceeds to refer to the learning that has taken place in the composition of his work. Citing Domitius Piso, who said that storehouses (*thesauri*) rather than books are required, the author declares that he read around 2,000 obscure volumes, and that he has collected 20,000 facts along with other facts ignored by earlier authors and others discovered later, which he located in the thirty-six books of the *Natural History* (pref. 17). Pliny's work is something of an encyclopaedia, a synthesis and abstraction of many other books, indeed an epitome of a library's worth of texts, and this last

understanding of the work may account for the special attention that the author draws to the title of Diodorus Siculus' universal history, the *Library* (βιβλιοθήκη; cf. pref. 25). The *Natural History* is also an undertaking that seeks to compete with that of predecessors, and that in turn anticipates being challenged by subsequent authors. It is for this reason and also to acknowledge his predecessors that Pliny has prefaced his books with the names of his sources, although others have not been so scrupulous in attributing the material they have used for their works. In fact, he notes that well-regarded, modern authors have actually plagiarized older writers word for word (pref. 20–3).

The preface concludes with Pliny making deferential overtures to his dedicatee. He states that it is his concern to spare the time of his imperial reader out of interest for the public good, and, in so doing, he rehearses a trope used earlier by Horace. The poet begins the second book of his epistles by acknowledging the political and military concerns of Augustus and disavows claims on the latter's time with a 'long speech' (*longo sermone*, Ep. 2.1.1 ff.). Yet, despite this anxiety about taking up Titus' time, Pliny has, nonetheless, written for and dedicated to the former a thirty-six book work filled with erudite facts, details, and narratives. Accordingly, he has attached to this prefatory epistle a table of contents for the different books (cf. *quid singulis contineretur libris*) and by this means he has taken care that his reader does not feel obliged to read each of the books. These are the external signs for what is inside the work. These signs will also ensure he does not feel the need to read through (cf. *perlegant*) his whole work, but it will enable each individual to know where to find what he wants in the work. Pliny ends the preface with the comment that Valerius Soranus had provided his audience with a similar map of its contents in the books entitled the *Female Initiates* (ἐποπτιδαί, pref. 33). Pliny is otherwise the first author to provide his reader with a list of the topics in his work and thereby, along with Scribonius Largus, Aulus Gellius and Columella,²² invents the table of contents—although Doody refuses this description²³—as distinct from the index, a summary list ordered according to a principle such as alphabetization.²⁴

Following the book-by-book summary, book 2 treats the world and cosmological and meteorological phenomena, book 3 deals with Italy, book 4 with Greece and other parts of Europe,

book 5 with Africa and the Middle East, and book 6 with the Near East and India. Book 7 discusses human life from birth to death, while books 8 to 11 consider the rest of the animal kingdom, treating animals, fish, birds, and insects respectively. Books 12 to 17 are about different kinds of trees, domestic and foreign, wild and cultivated; books 18 to 19 concern crops; books 20 to 27 discuss the uses of different plants and trees, with particular emphasis given to their role as drugs and medicines, while books 28 to 32 name the different drugs obtained from animals and fish. Books 33 and 36 are concerned with the uses of metals and gems, with book 35 devoted to art. The summary of the topics suggests that *natural history* is one that has mankind at its centre.

Cosmology yields to geographical and political regions in the first six books, while the human life process receives attention in a way that the animal kingdom in books 8 to 11 does not. The remainder of the work, on trees, crops, plants, and metals, is directed towards the uses and functions these elements of the world have for human beings: the concern is how nature affects man, so that the *Natural History* is a natural history that addresses mankind's needs. The contents of the work are consonant with the purpose of Strabo's *Geography* to treat the history of animals, plants, and other things, and to demonstrate how the sea and the earth provide what is useful and not useful to mankind (cf. Strabo 1.1.16).

The author of the *Natural History* has provided a rationale for book 1 of the work. It is here that he lists the contents of each book, beginning from the second one, chapter by chapter, and, following the naming of the topics, enumerates the number of facts (*res*), investigations (*historiae*), and observations (*observationes*) after the heading 'total' (*summa*). If the library catalogues at Alexandria and Pergamum contained line counts on the tags of the book rolls, the table of contents is an inventory of literary topics that reinforces the concern to enumerate disclosed in the prefatory epistle, where Pliny declares that his work contains 20,000 notable facts (pref. 17). So, for example, book 2 contains no less than 417 facts and details on the cosmos and the physical world; book 6 treats 1,195 towns, 576 peoples, 115 famous rivers, 38 famous mountains, 108 islands, 95 extinct towns and peoples, totalling 2,214 facts, investigations, and observations. Book 8, on animals, contains 787 facts,

investigations, and observations, while book 23, on drugs taken from cultivated trees, contains 1,418 drugs, investigations, and observations, and so on in the synopses of the books. Pliny displays a concern to enumerate and to quantify the contents of the *Natural History*, and it is the case that this trait is displayed within the indices to individual books. He declares that book 14 deals with 91 kinds of vines and grapes, with 50 wines of quality, with 38 from overseas, 7 kinds of salt wine, 17 kinds of sweet wine, 3 kinds of inferior wine, 66 kinds of artificial wine, and 12 kinds of remarkable wines. Similar enumeration is also evident, for instance, in the following book, which names the number of different kinds of fruits, in book 16, where different kinds of trees are numbered, in book 20, where the medicines derived from garden plants are counted out, in book 22, where the number of drugs made from wreaths are listed, and in books 23 and 24, where the drugs obtained from trees are tallied.

Pliny stated in the preface that the *Natural History* is the product of his reading of around 2,000 volumes (cf. *lectione voluminum circiter duorum milium*, pref. 17). At the end of the listings for each book in book 1, he identifies these volumes through their authors. Here he provides a list of the authors and occasionally of the book titles that have supplied him with his information. If books serve as *aides-memoires* for recitations²⁵ the *Natural History* serves the function of *aide-memoire* for memory hints—namely, the work itself. John Henderson also suggests that the table of contents demonstrates Pliny emphasizing the need to maximize one's return of time: so knowing where to find something saves time.²⁶ The list of authorities offers means of approaching the body of material contained in the work that is distinct from the topic-oriented method produced by the summary of each book's contents. Here the names are divided into two groups, those that are Roman and those that are 'foreign' (cf. *externi*), which suggests a Romanocentric world view in the work. After all, the author exclaims at the beginning of the preface to his work that it is one that belongs to Roman citizens for the Muses (cf. *novicium Camenis Qurritium tuorum opus*, pref. 1). The citation of sources stands as an aetiology of the encyclopaedic text, one that Pliny has observed in his preface is unusual (pref. 22). Pliny's text most emphatically presents itself to the reader as a compendium of material from other writers and

their works; it asks the audience to perceive it as a reference text. Within the text itself the author occasionally reinforces this sense of accountability to his sources with acknowledgements of his sources. At 2.3.8 he refers to Marcus Varro for *caelum* as a word that has the sense of ‘engraved’ (cf. *de lingua latina*, 5.18), and at 2.54.140 he points to *Annals* 1 of Lucius Piso for evidence that thunderbolts came in answer to Numa’s prayers.

Beyond this, the list of author’s names serves, moreover, as a larger pointer to Greco-Roman textuality, as an index to the various authors and their texts as far as the topics treated in Pliny’s text are concerned. The ability to catalogue the world in this manner is a way of claiming an authority over it.²⁷ But it also allows the reader some licence. The listing of sources serves as an invitation to the work’s audience to search these texts for the materials and contexts that have gone into the writing of the *Natural History*. The naming of textual sources identifies the writing of natural history as a metatextual act.²⁸ If Pliny is describing the physical world from an anthropocentric perspective, book 1 qualifies the description, showing it to be mediated by the writings of other authors. The author has selected from and restructured the material of his sources into the narrative that is the *Natural History*. It follows that reading the work becomes in turn a metacritical act: the audience reads (through) Pliny’s own readings of his sources and with the assistance of the table of contents in book 1, which enables the reader to avoid reading the work in its entirety (cf. pref. 33). The audience, then, is empowered to epitomize the author’s work, and, in this way, to reauthor it through the process of reading as he consults it piecemeal or sporadically for particular facts and details.

III

The *Noctes Atticae* of Aulus Gellius, a very different composition from the *Natural History*, is the second work that provides its reader with an overall table of contents. Yet, like the *Natural History*, it is a text that is the product of much reading of other authors’ writings such that the work is itself something of an encyclopaedic compendium, although Holford-Strevens argues that it is rather a miscellany, like the work of Plutarch, Aelian,

and Athenaeus, because it does not aim at completeness.²⁹ Gellius writes that whenever he took any Greek or Latin book in his hands or heard anything worth remembering or that was pleasing he made notes so that the material could be easily recovered even in the absence of the books from which he had gleaned the facts and stories. The order of material in the *Noctes Atticae* follows the order of Gellius' reading and note taking (pref. 2). But he is also insistent that he does not, unlike many other, and especially Greek, authors, indiscriminately sweep up any detail that he comes upon in his reading and put it into his work such that it exhausts the mind of his reader. Rather, to ensure that the reader reads for pleasure and cultivation, and to remember what is useful, he is mindful of Heraclitus' saying that 'much learning does not teach the mind'

(πολυμαθίῃ νόον οὐ διδάσκει) and takes a modest amount of material that has the capacity to lead the mind to desire honest learning and contemplation of useful arts or to rescue men from boorishness and unlearning (pref. 11–12). *The Noctes Atticae* is not so much a work that seeks to contain everything that there is to know as one that aspires to instruct and cultivate its reader. In fact, the author takes Pliny to task for including what he classifies as garbage and as boring.³⁰ Gellius has included some particular points from grammar, dialectic, and even geometry, even though these might seem to be useless and difficult to understand (pref. 13). Yet he declares it fair that the reader should encounter what is new and unknown to him and consider whether this material may nourish his mind, memory, speech, and pleasure (pref. 16).

Gellius makes it apparent that he has devoted free time (*otium*) to the composition of the *Noctes Atticae*. Earlier in the preface he comments that the name of the work comes from the notes that he had begun to make during the long winter nights in a field in Attica (pref. 3–10). The work takes up twenty books, and its creation, the collecting of pleasurable memories of a particular kind (cf. *ad collegendas huiuscemodi memoriarum delectatiunculas*), is the result of time snatched from looking after his household and from the care of his children. There is a sense in which the writing of the *Noctes Atticae* is a task that has become the author's life, for he writes that he does not wish to live longer than he would be able to write and collect material for his notebooks (pref. 22–4).

At the end of the preface, Gellius provides his reader with the table of contents. Here he identifies the concern of each chapter in these books, so that retrieval of material from his work is made an easier activity: *capita rerum, quae cuique commentario insunt, exposuimus hic universa, ut iam statim declaretur, quid quo in libro quaeri inveniriue possit* ('I have here set out all the headings of the topics, which are present in each notebook, so that what can be sought and found in each book will be now instantly declared', pref. 25). If the point of books is to be aides-memoires for recitations,³¹ then the compendious work must seek to serve the task of memory aid even more thoroughly in the light of its large size. The point of the chapter-by-chapter synopses—for that is what they are—is to ensure that the audience knows where to find what in the work, and these synopses reappear at the beginning of the chapter in question, whether serving the function of a 'title', or else serving to remind the audience of the contents of the chapter, or perhaps fulfilling both these roles. Where Pliny's entries are generally brief and denote the topic being treated in the most generic terms—so, for example, 'marvellous things concerning the waters' (*aquarum mirabilia*) and 'the differences of the waters' (*aquarum differentiae*) (book 31, chapters 1 and 2), Gellius draws in much more detail and context, so that the headings function as vivid mises en scene, drawing the reader into the narrative situations presented in each of the chapters. For instance, the heading for chapter 10 of book 1 concerns the works that the philosopher Favorinus used to chastise a young man who was speaking empty words (*quibus uerbis compellaverit Fauorinusphilosophus adulescentem casce nimis et prisce loquentem*), while [chapter 1](#) of book 7 contains the heading 'how Chrysippus answered to those who denied that providence exists' (*quem in modum responderit Chrysippus aduersum eos, qui prouidentiam consistere negauerunt*). The capita stand now as abbreviated narratives of the individual chapter, which may make recollection of them easier. But it is also possible to think of them as authorial shorthands marking out the contents of the text before its final, full composition similar to passages in the text of Thucydides, especially in books 5 and 8, which scholars have thought to be the author's indications to himself to place a speech there.³²

The table of contents has become particularly important

where book 8 of the *Noctes Atticae* is concerned, for this is virtually all that remains of the book apart from two sentences belonging respectively to [chapter 3](#) and chapter 15 of the book. Thus in the Oxford edition of Aulus Gellius the chapter headings stand as place markers for the absent text, serving as the invaluable traces of an otherwise nonexistent text. Book 8 realizes its status as a memory aid in a manner that is unlike, and more emphatic than, the rest of the *Noctes Atticae*.

If Pliny identified his authorities by listing their names at the end of his book synopses, many of the *capita* serve to identify the textual sources for the narratives and information that constitute the material of Gellius' chapters. The heading to [chapter 1](#) of book 1 identifies Plutarch as the basis for the narrative, which deals with how the philosopher Pythagoras determined the bodily size of Hercules, and, indeed, book 1 [chapter 1](#), begins with a reference to Plutarch, Plutarchus in libro... dicit (1.1); the heading of [chapter 2](#) of book 1 highlights the 'words of Epictetus the Stoic' (*uerba Epicteti Stoici*) as the means by which Herodes Atticus silences a boastful young man, and [chapter 2](#) indeed cites the passage in question at 1.2.8–12. The book of Servius Sulpicius *On Dowries* (*de dotibus*) is mentioned as the basis of [chapter 4](#) of book 4 on the law and habit of ancient betrothals, while Publius Nigidius is cited as the basis for seeing a difference in meaning between the verb *mentiri* and the phrase *mendacium dicere* (11.11). Gellius does not shy away from citing extended passages from source texts, as in 1.2. For example, the chapter heading of 10.22 refers to a passage from Plato's *Gorgias* regarding the disgraces of philosophy, which Gellius says that he quotes in Greek since the thoughts cannot be adequately put into Latin, while the heading of 17.20 declares that a passage from Plato's *Symposium* is translated into Latin, and at 17.20 the author cites both the original Greek and the Latin translation. On other occasions, Gellius retells stories contained in other sources or authors—for instance, a story concerning Tiberius Gracchus taken from the annales (6.19) or the story of the lyrist Arion in Herodotus (16.19).

The *capita* are explicitly metatextual: that is to say, they point to other texts as source materials for the chapters of the *Noctes Atticae*.³³ In addition, they present Gellius' text as a rewriting, or, perhaps, an overwriting of the authors cited as source material

and in such a way that the acts of reading and authorship become indistinguishable where Gellius is concerned: the production of the *Noctes Atticae* is a consequence of its author's consumption of a considerable body of written matter. Gellius has predigested Greco-Roman literature and now presents it to his audience as a body of epitomized material—he characterizes the body of material as 'traces' (cf. *uestigiorum*, pref. 17)—to be read for their cultivation, and this act of intervention between the original material and the reader may be seen as a critical one. The reader-author has discriminated between what is useful and useless, between what is pleasing and unpleasing, between what is edifying and non-edifying. The *uestigia* are ideally not the reader's final horizon, as the author's writings exist less to teach than to suggest the need for learning. Having become content with these traces, Gellius envisages the reader pursuing the sources he has presented in the original, unabridged books and with the aid of teachers (pref. 17). The *Noctes Atticae* thus stands as a propaedeutic for literature.

IV

The tables of contents in the works of Pliny and Gellius may reflect the unwieldiness of dealing with ancient book rolls. In the *Memorabilia* Xenophon has Socrates describe how he unrolled the books of the sages of antiquity and made extracts from them (*Mem.* 1.6.14), a passage that F. G. Kenyon regards as providing testimony to the practice of consulting books in a library.³⁴ The reader would have required both hands to manage the book roll, unwinding the roll with one hand and rewinding it with the other hand, and would have found it difficult to look for particular items or topics in it given the absence of chapter headings.³⁵ What this entails, as Christopher Pelling has persuasively argued, is that authors will have done all their reading before they sit down to compose their own works. And, while authors may claim to have read many Greek and Roman writers in the composition of their works, they are likely to have used one principal source for each section of their work and to supplement it with other sources from memory or from notes made in the process of reading because of the unwieldiness of consulting references (cf. Lucian *quom hist.* 47–8 and Pliny Ep. 3.5).³⁶ As authors who

relied on numerous sources, Pliny and Gellius would no doubt have been well aware of the problems of source collection, and, in the writing of their own works, they have attempted to alleviate some of the difficulties for their readers. So now the reader of the *Natural History* and of the *Noctes Atticae* is provided with indications of where to find what in these works, and has the authors' tables of contents as an abbreviated set of notes (ὑπόμνημα) should he wish to use this as source material for his own composition. The book is not just a memory aid for recitation, but also now a source text for writing. Pliny and Gellius have made their own works deliberately accessible for the reader who aspires also to use them as a basis for his own compositions. They have effectively listed their topics and sources, engaging in what Walter Ong observes is a sign 'of the deep interiorization of print' ³⁷

But, beyond this, the introductory book comprising the table of contents in Pliny's *Natural History* and Aulus Gellius' *Noctes Atticae* is in all likelihood a *hysteron proteron*. That is to say, it is a summing-up of the contents of the whole work in question made after the completion of the work, as such an activity must be, placed at the beginning of the work rather than at the end. Accordingly, it does not accurately represent the order of composition by its position in the work. Certainly, if the *Noctes Atticae* is a work whose order of topics follows the order in which the author and compiler encountered them in his reading, then the text's table of contents stands apart from this chronology as a record of the author's reading of his own composition. This may explain why the chapter headings are appended to the prefatory epistle rather than identified as book 1 of the work, as is the case with the *Natural History*. Furthermore, there is a sense in which the table of contents has a temporality that is similar to that of the preface as far as its relation to the larger work is concerned. Just as the preface is an afterword that deliberately stands apart from the rest of the text and is located at the beginning of the work, so the table of contents stands as something of a commentary and a summation, retrospective entities, near the start of the work. Yet the table of contents in the *Natural History* and in the *Noctes Atticae* is also distinct in representing the order of the contents of the works in question, and in this respect differs from the index, which references a work's topics under

headings distinct from their order of appearance and which is still to be invented.

The retrospective summing-up of a work's contents located at the start of a work is the mnemonic device that Pliny the Elder, following the lead of a certain Valerius Soranus, and Aulus Gellius devise to assist with the recollection of their own literary materials. The tables of contents tell the reader where to find a particular topic. By identifying the location, they assist the process of memory in as much as geography is a central component of ancient recollection. Ancient rhetorical theory presents memory as operating in and through a particular imaginary space, and the book's own memory device presents the book's own structure as the space of recollection. Understood as a mnemonic aid, the table of contents foregrounds the issue of the text as a whole as (an insufficient) memory receptacle, and this may have to do with the sorts of texts that these authors are writing. Pliny and Aulus Gellius both compose works that draw on many other sources, both Greek and Latin. Their works are the product of substantial reading over a wide variety of texts; they are the consequence of what may be assumed to be the compilation of material from libraries. If the *Natural History* and the *Noctes Atticae* represent the essence of other book collections, they also reveal the anxiety that their own narratives will fail to recollect the knowledge contained and excerpted in themselves. What the tables of contents do is to attempt to ensure that the contents of the two works remain readily accessible, and, because the works themselves point more or less explicitly to other texts, to ensure that the reader is aware of and recollects the larger body of textuality that underlies these two compendious works. The content lists stand as synecdoches both of the encyclopaedias and of the texts that have gone into the making of the former.

These tables of contents are the means by which the authors indicate that their works are texts that require mnemonic and navigational assistance, and one wonders if this suggests a lack of confidence in the reader. If Pliny expresses concerns about not wasting the precious time of his addressee and dedicatee, Gellius offers his work as something of an introduction to his reader. Gellius' reader is not someone assumed to have prior knowledge of the author's source texts or of his material, so that the references in the table of contents to the topic and the text or the

author from which they come must be seen as an important orientation for this individual. Alternatively, as in the worlds of Apuleius and Athenaeus, the contents lists may otherwise acknowledge the vast body of material that a literate culture must now deal with and absorb in order to merit the description 'literate'. Being educated no longer means just knowing one's Homer and perhaps one's lyric poets; it now entails knowing, in addition to Greek literature, a growing body of Roman material. The tables of contents may thus be serving to reassure the reader of what he will find, and where he will find it, and that what he will find can be articulated in summation as he approaches the activity of reading and attempts to master (some of) this material. They are a way of previewing a work's contents before the reader encounters them, a means of ensuring that what will be read has actually already been read, as would have been the case with the older, traditional works of the Greco-Roman corpus.

V

The tables of contents are an innovation in textual production in the first and second centuries CEX. Apart from their appearance in Pliny's *Natural History* and Aulus Gellius' *Noctes Atticae*, they also appear in later works, although here they have evolved in such a manner that they take on a slightly different form. Tables of contents of each book are now prefixed to the individual books, suggesting that readers are now expected to encounter each book of a work as a fixed, self-sufficient unit that perhaps may be read in isolation from the rest of the work. This increased sense of the book portion as a distinct unit may have a physical basis as far as textuality is concerned, for it suggests above all the move from the book roll, which had been the domain of literate culture until the late third century CE, to the codex.

The shift in the pagan world was one that occurred slowly, with the poet Martial alone experimenting with parchment books (see 1.2; 14.184, 186, 188, 190 and 192), and with no evidence that other authors like the two Plinys, Suetonius, Aulus Gellius, Lucian, Aelius Aristides, or Galen used the parchment codex.³⁸ The papyrus roll was the dominant form of the book until the beginning of the fourth century CE in non-Christian circles, but after this both the papyrus roll and codex yielded to the vellum

codex.³⁹ Why this occurred may be attributed to the advantages of the codex as a physical object. Vellum was a superior material to papyrus. Beyond this, as William Harris emphatically observes,⁴⁰ the codex was able to contain more text and, indeed, longer works in their entirety, enabling collections of an author's works in a much more portable form. The fact that text appears on both sides of the codex rather than on one side as with the book roll made it cheaper, but this reason alone does not explain its growing popularity.⁴¹ The codex, furthermore, made reference to particular passages in texts a much more easy task.⁴² König and Whitmarsh suggest that the codex enabled such a rapid reference to the text that the result was a hypertextuality.⁴³ This may above all explain why the codex gained a position of prominence among Christians beginning with the second and third centuries, for Christians needed to be able to refer to certain passages of biblical text, whether or not canonical, in order to prove and support their beliefs and teachings.⁴⁴

One of the next works to make use of the table of contents is the *Diatribai*, or *Conversations*, of Epictetus, the Stoic philosopher (c.50–120 CE), which was taken down word for word by his pupil, the historian and administrator Flavius Arrian, as Sextus himself wrote down nothing for publication. Each of the four books of the *Diatribai* is preceded by a list of the chapters as denoted by their topics, with book 1 containing thirty chapters, books 2 and 3 consisting of twenty-six chapters each, and book 4 comprised of thirteen chapters. These lists of chapters are entitled *ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΑ ΤΟΥ Α [or Β or Γ or Δ] ΒΙΒΛΙΟΥ*. Each of these descriptions of the chapters then appears verbatim at the beginning of the chapter in the main text. In later works the summation of the chapter contents may appear as chapter headings and not also in a list of chapters at the beginning of the work's individual books, as in the case of the writing of Sextus Empiricus (c.200 CE) and of Augustine *De Civitate Deixs*. In the case of the works the reader must plough through the texts in order to find her directions rather than have indications of what she might expect in each portion of the text.

Claudius Ptolemy (c.90–168CE), the geographer who wrote during the time of Hadrian and lived until the reign of Marcus Antonius (*Vit. Ptol.* and Suidas), also signalled the order of contents in his work. In his *Geography* Ptolemy announces the

topics contained in each book in a table headed by the phrase ‘these are the things in X book’ (τάδε ἔνεστιν ἐν τῷ Ξ [βιβλίῳ]) at the beginning of each book with the topic reappearing before the relevant section in the body of the text. The issues announced for the first book are those of methodology, including such topics as ‘In what way geography differs from the description of places [χωρογραφία]’ and ‘How is it necessary to depict the inhabited world on a sphere?’, while the later books much more succinctly list the places treated in each book. These subsequent tables also conclude with an enumeration of the sort undertaken by Pliny in his *Natural History*. In the table of contents to book 2 Ptolemy names the number of provinces treated in the book—sixteen—and the number of tables of coordinates for maps (πίνακες)—five—which present the reader with a representation of Europe. After this he provides a list containing the different subjects dealt with in the geography of book 2: borders (περιορισμός), promontories, islands, juxtapositions (παραθέσεις), the outline of the beach, the names of seas, mountains, rivers, harbours, the names of provinces, places or tribes, inscriptions, epigrams, famous cities, cities of secondary importance, cities of tertiary importance. A similar catalogue also appears in the table of contents to book 4, where the author treats the regions and satrapies of Libya. Again, the final list in the catalogue concerns the physical, cultural, and political geography of Libya: borders, promontories, islands, juxtapositions of rivers, the contours of beaches, the names of sea, mountains, rivers, and harbours. Also included are the names of provinces, places, tribes, inscriptions, cities of the first, second, and third rank. Concluding the table of contents is the numbering of the provinces treated—fifteen—and the number of maps—five.

The *Geography* is a work that aspires to correct the maps of the geographer Marinus (c.70–130CE), who is discussed in book 1. Its stated aim is to offer a representation of the inhabited world: see ποιεῖσθαι τὴν τῆς οἰκουμένης καταγραφὴν (1.6.2), and, to this end, Ptolemy states in the final book of the work, 8, that he divides the world into three parts: Europe, which is depicted in ten maps, Africa, depicted in four maps, and Asia, depicted in twelve maps (8.2.1). He proceeds in the remainder of book 8 to summarize the contents of each πίναξ or map so as to mention each region and its borders, each region’s provinces, and

then, finally, the dimensions covered by each map of each region. The geographer thus recalls the contents of his work at the conclusion in a way that both reinforces and complements the tables of contents at the beginning of each book. It is notable that the topic entries for the final sections of book 8 declare their function to summarize. For section 3 of book 8 Ptolemy declares the number of maps, provinces, and cities of Europe, Libya, and of Asia, while for section 4 of book 8 he totals up all the maps, provinces, and cities mentioned in the work as a whole. I suggest that this concluding gesture of summarization is to be seen as having a very different function from the initial table of contents, serving to recall and comprehend the foregoing text where the latter functions to indicate where the reader might locate particular topics.

The noun *πίναξ* denotes the tables on which maps might be drawn and, as far as the text of the *Geography* as it comes down to us is concerned, the tables providing the coordinates from which a map is to be drawn. In the case of the *Geography*, *πίναξ*—that is, the tables of coordinates—probably correlates to *πίναξ*, in the sense of the map.⁴⁵ P. J. Fischer argues that Ptolemy indeed published his text together with maps, and observes that maps have been found with the oldest and most authoritative manuscripts.⁴⁶ But *πίναξ* is, of course, also the noun that denotes the catalogues of books in the Alexandrian library, the means by which the reader is able to find his way around the vast collection of texts. There is a relation between the maps and tables of the *Geography*, and the catalogues and their counterparts *with in* individual works, the tables of contents, for they are different strategies to orient one around a large domain, either that of reality or that of letters. The tables of contents that precede each of the books of Ptolemy's work thus in a sense replicate the function of the text, enabling the reader to locate his position in it, just as the work as a whole stands as a guide to the different regions of the inhabited world.

The Christian polemicist Hippolytus (170–236CE) uses tables of contents in his work *Refutation of All Heresies* (*Refutatio Omnium Haeresium*). The work is one that sets out and criticizes various schools of belief, those of pagan philosophy (book 1), the doctrines and mysteries of the Egyptians (in the missing book 2), Chaldean science and astrology (in the missing book 3), the

system of the Chaldean horoscope (in the partially preserved book 4), and the heresies of the church (books 5 to 9). The author begins each book by setting out its contents, which are generally presented in terms of the individuals identified with particular beliefs or sets of beliefs rather than in terms of the beliefs themselves. Book 1 thus begins with a statement that Hippolytus will explain the doctrines of the natural philosophers, those of moral philosophers, and, finally, those of the logicians, and it continues with a list of the natural philosophers—Thales, Pythagoras, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, Parmenides, Leucippus, Democritus, Xenophanes, Ecphantus, and Hippo—a list of the moral philosophers, Socrates and Plato, and then one of the logicians Aristotle, Chrysippus, Zeno, Pyrrho, with further mention of the Brahmins, the Druids, and Hesiod. Following this table and a prologue, the author proceeds to explain the thought of these individuals chapter by chapter. In book 5 Hippolytus indicates his concern with the thought of the Gnostic Naasseni, the Peratae, the Sethians, and Justinus, and in the book's twenty-eight chapters he fulfils this prescription, devoting several chapters to each group or individual. Similarly, in the remainder of the work the tabulation of contents is quite rough, with the author setting out the belief system of individuals to be covered often by several chapters in the narrative of the work.

In book 7 the mention of Menander's teaching that the world was created by angels in the table of contents is covered very briefly at the beginning of chapter 28, which is for the most part devoted to the thought of Saturnilus (7.28.2). Similarly, the mention of Lucian's blasphemy is given less space in the body of the text than the initial reference to the topic suggests. Lucian is treated in chapter 37, with Cerdon and Marcion almost as an afterthought with the statement that 'in a similar way also [did] his [i.e. Marcion's] student Lucian [behave]' (ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Λουκιάδης ὁ τούτου μαθητής, 7.37.2). It would seem from these two instances, where the initial introduction of a topic suggests a fuller and deeper treatment than is actually given, that Hippolytus' narrative occasionally took a different course from the one that he initially imagined for his work. These moments in the *Refutation* suggest that the table of contents is not a final summing-up of the work's contents—as

it appears to be in the case of Pliny's *Natural History* and Aulus Gellius' *Noctes Atticae*—so much as a plan that the author sketches out for himself and for his reader before the composition of each book.

Indeed, the final book of the work, book 10, functions as a summarization of the work's contents, suggesting that the prefatory tables of contents are not intended as summations. As in Ptolemy's *Geography* the contents markers are condensations of the succeeding summations: 'epitome of all the philosophers', 'epitome of all heresies', followed by 'what is the truth in addition to all these things'. Hippolytus justifies what will follow by observing that he has not broken through the 'labyrinth of heresies' (τὸν λαβύρινθον τῶν αἱρέσεων) with violence but has unravelled it with refutation and with the power of the truth (10.5.1). He will in this final book present his reader with a demonstration of the truth, but not until he has comprehensively presented the teachings of the Greeks, contained in the first four books of the work, and those of the heresiarchs, contained in the following books. And so Hippolytus recounts the doctrines of the more important figures among those already treated earlier in the *Refutations* until chapter 32, where he sets out his theology. Recapitulation in the final book thus functions as part of the author's demonstration of the truth, and not as a way of pointing the reader to various parts of the text for particular topics. It is rather the tables of contents that function in this way.

In Eusebius' *Ecclesiastical History*, a work that dates to the second decade of the fourth century CE, tables of contents are prefixed to each of the ten books, again showing with certainty the influence of the codex on the arrangement of materials in the work. Before each of the tables Eusebius (c.260–339/40) writes 'the first (and so on) book of the *Ecclesiastical History* contains these things' or 'the following'. He then lists the topics of each section chapter by chapter, emphasizing in particular key events in church history, doctrinal issues, different individuals, and key episodes in their lives. In books 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, and 9, there is exact correlation between the tables and the chapters that they describe. In the other books, however, the symmetry breaks down, either with the tables of contents suggesting a different order from that which actually occurs, or else with fewer topics denoted by the tables than actually occur in the book. At book 3,

chapters 13 and 14, where the table announces that chapter 13 will be concerned with Abilius, second ruler of the Alexandrians, and chapter 14 will be concerned with Anencletus, the second Roman bishop, chapter 13 narrates Anencletus' receipt of the Roman bishopric and chapter 14 concerns itself with Abilius coming to power, while in book 6, the table of contents declares that chapter 26 will treat the regard that the bishops had for Origen and chapter 27 will deal with Heraclas succeeding to the Alexandrian bishopric, although the topics are reversed in the book itself. In book 7, the table lists thirty chapters, while the actual book itself contains thirty-two chapters. The non-congruence of the table of contents and the book chapters is due to chapter 18, where Eusebius intrudes a description of two statues depicting the woman healed of bleeding by Christ and Christ himself at Caesarea Philippi, and to chapter 29, where the author relates the excommunication of the leader of the heresy at Antioch during the reign of Aurelian. The table of contents to the final book, 10, lists eight chapters, while there are actually nine chapters in the book. The extra chapter is interpolated as chapter 6, which contains a copy of a letter concerning money grants to churches. The non-congruence in these books suggests strongly that the tables of contents were written first, perhaps as much as markers the author made to himself regarding the workingout of the book, and the books written later without care to revise the tables.

The *Ecclesiastical History* is a work that draws on numerous sources, and Eusebius declares at the beginning of the first book that he has selected as if from 'discursive fields'

(ὥς ἂν ἐκ λογικῶν λειμώνων) from memoirs and from ancient writers and has given this material body through his historical narrative so that it will be useful for those who value such a writing (1.1.5). This is in part a result of the access that the author had to two libraries, both with an Alexandrian bias.⁴⁷ The first of these was the one created by his teacher Pamphilus at Caesarea, which included the works of Origen and other church writers, and the other, the episcopal library at Jerusalem, founded by Bishop Alexander of Jerusalem, a pupil of Origen.⁴⁸ Eusebius explicitly acknowledges the sources of his text. The contents table to the second book refers to the source materials for the books, which identifies Clement (of Alexandria),

Tertullian, Josephus, and Philo as sources, although, as R. M. Grant observes, book 2 also cites Justin and Irenaeus (2.13.1–5), Hegesippus and possibly Josephus for the death of James (2.23.3–20), and Gaius and Dionysius for the deaths of Peter and Paul (2.25.5–8).⁴⁹ Elsewhere the author does occasionally speak of chapters as concerning the writings of certain individuals—for example, ‘the extant treatises of Philo’ (‘Ὅσα τοῦ Φίλωνος εἰς ἡμᾶς περιῆλθεν συγγράμματα. 2.18). ‘the treatises of Clement’ (Περὶ τῶν Κλήμεντος συγγραμμάτων, 6.13), ‘the letters of Dionysius’ (Περὶ τῶν ἐπιστολῶν Διονυσίου, 7.25). Book 10 contains copies of imperial letters in chapters 5 to 7, attesting to the emperor Constantine’s actions on behalf of the Church. Otherwise, Eusebius draws, among other sources, on the New Testament, Julius Africanus (cf. HE 1.7 and 6.31), the Archives of Edessa (cf. HE 1.12.3), Hegesippus (cf. HE 4.22), Papias, the bishop of Hierapolis (cf. HE 3.39.9), Aristo of Pella (cf. HE 4.6), Justin Martyr (HE 4.1618), Irenaeus (e.g. HE 4.18), and Origen (e.g. HE 6.4).

Finally, that the table of contents becomes such an important device is shown by Josephus’ *Jewish Antiquities*, a work finished, the author tells us at 20.267, at the end of the first century CE in the thirteenth year of Domitian’s reign, that is 93–4. While this work was originally composed without tables of contents, it was later—and, perhaps, not too long after its original composition—furnished with rough lists of each book’s contents followed by a statement regarding the number of years covered placed at the beginning of each book in a variety of different manuscript traditions. I suggest that this confirms the realization that both the author and the reader must be able to find his way around the contents of a work, and here it is the copyists who have taken the responsibility for ensuring that this task is made easier for the audience by providing brief summaries of each book’s contents before the latter encounters them.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown that, where the ancient library is concerned, it is not enough just to possess the literary material in a collection. Beyond this, the reader must know where the

material is in order that the function of writing as a memory aid is not rendered invalid. Thus, tags on book rolls, library catalogues, such as Callimachus' *Pinakes*, and then tables of contents are the means by which scholars and authors indicate the location of literary material, first in the large book collection, and then in the compendious or encyclopaedic work. Overall, what this proposes is that the library in antiquity, as in modernity, is an institution in which memory must be supplemented in order for the written word to retain its mnemonic value. It is not enough for the literary texts to contain the narratives, histories, and facts belonging to a culture, but it is also necessary that the literary texts must themselves have their position and contents marked within another subsidiary structure of recollection, one that may either refer to their location within the overall collection or else identify the parts of a literary text with respect to its whole structure.

Now do not forget: in the library, memory (the table of contents) must supplement memory (the book).

Forms of the Library

The Breathing Library: Performing Cultural Memories

‘I want you to meet Jonathan Swift, the author of that evil political book, *Gulliver’s Travels*! And this other fellow is Charles Darwin, and this one is Schopenhauer, and this one is Einstein, and this one here at my elbow is Mr Albert Schweitzer, a very kind philosopher indeed. Here we all are, Montag. Aristophanes and Mahatma Gandhi and Gautama Buddha and Confucius and Thomas Love Peacock and Thomas Jefferson and Mr. Lincoln, if you please. We are also Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John.’

Everyone laughed quietly.

‘It can’t be,’ said Montag.

‘It is,’ replied Granger, smiling.

Ray Bradbury, *Fahrenheit 451* (New York, 1950), 135.

INTRODUCTION

This is a chapter that proposes that a library need not be a physical, static collection of literary texts, and the basis for such a proposal is the notion that texts might come in very different sizes, shapes, forms, and, indeed, people. The late twentieth century has worried about the demise of the book in the face of electronic technology, focusing its anxieties around issues concerning authors—certainly, one of the givens of post-classical print culture¹—their intentions, and their deaths; however, this worry is in many senses a contemporary one. I suggest that, by a notable difference, antiquity concerned itself particularly with the question: ‘how can a text be?’ If literary texts can be physically

located in writing, in the ‘book’ and in book collections, Greco-Roman antiquity also acknowledged and played with the idea that literary texts can be embodied by persons. According to a representation of textuality that comes largely from the late empire, the literary intellectual or *pepaideumenos* constructs himself and is constructed as the ‘walking library’, the embodied receptacle of bookish culture.

The cultured man through his vast reading knowledge comes to personify the book collection, and as such he performs his own literary socializations and acculturations. He is imbued with textual culture to the point that he can (or should be able to) recall it from memory. Because knowledge is a form of power and authority, he is an intellectually empowered being quite distinct and independent of the power of the physical libraries established by antiquity’s rulers and he occasionally comes up against the state. But, as the embodied receptacle of textual culture, the literary intellectual is also a figure who demonstrates that the institution of library is far from objective: the breathing library is a critical entity, one who chooses what to commit to memory and what to forget and what to validate as society’s literary culture.

I

Where relatively recently the written text has been the privileged form of textuality, in antiquity textuality was less emphatically literary—that is, written, or at least literary in a far more qualified sense. Authors such as Plato and Isocrates had characterized the written word as unserious and defenceless offspring (cf. *Phaedrus* 274e5–275b3), or as aetiolated, because disembodied, *logoi*, constructing a quarrel between the oral and the written word (e.g. Isocrates *To Philip* 25–72). One of the dimensions of this quarrel involves the comeback of the spoken text as one that redeems itself because it is embodied, whether by its father-author or by a professional performer.

In the fifth century BC Gorgias declared logos a ‘powerful ruler’ that by means of the smallest possible and least visible body (*σμικροτάτῳ σώματι καὶ ἀφανεστάτῳ*) accomplishes the most godlike deeds (*θειότατα ἔργα*, Helen 8). But this statement comes in the face of other realizations that logos did

and certainly should acquire a more substantial body along the way. Karen Bassi has written of the way in which epic poetry might either be direct—that is, uttered by its composer—or else mediated, in which case it is uttered by someone other than the composer, and is potentially unreliable.³ The story of the embodied text in Greek antiquity is to a large degree the story of mediated texts, for *logos* demonstrates the capacity to possess voice, mind, and, moreover, critical facility, even in the absence of its original creator. It is a performer's body that gives the speech its mobility, its orality, its entity, and antiquity has its textual persons, individuals who lend their voices and minds to the end of embodying *logos*. Most obvious of these was the rhapsode, literally 'the stitcher of words' (cf. Pindar *Nemean* 2.1–3), who travels throughout the *Greek* world performing the poetry of Homer word for word. The rhapsode is the receptacle of Homeric knowledge and culture, and, in the light of Homer's emblematic status as *Greek* author, he is thus the receptacle who reproduces Greek knowledge and culture for his audiences. And the rhapsode is well regarded in his community as one of a class of craftsmen.⁴

But this embodied text culture is also originally one that is recognized as requiring careful surveillance and regulation. The rhapsode, as privileged representative of oral culture, is a figure who needs to be carefully watched for the sake of textual integrity. Indeed, Xenophon depicts the rhapsode as someone who knows his epic extremely well (cf. ἀκριβοῦντας), but is nonetheless likely to be rather stupid (Memorabilia 4.2.10).⁵ Plato's infamous rhapsode, Ion, may regard himself as the best general in Greece because he can recite the *Iliad*, although conversation with Socrates shows him to be lacking in understanding of what generalship is.⁶ Ion is merely the mouthpiece who speaks his texts without true understanding of them or discernment, as discussion with Socrates makes evident. He knows only Homer (536d), mistakes emotive response for interpretative response, and regards memorization as understanding.⁷ Literary representations apart, mistrust of the embodied text culture is articulated through legislation. Precisely because the textual performer is not an author but a mediator, he can corrupt authorial intention. He may emend, elide, omit, elaborate the text; he may forget; he may introduce variations

into the text.⁸ This the Athenian tyrant Peisistratus recognized when he is reputed to have instituted the Panathenaic Rule, the law that ensured that the Homeric epics would be recited in exactly the same way and order performance after performance (cf. *Pangegyricus* 159; Plato *Hipparchus* 228b; Diogenes Laertius 1.579).

The rhapsode is far from the only individual envisaged as the receptacle of textuality. The culture of textual memorization is not the domain of only the professional or specialized intellectual, and in the case of these other individuals there is a sense that memorization maintains and ensures the integrity of the original text. Oenopides, the mathematician, rebukes a young man for having many books, but not ‘in his heart’ (DK 41 fr. 4), suggesting that learning must be internalized through memorization, while Antisthenes insists on the need to inscribe books on the soul (*psyche*), and not on paper.¹⁰ Following the conquest of Megara and the looting of his house, Stilpo declares that no one can carry off his *paideia*, implying that he carries it around within him (cf. Diogenes Laertius 2.115).¹¹ *Paideia* is a precious possession to be protected and cherished. The Athenian stranger speaks of education as one in which the young learn poems by heart in Plato’s *Laws* (810e–811b), and, certainly, this is borne out by accounts of conventional *paideia* in the *Republic* and the *Protagoras*.¹² In the *Symposium* 3.5–6 Xenophon gives us Niceratus, whose father had made him learn both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* by heart so that he will appear to be cultured. Through the process of extensive memorization Niceratus becomes the voice of the Homeric poems, and thus embodies these texts. In the Roman period, learning texts by heart is one of the duties of slaves. Seneca *Ep.* 27.6 describes Calvisius Sabinus training slaves to memorize Homer, Hesiod, and the nine lyric poets.¹³ According to the *Historia Augusta*, the emperor Hadrian is said to be able to recall texts from memory after reading them: ‘at once he presented from memory works he had read and unknown to most people’ (*libros statim lectos et ignotos quidem plurimis memoriter reddidit*, 20.10).¹⁴ Knowledge of texts is clearly a valued and valuable ability that places one at an advantage over others.

The personified text owes any status and authority that it might possess to an oral literary culture, and these would seem to be challenged by a culture of collecting that requires texts to be physical *objects* that can be acquired and stored. The text as person ought to be rendered subordinate to the text as scroll or book by the formation of libraries, and the moment at which this is to be most true should be the Hellenistic period, with the formation of the great libraries. Yet it is at this point that in one representation of the textuality of the period the embodied text gains even greater authority, for it implicitly becomes the authoritative and authorizing text: the embodied 'book' becomes the regulating work with respect to the written word. The spoken word maintains and even strengthens its position in aspects of literary culture in and after the Hellenistic period.

The libraries of Hellenistic Egypt might be regarded as declaring a very particular relation of writing to knowledge: books are to be seen as the receptacle and monument of the prior knowledges that constitute the civilized Greek world and that now stand as the basis for the Hellenistic world. There had already been public libraries or notable book collections prior to the Hellenistic period. Peisistratus' own collection of texts was supposed to have been the inspiration for Ptolemy II's Alexandrian institution (Isidore *Etymologies* 6.3.3–5), and Athens had the Metroon, the building that served as the city state's public archives. After the dissolution of the Athenian empire, libraries were established at Pergamum and Alexandria, as the kings of these cities struggled to set up the first such institution. Pliny provides testimony to the competitive nature of the library's creation in Hellenistic Egypt (*NH* 35.2.10), while the Roman author Vitruvius proposes that a jealous Ptolemy copied the Attalid king in establishing a library at Alexandria (7, *praf.* 4). The Alexandrian library in particular was one that attempted to contain *all* Greek culture, so that the Ptolemies could lay claim to cultural hegemony. According to Galen, Ptolemy copied all books that arrived by sea at Alexandria (Galen, *Comm. in Hipp. Epidem.* 17.1.606 Kuhn), and both the libraries at Alexandria and Pergamum offered rewards to individuals who supplied them with volumes (cf. *Comm. in Hipp. De Nat. Homin.* 1.44.105).

The Hellenistic library simultaneously demonstrates the inadequacy of the library as a body of physical, written texts, and

the genealogy of Egyptian text culture is founded (at least in subsequent representations) in parallel with an alternative notion of library. It foregrounds a belief, in fact a re-recognition of the Platonic realization, that the physical text needs its human advocates.¹⁵ This the textual material concerning the origins of the 'Library', as an idea and as a historical institution, suggests. A story that Strabo tells about the fate of Aristotle's books, a notional precedent for the Alexandrian library, is testimony that physical texts are liable to physical abuse and neglect. The geographer relates how Aristotle, who taught the Egyptian kings to gather and collect books, passed his collection of texts to his pupil Theophrastus. He continues his account, telling his reader that Theophrastus then bequeathed his own and Aristotle's libraries to his pupil, the philosopher Neleus, who took it to Scepsis, whose non-intellectual descendants (cf.

ἰδιώται ἄνθρωποι) put the books away carelessly. A worse desecration is to befall the texts in Strabo's narrative. Hearing that the books from their collection are being sought by the Attalid kings for the library at Pergamum, Neleus' descendants bury them in a trench and so cause their decay.¹⁶ A bibliophile named Apellicon subsequently restores the texts, making new copies of them and incorrectly filling the gaps. At Rome the grammarian Tyrannion and booksellers acquire and then circulate poorly edited copies of these works after acquiring them (Strabo 13.1.54; for Apellicon's role in acquiring Aristotle's library, see Athenaeus 5.2.14).

Strabo's narrative is in some sense a nightmare scenario of what happens when books fall into the ownership of individuals who do not understand their value. There is a sense in which the fate of Aristotle's library warns that libraries, far from secure or eternal monuments, are indeed vulnerable and, in some sense, make the existence of books more precarious. The physical library renders the whole cultural legacy, which ideally it serves to protect, liable to destruction and to irrecoverable erasure. And indeed this recognition is one that even the untrustworthy narratives concerning the burnings of the Alexandrian Library by the Romans and later the Christians and Muslims confirm.

But there is also a sense in which the creation of a library can paradoxically be its own worst enemy. In their eagerness to acquire volumes for the Library, the Ptolemies prompted the

production of fake texts by offering payment for those who could bring them the writings of the Greek world. Individuals produced spurious texts in the hope of a reward, and, accordingly, the library could never be an authoritative institution. Texts had to be authenticated, in addition to and apart from the fact that many of them, such as the Homeric epics, already had layers of editorial and rhapsodic interpolation. In connection with this we can read again the narrative regarding the appointment of Aristophanes of Byzantium who as librarian at Alexandria establishes the need to supplement the textuality constituted by the conventional library. In the preface to book 7 of *De Architectura* Vitruvius (fl. 1st cent. BC¹⁷) states that, after deciding to set up a rival library to Pergamum's, Ptolemy—Vitruvius does not specify which one—establishes literary contests dedicated to the Muses and to Apollo. He seeks educated judges (*iudices litterati*) to determine the victors of these contests. The king himself selects six individuals, and has Aristophanes recommended to him by the governors of the library as the seventh *judge for the reason that he has diligently and carefully read in order all the books in the library (summo studio summaque diligentia cotidie omnes libros ex ordine perlegeret)*. When it comes to the poetic adjudication, the first six judges agree to give the prize to the poet who most pleased the crowd. Aristophanes, however, alone deems that the prize should be awarded to the individual who least gratified the audience with his composition (*De Architectura* 7, pref. 5–6). To justify his decision Aristophanes shows that the individual he selects as winner is the only one who presented an original text, while the others had put forward plagiarized texts (cf. 'thefts', *furta*). He establishes that misappropriation has occurred by relying on his memory (*fretus memoriae*) to match the stolen works to the texts from his bookcases.¹⁸ The offenders are punished, and Aristophanes is made the head librarian. In this case, the intellectual authority of the walking library successfully stands against the political authority of the judges.

The educated man after the classical period is one imbued with the *paideia* or culture of his community, whether this is a contemporary culture, or, more likely, a prior one constituted by a series of authoritative and canonical texts. Specifically, the learned reader becomes a textual regulator and authenticator; he

is the back-up system for the physical library. And so Aristophanes is a figure who in the Vitruvian narrative comes to instantiate the textual *paideia* of Hellenistic Alexandria. He can discriminate between authentic and false texts because he has read all the works in the library, and knows them sufficiently well to be able to identify the texts of the competitors as plagiarisms. It may be that he has memorized all the texts in the library, or it may be that he has memorized the location of the innumerable volumes in the library, in which case the physical structure of the library is a mnemonic aid that enables him to match up the fake with its true source.¹⁹ Aristophanes is thus able to distinguish the copy from the original (but less than brilliant) composition in the poetic competition. He is the walking, human counterpart of the Ptolemaic library, and, accordingly, deserves to be its librarian.

Vitruvius is an intellectual who belongs to Augustus' Rome (cf. bk 1, pref. 1), and accordingly the Vitruvian Aristophanes reflects an Augustan awareness about the potential of the library for mobility and dislocation and also for discrimination, one that is particularly appropriate in the light of the origins of Augustus' library in earlier collections. Aristophanes oversees the establishment of texts from the classical world in a collection at Alexandria, and his activity provides a precedent for Rome's own assimilation of Hellenic literary culture. Vitruvius frames the narrative of judgement and criticism by a set of statements that acknowledge that 'we', that is the Romans, owe our knowledge of Troy's history, of the teachings of the Greek philosophers from the pre-Socratics to Zeno, and of the accomplishments of great political leaders to written records that memorialize them (cf. *memoriae ad posteritatem*). The preface to book 7 commences with an acknowledgement that works from the past exist at present because they have been written down and collected (7, pref.1). The preface continues with the observation that there are some who steal the works of others and appropriate them to themselves (cf. *qui eorum scripta furantes pro suis praedicant*). The story of Aristophanes of Byzantium is presented as a historical example that goes on to make the point that those who claim the work of others for themselves must not only be censured (*non modo sunt reprehendendi*) but also be punished (*sed etiam, qui impie more vixerunt, poena contemnandi*, 7, pref. 2-3): it is also the case that

the Roman ‘we’ has to watch over the contents of its textual receptacle for cultural memory and it is the walking library who stands as the foremost authority for the authenticity of the text.

III

Subsequent authors suggest that the ‘living library’ should be a notion disassociated, as seems only logical and appropriate, from the idea of the physical library and therefore from any authority or power it might bear. The individual as library becomes an independent focus of intellectual power, which may stand against political power (as in the case of Apuleius). In the *Lives of the Sophists* (VS) Eunapius (346–c.414) offers the following note on Longinus, whom he identifies as the teacher of the philosopher Porphyry (233–c. 301) (and not as the author of the treatise *On the Sublime*):

Λογγίνος δὲ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον ἐκείνον βιβλιοθήκη τις ἦν ἔμφυχος καὶ περιπατοῦν μουσεῖον, καὶ κρίνειν γὰρ τοὺς παλαιοὺς ἐπετέτραπτο, καθάπερ πρὸ ἐκείνου πολλοὶ τινες ἔτεροι...

(Eunapius VS 456)

At that time Longinus was a breathing library and walking museum, and he was entrusted with the task of judging ancient [authors] just as many others before him ...

Eunapius is the biographer who explicitly identifies the phenomenon of the library that is unfixed from geographical location. Where the sacred library (ἡ ἱερὰ βιβλιοθήκη) of the Egyptian king Osymandyas bears the inscription ‘the healing place of the soul’ (ψυχῆς ἰατρεῖον) (cf. Diodorus Siculus 1.49.3), Eunapius assimilates the soul to the ‘library’. He compares Longinus to a ‘breathing’ or ‘living library’ (βιβλιοθήκη τις ... ἔμφυχος) and a ‘walking museum’ (περιπατοῦν μουσεῖον), appropriating the institutions that were active in the wholesale appropriation of Homer, archaic poetry, classical Greek literature, and, in the case of the Septuagint, the Hebrew Bible at the hands of an elite Alexandrian culture and its representative agents. But where the original Museum-Library was constituted by a complex of buildings, the body of professional literati who inhabited it, and their books, as far as Eunapius is concerned, the historical individual Longinus now

personifies the critical institution as a 'breathing' or 'living library and walking museum'. Longinus, like the earlier library/librarian Aristophanes, is an individual who is to be highly regarded for personalizing the Hellenistic library and museum. He emblemizes the idea of textual mobility, for a 'living library' is one that frees the institution from strict geographical location.

Eunapius' biographical sketch, moreover, foregrounds the idea of judgement, for he adjudicates the work of prior writers, and, as in the case of his predecessors, great learning validates his position as judge. The biographer goes on to declare that Longinus' literary judgement (*krisis*) was required to legitimate the critical positions of his contemporaries: the walking library is the critics' critic.²⁰ The teacher of Porphyry is to be regarded as a judge *par excellence*, and, moreover, as one from which other literary experts take their advice and authority. Longinus is the keeper of a textual heritage, the individual who can discern and discriminate, and in this way he is the embodiment of library culture as first conceived by the Egyptian Ptolemies. In Porphyry's *Life of Plotinus* Longinus may not be a walking library, although he certainly exercises his powers of discernment and judgement (*krisis*) on the works of his philosophical community in a text entitled *Longinus: Concerning Plotinus and Gentilianus Amelianus on the End* (20.13–16). In this study Longinus locates Plotinus and Amelianus in the first rank of philosophers, and Ammonius and Origen in the second rank. What is notable about Porphyry's account of Longinus is that he is here someone who deals with the physical, written text. He requests that Porphyry bring him his teacher's works so that he can fill in the missing parts in his edition (19.7–8), and elsewhere he comments that Euclides, Democratius, and Proclinus did not collect or transcribe the work of their predecessors (20.57–60). Porphyry's Longinus is the keeper of a physical library rather than a library himself and no less powerful for it.

In a similar vein the Christian author Jerome praises a certain Nepotianus for his learning in *Epistle* 60. According to Jerome, Nepotianus could declare that a passage of text came from Tertullian, Cyprian, Lactantius, or Hilarius, and he could also assert that Minucius Felix, Victorinus, and Arnobius spoke in such and such a style:

atque in hunc modum eruditionis gloriam declinando eruditissimus habebatur. ‘illud’, aiebat, ‘Tertulliani, istud Cypriani, hoc Lactantii, illud Hilarii est. sic Minucius Felix, ita Victorinus, in hunc modum est locutus Arnobius’.

But in this manner he was considered extremely learned because he avoided the reputation of learnedness. He would say ‘that is Tertullian’s, that Cyprian’s, this is Lactantius’, that Hilarius’. Thus Minucius Felix, so Victorinus, and Arnobius spoke in this manner. He goes on to say that as result of his constant reading and daily meditations Nepotianus bore his breast as a ‘library of Christ’ (*bibliothecam... Christi*) (Ep. 60.10). Jerome’s subject is so learned in the writings of Christianity that he knows them and their style by heart, and this is what causes the author to declare that his heart contains a Christian library: no longer are the texts of pagan Greco-Roman antiquity the privileged contents of a library.

IV

Vitruvius ‘Aristophanes, Eunapius’ Longinus, and Jerome’s Nepotianus are far from the only instances of the mobile, personified library in post-Hellenistic antiquity. In Apuleius’ Apology, the text that purports to offer a defence against the charge of using magic for criminal ends, the author offers a self-portrait that articulates the idea that the educated man, in this case, the *philosophus*, is to be regarded as a polymathic walking library. The rhetorician’s line of defence is that, because he is a man to be associated with book learning, eloquence, and knowledge, he is also to be disassociated from evil sorcery and magic. The orator is an individual who has surrendered all physical pleasures in order to pursue *eloquentia*, such that his position as an intellectual necessarily defines him as a virtuous innocent, and thus he is the ‘most skilled at speech’ (*facundissimum*) and without any *nefas* (Apology 5).

Apuleius emblemizes his identity as learned individual in a number of ways. One of them is through his possessions, specifically the books that he carries with him wherever he goes:

nam morem mihi habeo, quoquo eam, simulacrum alicuius dei inter libellos conditum gestae eoque diebus festis ture et

mero et aliquando victima supplicare.

(*Apology* 63.9–10; cf. 37.13–16)

for it is my habit to carry wherever I go an effigy of a god amongst my books and to worship it on festival days with incense, honey, and a sacrifice.

The orator has a portable library, but this is merely the physical symbol of the library that he carries within his head. The *Apology* is, one notes, a carefully orchestrated performance of literary knowledge for his forensic audience. It is one that serves to display both his extraordinary erudition and his moral integrity. Early on in the *Apology*, Apuleius declares that the ‘wise man’ is one who recalls (*recordatur*) learning (12.21–2; cf. *eruditionis memoriam*, 91.7). This gloss on ‘philosopher’ signals the performance of textual knowledge as a feat of memory.

Knowledge of literature is what absolves the speaker of the charge that he is a sorcerer (*magus*) precisely because literature has produced his identity as an intellectual. Accordingly, the oration is one in which the orator selectively recites and refers to the traditional Greek and Roman literary canon in the service of forensic defence. Thus the text of Plato (*Alcibiades I*), together with invocations of Anaxagoras, Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, Epimenides, Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Ostanes—the list is deliberately intimidating—qualify the court’s understanding of what a *magus* might be: Apuleius proposes a Platonic notion of *magus* as sage and philosopher-king (25–7).²¹

Apuleius presents himself as a consummate doyen of bilingual and bicultural erudition, who operates in the midst of a generally uncomprehending and unlearned community.²² He is as ‘learned in Greek as in Latin’ (*quam Graece tam Latine... disertissimus*), as even one of his accusers Tannonius Pudens must admit (4.2–3), and as he himself readily confesses elsewhere (e.g. 19.23, 36.19, 36.38; see also *Florida* 8.16, 18.91). In chapter 25 he draws attention to a ‘Hellenic eloquence’ (*eloquentiam Graecam*) as one of his virtues, and at 36.19–21 the defendant announces that he will attempt to write the same things in Greek and Latin, to enquire what is missing and to make up for the deficiencies in all things (cf. *eadem Graece et Latine adnitar conscribere et in omnibus aut omissa adquirere aut defecta supplere*). He virtually reiterates this thought as he describes himself as someone who will write all

things that are known to the fewest people with proper and eloquent Greek and Latin words (*qui res paucissimis cognitae Graece et Latine propriis et elegantibus uocabulis conscribo*, 39.23–4). In these passages the author alludes to his bilingualism in terms of Lucretian translation (cf. Lucretius DRN 1.136–7), which he more explicitly and verbosely details at 38.10–16:

pauca etiam de Latinis scriptis meis ad eandem peritiam pertinentibus legi iubebo, in quibus animaduertes cum me [collegisse res] cognitu raras, tum nomina etiam Romanis inusitata et in hodiernum quod sciam infecta, ea tamen nomina labore meo et studio ita de Graecis prouenire, ut tamen Latina moneta percussa sint.

I shall order to be read from my Latin writings a few things pertaining to this science, in which you will notice that I have assembled both little known matters and words unaccustomed even to the Romans and, as I know, even today unformed; however, those words come from the Greek by my labour and my study in such a way that they seem to have been coined from a Latin mint.

The *Apology*'s topics and themes reinforce its identity as a Greco-Roman text. The Latin oration's conceit of the philosopher on 'trial' for his life is a markedly Greek one.²³ The Greek text to which Apuleius' Latin oration most obviously refers and mirrors is Plato's *Apology* of Socrates. This text offers the model for the forensic defence as a literary construct that serves to define the identity of its dramatized speaker and/or author. Apuleius produces the defence of his life against the *crimen capitale* (4.31–2) as a latter-day Socrates going up before the jury to deliver an *apologia pro vita sua*. But the motif of the persecuted intellectual is also an Isocratean one. The Athenian rhetorician's *Antidosis* employs the fictional charges of tax evasion and corruption of youth as a pretext for a larger defence of his educational theories and his whole life. That the Roman Apuleius is deliberately impersonating Greek Isocrates is evident from the former's emphasis on his role as teacher of youths—namely, his nephews Sicinius Pudens and Sicinius Pontianus (28.21–9), and also from his adaptation of the Isocratean encomium of *logos* (15.254; 3.6–7) in chapter 18 of the *Apology*, where now the virtue of poverty (*paupertas*), rather than *logos*, is responsible for creating

civilization and its arts.

The forensic setting of the *Apology* is poignant, for the trial serves, amongst other things, as the site of literary discrimination and judgement in a political setting. The judge (Latin *arbiter* or Greek *krites*), according to Aristotelian rhetorical theory, is both, in the narrow forensic sense, the authority figure who hears and deliberates the legal case, and, in the larger, metaphorical sense, the general spectator and hearer. Apuleius deliberately conflates these senses of 'judge' as far as the *Apology* is concerned.²⁴ The rhetorician quite deliberately installs the judge, Claudius Maximus, in the role of literary critic, when he addresses him as an individual who has spoken much and learned even more by reading (cf. *multa fando, Maxime, audisti, etiam plura legendo didicisti*, 81.7, and *quod multo praestabilius est, tua doctrina, Claudius Maxime, tuaque perfecta eruditione fretus contemniam stultis et impolitis ad haec respondere?*, 91.8–10; cf. 95.1–2). Claudius is specifically cast as a fellow student with Apuleius of Aristotelian natural physics and science (36.11–16; 38.1–2; 41.10–11). Indeed, elsewhere Apuleius proposes that familiarity with the Platonic canon is the basis for his kinship with Maximus: both are named as members of the 'Platonic family' (*Platonica familia*, 64.8); both have identical knowledge of *Platonic doctrine* (51.1–2), having read the same dialogues, the *Alcibiades* (25.30), the *Timaeus* (25.25), and the *Phaedrus* (64.12–13). The speaker creates the sense that the well-read form a closed and exclusive community when he declares that his speech will absolve philosophy in the presence of those who are learned (*apud imperitos*, 1).²⁵ He presents literary knowledge as being on a par with political authority.

Apuleius also demonstrates the critical capacity that Vitruvius had attributed to Aristophanes of Byzantium and Eunapius to Longinus, the walking library. The orator becomes a latter-day Alexandrian scholar, distinguishing false from true text. He shows that an epistle in which his wife Pudentilla supposedly calls him a sorcerer (*magus*) is actually a forgery. His prosecutors have taken a statement that Pudentilla is herself refuting out of its context so that the false accusation stands unqualified (80–2). Pudentilla's words are actually part of a defence of her husband, and Apuleius asks Claudius to allow the text to assume its proper voice (*proprium vocem*, 83). Next the orator denies authorship of a

second letter in which he himself is supposed to have tried to charm Pudentilla into marriage (87). The forged epistle (*commenticia epistula*) becomes evident as such, thanks to poor style, language that is not socially acceptable (cf. *uitiosis uerbis, tam barbaro sermone*, 87.10–11), and its poor calligraphy (*numquam mea manu scripta*, 87.5). The letter displays none of the learning that is the basis of Apuleian identity.

The crucial critical distinction in the *Apology* is between those who are educated and therefore also virtuous—as the Apuleian philosopher must be—and those who are uncultured and therefore necessarily without virtue.²⁶ Literary knowledge is also equated with ethical behaviour. Accordingly, to discredit the prosecution, Apuleius emphasizes the ‘unlearning’ of his opponents: ‘so uncultured, and so uncivilized’ (*tam rudes, tam barbari*) are they that the speaker does not bother to mention the names of all the authors he has read in public libraries (91). The chief accuser Sicinus Aemilianus is ignorant about books, a rustic, boorish figure completely opposed to the urbane, learned Apuleius, who faults him for ignorance about the teachings of Archimedes on katoptrics (chapter 16). Aemilianus is ignorant of all literature (cf. *tam rudis...omnium litterarum*, 30), and it is because he cannot even read a Greek letter that the orator declines to cite Greek poetry to him (30). In a clearly futile attempt to educate this individual, Apuleius presents him with a reading list—Aristotle, Theophrastus, Eudemus, Lycones, and other minor Platonists (36). The overall point is that this individual is ignorant (cf. *nescis*) of the nature of the accusations he makes (53).

Because the individuals who persecute Apuleius and claim his textual culture to be sorcery are conspicuously unsocialized in bookish learning, they see vice where it is absent. They see sexual doubleentendres in the defendant’s scientific writings where such is not intended or present (34 and 35). Another of the prosecutors, Crassus, can only claim to have seen proof of Apuleius’ magic activities because he is ignorant of Homer’s *Odyssey* (cf. *quem si oculis uidit, ultra Vlixi uota et desideria hic quidem est oculatus; Vlixes fumum terra sua emergentem compluribus annis e litore prospectans frustra captauit... 57.15–18 = Odyssey 1.57*). Crassus’ devotion is to *studium bibendi* (57.25) rather than to the Apuleian ideal of *studium litterarum* (5.3). Rufinus

maintains a household that neither speaks nor writes Greek and Latin, and the texts that he and his associates produce attest to this fact (cf. 98.26–31; see also 87.10–16). By corollary, education is to be viewed as something that regulates those initiated into it, so that Apuleius becomes a defender of elite Greco-Roman culture against all that is corrupt and foreign, whether Asian or Punic.

V

In archaic Greece, knowledge of text from memory had been a requirement for entrance into the elite symposiastic and the later dining scene if we are to give authority to our witnesses to this culture in the archaic and classical periods. One's self-definition as a member of the cultured class depended on one's ability to mediate a pre-existent literature to similarly socialized individuals. The archaic poet Xenophanes provides evidence of symposiastic recitation in fragment 1, where he steps in to regulate the sort of poetic material that may be presented if such an occasion is to be orderly and just. The participants of the drinking party are to avoid stories of giants and gods in strife and war, anticipating one of the constraints that Plato would place upon poetry in the *Republic*.²⁷ The specific association of libraries and dining comes from textual material describing the Alexandrian library. The scholars of the Museum-Library enjoy a common mess hall (*sussition*, Strabo 17.1.8), while Diodorus Siculus informs us that in the ambulatory around the Library of the Egyptian king Osymandas are to be found depictions of all sorts of delightful foods and next to the Library is an exquisite hall in which are to be found a table with couches for twenty, and statues of Zeus, Hera, and the King, who together speak of the authority of the library (I.49.1–5).

For later periods, there are numerous texts—for example, Petronius' *Cena Trimalchionis*, Macrobius' *Saturnalia*, and Plutarch's *Quaestiones Convivales*—that attest to the dinner party as a scene in which literary erudition was displayed, celebrated, and performed.²⁸ Yet, in particular, it is precisely the backward-looking and hellenophile community of Egypt in the Second Sophistic period that aspires to recreate and, as I shall now suggest, to surpass this sophisticated culture. Textuality and food

intermingle in such a way that literary texts are presented as precisely material for consumption, but it is also the case that the literary dinner party is one in which food and drink are the vehicle for the staging of discourse. Unlike Plato, who had done away with food and drink in order to transcend the physical concerns of the body through reason and speech in the *Symposium* and also the *Phaedrus* (cf. ‘the feast of words’,

τῶν λόγων . . . εἰστία, 227b6–7), Athenaeus grants an equal importance to food and discourse.²⁹ As Lukinovich observes, the work is an imitation, a representation, of a banquet, where words become the dishes at the banquet. The dinner guests are treated to words (2b); they dine on investigations,

ζητήσεις γὰρ σιτούμεθα (398b); they are both thirsty and greedy for speeches as well as food (cf. 122ef and 401c).³⁰

In Athenaeus’ *Deipnosophistae* the walking library seems to have evolved into an enormous reference source, a collection of texts, or rather of citations from texts. The work opens with the author’s observation that the subject of his work is a banquet hosted by a wealthy Roman named Larensis,³¹ for whom Athenaeus probably worked in helping him to acquire texts, as Christian Jacob notes,³² and who summoned to his feast men who were the most skilled in every branch of learning (cf.

τοὺς κατὰ πᾶσαν παιδείαν ἐμπειροτάτους ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῦ διατυμόνας ποιούμενος, 1A).

Athenaeus offers a eulogy of his host that constructs this individual as the foremost connoisseur of book culture at Rome. He gathers around himself men who seem to exude learning, engages in vigorous study and research, demonstrating a critical acumen that merits the description ‘Socratic’ (cf.

μετὰ κριτικῆς τινος καὶ Σωκρατικῆς ἐπιστημῆς), and he is utterly bilingual (cf.

ἐπ’ ἴσης ἀμφοτέρων τῶν φωνῶν προ-ιστάμενον, 2b).

Rhapsodes, the original representatives of oral textuality, are present and prominent at his dinner parties, attesting to the host’s extraordinary predilection for Homer (620b). Larensis is also a library-owner, and his book collection, in keeping with encomiastic hyperbole, is one that in size surpasses those of Polycrates of Samos, Peisistratus, Eucleides, Nicocrates of Cyprus, the kings of Pergamum, Euripides, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Neleus (3b). He is a latter-day Ptolemy, the founder of the

Alexandrian library, as Athenaeus proposes, for he has taken up the learning and writing of the ancient world and brought it to Rome. Furthermore, Matthew Nicholls observes that Larensis is a figure parallel to the emperor.³³ He is also a latter-day North African Varro in the light of his book acquisition.³⁴ Appropriation of prior cultures is now complexly and somewhat ironically figured as ‘hospitality’ (ἐπὶ τὰς ἐστιάσεις): Larensis makes his guests, wherever they come from—Elis (Leonides), Nico-media (Pontianus and Democritus), Ptolemais (Philadelphus), Ephesus (Daphnus), Pergamum (Galen), Nicaea (Rufinus), Alexandria (Alceides) (1d-f)—feel at home in Rome, if not actually Roman (3c). But each of these individuals is more than a guest, for he is also supposedly a breathing library, and there is some discomfort in the conjunction of the mobile libraries with the static, fixed book collection.

The occasion of the dinner is both the context for and the enactment of the knowledge that these guests purport to bring to it. The diverse conversation is paralleled by the numerous courses of the meal (1b), and it is the case that dinner protocol requires the guests to bring some contribution to the meal. Athenaeus states many of the distinguished literati bear *grammata* in their bedrolls, perhaps offering a gloss on the idea of the stromateis, or literary compendium (cf. Aulus Gellius NA 1, pref. 7). But it is also the case that the *grammata* are the external signs that prompt recitation, as has been the role of the book in antiquity.³⁵ The highly educated (πεπαιδευμένος) Charmus has something to quote for each dish presented; Calliphanes had copied out the beginnings of many poems and speeches for citation during the dinner, while others had various other bits of learning to perform at the meal (4c-d). The meal is—to cite a series of anachronistic analogies—a textual pot luck, an open buffet, a smorgasbord, or, in Charles Gulick’s translation, a ‘picnic’, but it is strictly a meal by invitation only.³⁶ The learned and cultured morsels are available for consumption, or, perhaps more to the point, regurgitation, only to those who have already been well initiated into literary culture. Graham Anderson draws attention to the ‘facility for display’ that is manifested by these sophists, and, indeed, by sophistic culture since the fifth century BC.³⁷ The literary dinner is staged as a series of citations, of references, of name-droppings, so that familiarity with the texts as a whole is

assumed and anyone without prior knowledge is excluded from enjoyment of the morsels. The walking library has now become a metaliterary institution, as the work's symposiastic context might indeed determine.

The reader may be awed by the setting and the intellectual action that unfolds in the course of the work, but the reader, whether through good sense, jealousy, or cynicism, might also have cause to suspect that literary culture in second- and third-century Egypt now consists in superficial, surface knowledge.³⁸ There is after all much about the staging of the dinner party that calls it and the status of its participants into question. A library is only a bookshelf, a receptacle for the texts (e.g. Pliny *Ep.* ii.17.8), and so, there is a sense in which the identity of Athenaeus' characters is insignificant. Indeed, according to Barry Baldwin, the guests may not be quite who they appear to be. One of the named guests, Plutarch from Alexandria, should probably not be confused with the author Plutarch of Chaeronea, known for his many moral writings. Galen is a poignant presence, as one of the fonts of ancient knowledge that Edward Gibbon identified along with Aristotle and Pliny.³⁹ There is a problem of chronology that raises uncertainties about who 'Galen' and 'Ulpian' are. Baldwin argues that Galen, if he is the medical writer, could not have actually dined with Ulpian, if he is the famed Roman jurist, for the former died by the first decade of the third century AD and the latter in AD 228.⁴⁰

There are, nonetheless, literary precedents for bringing together historical figures who would not actually have been alive at the time represented in the text or who would have been unlikely to have been present in the same space. Plato's *Symposium* is one work that brings together the leading intellectuals of classical Athens together with Socrates at a party to celebrate Agathon's victory in a tragic competition. But, as Kenneth Dover observes in his commentary, there is no basis for thinking that all these figures were actually present at the dramatized party, and, furthermore, it is likely that Aristophanes might have been so hostile to Socrates (after the production of the *Clouds*) that it would have been unlikely for them to be in the same room.⁴¹ If literary works construct their own ahistorical socialities, then it is the case that Athenaeus has brought together the leading intellectuals of his period for the purpose of

overwhelming the reader with the acculturated scene and its players. The dinner guests are themselves, but are also representatives of types. Kaiber, the editor of the Teubner edition of the work, had argued that the majority of Athenaeus' dining sophists were fictions created on the basis of famous sophists from the past (pref. vi); to put it another way, Athenaeus' 'personages are character types, reflections of the intellectual environment of Rome of the later imperial period. And, so, Amoebus, who arrives late at the banquet at 622c–623d, is all too recognizable from his tardy counterparts in Plato's *Symposium* (Alcibiades), in Petronius' *Cena Trimalchionis* 65.5–6 (Habinnas), and Lucian's *Convivium* 20 (the doctor rushing from an appointment).⁴²

The portrait of supposedly learned society in the second century AD is not always a flattering one. If the 'walking libraries' merely give voice to the texts they embody, it is also the case that a human library inevitably mediates its material, and, in the light of the perception that the literary cognoscenti of the Roman period is in a sense a critic, he is expected to select and to exclude, to comment and to correct. This critical capacity is foregrounded by the performative imperative of the literary dinner. Athenaeus' dinner guests are compelled to drop names in order to articulate the scope of their learning. Moreover, they must recall and cite material as prompted by their host, each others' comments, the material recalled, and, no less, by the meal itself. The size of the dinner party compels citation to be abbreviated and elliptical even despite the length of the work, so that the guests seek out the especially recondite to stand as a symbol for their larger learning and to lie beyond the scrutiny of the general public and even their colleagues. They compete with one another, and the behaviour that the dinner party generates is of a kind to come under criticism elsewhere, in the *Noctes Atticae* of Aulus Gellius. At NA 1.2 the sophist Herodes Atticus silences a pushy and competitive young man, who insists that he can outgloss the gathering of learned grammarians by citing a text of Epictetus that highlights the uselessness of such knowledge (cf. esp. 1.2.4). When a friend gives Aulus Gellius a volume in the belief that it might assist the latter's own literary project, the author returns it as quickly as possible to its creator, ironically instructing him to benefit himself from 'this polymathy'

(ταύτης τῆς πολυμαθείας) when he discovers that the volume contains a variety of Homeric and geographical names with their histories (NA 14.6).

There exists, furthermore, a larger discourse about what a library might be that renders it liable to criticism, and perhaps this is where the regulative function that Aristotle attributes to symposiastic literature and culture assertively remanifests itself (*Politics* 1336b20–2).⁴³ One background for these representations of superficial learning is the traditional debate over compendious, and presumably shallow, knowledge. According to this debate, knowledge is distinct from wisdom (Φοφία, or *sapientia*), although it may sometimes attest to the latter, and it is precisely because the library emblemizes knowledge and learning that it may also suggest an individual or a society utterly bereft of virtue and good sense. The embodied library may come to speak of and to *polymathia*, to knowing much with implications of knowing *too* much, such that it becomes a notion to be ridiculed, satirized, and parodied rather than revered and admired. Archilochus had offered his audience the contrast between the fox, who knows many things, and the hedgehog, who knows one great thing (πολλ’ οἶδ’ ἀλώπηξ, ἀλλ’ ἐχίνος ἓν μέγα West 201; cf. West 126), ostensibly privileging the ‘one thing’ with the adjective ‘great’ (μεγα). Otherwise, pre-Socratic philosophers inaugurated the explicit criticism of *polymathia*, as distinct from wisdom. Democritus states that many of those who learn (and so know) much (πολυμαθείες) have no sense (νονν) (DK 68 B 64 = Stobaeus 3.4.8144),⁴⁴ and that one must cultivate deep understanding (πολυνοίην) rather than much knowing (πολυμαθίην) (DK 68 B 65). In his Babylonian writings, the philosopher is cited as saying on the matter of *πολυμαθίη* that, although he has travelled over many lands, investigated natural phenomena, and heard many speeches in eighty years of life,⁴⁵ no one has yet managed to lead him astray (DK 68 B 29 945).⁴⁶

To Heraclitus is attributed the observation that much learning (πολυμαθίη) does not teach understanding to anyone, or else it would have instructed Hesiod, Pythagoras, Xenophanes, and Hecataeus (Diogenes Laertius 9.1 = DK 22 B 40₄₆). In another fragment, he states that Pythagoras researched all mankind and, selecting certain of his writings, made them his ‘wisdom, much

learning, and corrupt skill' (cf.

ἐποιήσατο ἑαυτοῦ σοφίην, πολυμαθίην, κακοτεχνίην) (DK 22 B129). Somewhat more qualified is the treatment by Anaxarchus, who begins by asking whether πολυμαθίη greatly helps or harms the individual who possesses it. His response is that it assists the right sort—that is, virtuous—of person (τὸν δεξιὸν ἄνδρα), and harms the individual who speaks each word too quickly in company. The question becomes the pretext for a discourse on discursive opportunity (καιρός), for which wisdom (cf. Ψοφίης) is the criterion, so that again learning and knowing in quantity are set in opposition to wisdom (DK 72 B 147).

In Plato's *Laws* the Athenian stranger declares that the worst evil is not lack of experience (ἀπειρία) but multiple experience (πολυπειρία) and πολυμαθὴν with a bad education (πολυμαθία μετὰ κακῆς ἀγωγῆς, 819a). Beyond extending the critique of diverse learning into the classical period, Plato in particular focuses the critique of polymathy on the literary text and its human representatives. In the dialogue named for him, the 'inspired' rhapsode Ion claims to know not only all Homer's poetry but also all the technical and specialized knowledges that the epic purports to represent; however, investigation of the knowledge of this 'manifold Proteus' (Ion 541e) at the hands of Socrates reveals that the textual performer has only the most superficial acquaintance with the reality signified by the text (see *Ion* 542a). There are other literary savants whose 'knowledge' receives serious qualification from Socrates. Foremost among these is the sophist, who seems able through his wisdom to appear in different guises (παντοδαπὸν γίγνεσθαι) and to imitate all things (μιμεῖσθαι πάντα χρήματα, *Republic* 398a; cf. *Hippias Minor* 368c-d).⁴⁸ He will come to the ideal city of the *Republic* and will wish to make a display of his poetic compositions. Socrates observes that the citizens of the ideal city will worship this changeable individual as a holy man, but the philosopher also insists that such a person can and must have no place in the perfect city because he has no role or identity that is properly his. The final book of the dialogue offers the resounding dismissal of the poet. At 598d7 ff. the philosopher observes that tragic poets, who take their lead from Homer, the 'first teacher'

(πρῶτος διδάσκαλος) of all the tragedians (595c1–2), the ‘leader of Greek culture’ (ἡγεμῶν παιδείας, 600a9), and otherwise, the teacher of all Greece (606e1–2), are said to know all skills (πάσας μὲν τέχνας ἐπίστανται) and all things (πάντα δὲ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια τὰ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν) regarding human virtue and lack of virtue. Yet, because their work touches on so many different subjects, it must fail to contain knowledge of the truth about what they depict. Thus the poet appears to be all-wise (πάσσοφος) and a sorcerer (γόητης), not unlike the chameleonic sophist of 398cd (cf. 598cd). Poetry, as painting, is a form of imitation that fashions *all things* (πάντα ἀπεργάζεται) and, because it does so, manages to grasp only a small part of reality (cf. 598b7–8).

Yet it is important to observe that the condemnation of *polymathia* or multiple learning by authors who equated it with superficial knowledge (cf. Heraclitus 22B 40; *Laws* 811a-b; 819a; Phaedrus 275a2–b1) provokes a counter-response.⁴⁹ At Plato *Laws* 811a the Athenian stranger says that many say that those who are correctly educated must be made to learn the poets so that they become πολυμαθεῖς. To enable this to happen some select out the section headings (κεφάλαια) and gather the speeches (ῥήσεις) into the same place and make the young commit them to memory (εἰς μνήμην) in order that one might become good and wise from their experience and much learning (ἐκ πολυπειρίας καὶ πολυμαθίας). The servant of the Muses, the Alexandrian scholar-poet, recovers the positive sense implicitly given to the term by Homer when he attributed omniscience to the Muses at *Iliad* 2.485. The scholar-poet of the post-classical age needs to be knowledgeable in many things, and in his pamphlet *Against Praxiphanes* (fr. 460) Callimachus praised his contemporary Aratus for being ‘learned [πολυμαθής] and the best poet’.⁵⁰ At *Aetia* 3.75.8–10 the poet observes that much knowledge (πολυδρεΐη) is a bad thing when someone does not control his tongue, implying that it is otherwise a good thing. As someone who wrote works on many different topics, including geography, but mastered none in particular, Eratosthenes, the librarian (275–194 BCE), is perhaps an example of the Alexandrian polymath.⁵¹

Already, in the earlier empire books had come to serve as

markers of learning, and were seen on occasion as signifying apparent book learning. Earlier, in *De Tranquillitate Animi* Seneca had compared individuals who possess vast libraries but leap from passage to passage rather than reading intensively, to diners who merely reach for the *opsa*, or the ornamental titbits, at a dinner party, and disregard its more substantial offerings (1.9.5; cf. also Aulus Gellius 1, pref. 11–12). Petronius develops the analogy between the elaborate dinner and literary culture extensively in the *Cena Trimalchionis*, where the newly rich freedman Trimalchio boasts (possibly in parody of the library vision of Varro and Pollio) to his dinner guests of owning three libraries but then goes on to mention only two, one Greek, the other Latin ('*tres bybliothecas habeo, unam Graecam, alteram Latinam*, 48.4). In a world where learning is to be taken as a mark of success, the 'libraries' are only empty trophies, empty signifiers as regards their owner, as the mistaken counting indicates.⁵² Trimalchio perfunctorily summarizes elaborate stasis-theory, declaring that 'if it happened, there is no controversy; if it did not happen, it is nothing' ('*hoc*' *inquit* '*si factum est, controversia non est; si factum non est, nihil est*'). Logical subtlety, and with it the opportunities for rhetorical argument, are denied by the speaker's account. He alludes only to the most banal rhetorical and literary commonplaces, the rich and the poor man—which offers the opportunity for the tasteless quip 'what is a poor man?' (*quid est pauper?*)—and the twelve labours of Hercules, and offers a 'variant' of the Cyclops episode from the *Odyssey* in which Ulysses tears off the giant's thumb instead of blinding him.⁵³ Later, Trimalchio offers a confused epitome of Greek myth: Diomedes and Ganymede, rather than Castor and Pollux, are brothers, and Helen their sister; Agamemnon, not Paris, snatches Helen and sacrifices a hind to Diana; the Trojans and Tarentians go to war; Agamemnon sacrifices Iphigenia, gives a bride to Achilles, an act that causes Ajax to go mad (59.4–6).⁵⁴ Petronius' character is not unlike the character type who is criticized for considering possession of books and title-and theme-dropping to be literary knowledge in Lucian's *The Ignorant Book-Collector* (oration 31). As the work's speaker observes, as someone who possesses flutes but cannot play this instrument derives no use from them, so someone who owns many books without any education or culture remains ignorant and without prestige (31.5).⁵²

VI

I suggest that the breathing ‘library’ is an encyclopaedic figure who calls into question the status of encyclopaedism as an ideal to be attained. J. Relihan offers insight into the nature of Athenaeus’ work as a representation of second sophistic learning when he comments that, ‘as symposiac texts become increasingly encyclopedic, the images of learning as eating; of compilation as satire, of books as digests, come increasingly to the fore’.⁵⁵ Satire is, of course, the literary genre that has as its cognate the adjective *satur*, meaning ‘replete’, ‘filled [with food]’. According to the grammarian Diomedes (1.485 (GLK)), it is directly derived from the Latin *lanx satura*, a dish filled with lots of different ingredients, or else from *lex satura*, a law that takes up many different provisions.⁵⁶ The topic of food, even if at one remove and perhaps especially if it is at one remove, in literature opens the text to the possibility of satire and parody, and, even though food stands subordinate to talk at Athenaeus’ banquet, its surfeit points not just to a stuffed dish but to a stuffed work. Accordingly, the *Deipnosophistae* has become one of those works that the classicist is unlikely to read from cover to cover; it is rather a text at which she picks daintily, employing it as a scholarly research tool, and mining it for literary and biographical references.

But, if these literary titbits—one-liners, names, and so on—are understood as a radical synecdoche for high literary culture, they also point to the pressure to which it now subjects its participants, to the literal and metaphorical indigestibility of this culture. At Larensis’ dinner, the privileged textual performance is the feat of memory, and literary (dis)course is most often the catalogue. Banqueters announce that they will ‘recite’ (*καταλέξω*, 573B) or that they will ‘call to memory’ (cf. *μνηθήσομαι*, 585F) passages as prefaces to their offerings. The walking libraries are faced with a problem that the Alexandrian librarian Aristophanes, who supposedly knew (where) everything (was) in the library, did not have: no one can memorize the totality of literature any more. Even the literati run out of memory because of the abundance of material. That Didymus the Grammarian has earned the nickname ‘bookforgetter’ (*βιβλιολάθαν*) because he wrote so many volumes—3,500

treatises according to Demetrius of Troezen (cf. IV.39)—suggests that abundance of books has now become an issue for the person as literary receptacle. In gesturing at the limits of human memory, Athenaeus raises the issue of exclusion and inclusion of the library. The human library is unable to recall everything, so that each of the dinner guests is a partial representation of the totality of antiquity's body of texts. The inadequacy of memory is perhaps demonstrated above all by the fact that each of them cites snippets from the works he quotes during the dinner.

Athenaeus' own narrative about intellectual culture in the second century itself falls short as far as inclusiveness is concerned. The dinner, as literary metaphor, stretches even the author's own powers of recollection.⁵⁷ He follows the example of Philoxenus of Cythera, who recalled from memory

(μνημονεύων) many of the meats served at Larensis' dinner table, and himself proceeds to recall (ἀπομνημονεύσωμεν) the dishes (643a ff.). A few paragraphs later Athenaeus acknowledges the limits of his memory. Because so many cakes were named (cf. καταλεξάντων) by his fellow-guests, he will mention only as many as he can remember (cf. ὅσων μέμνημαι, 644e). That is to say, this is not a complete catalogue of cakes in the ancient world. Later in book 15 the author himself confesses that it is difficult to recall the things that were often uttered in banquets because of their diversity (ποικιλία) and the similarity of novel things to one another (cf.

τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῶν ἀεὶ καινῶς προσευρισκομένων, 665a).⁵⁸ The diverse nature of conversation, of course, mirrors the diverse nature of the banquet, which the work's length demonstrates. After all, at 411a the author cites from the satyric play *Heracles* of Astydamos a line that compares a varied (i.e. ποικιλία) banquet to a variety of literature in that neither bores its 'consumer'.

The parallelism between dinner party and literature, where the multiple courses produce equally multiple discourses, declares the materiality of the text in the Athenaeian world, even in the absence of a physical library. I want to suggest that this materiality is one that symposium culture assumes, for the languages of the drinking and dinner party are also the languages that determine the reality of the larger outside world.

Historically, the symposium has protocols governing both social and literary behaviours, essentially behaviours that are one and the same (cf. Xenophanes fr. 1). The *Deipnosophistae* enacts this legacy. Baldwin counts no fewer than eight grammarians among the dinner guests, by far the majority,⁵⁹ and portions of the dinner conversation revolve around issues of linguistic propriety: how does one accentuate various words (e.g. 388B; for ‘hare’ (λαγός) and its various perceived cognates, see 400ab; 490b; 484f-485a); how does one pronounce the Greek word for ‘partridge’ (πέρδικα), ‘quail’ (ὄρτυγα), ‘quart’ (χοίνικα)—with a short or a long vowel (388f); what are the correct names for various fish (cf. 7.287a-d); and so on. Anderson identifies 97c–99b as the longest single surviving pass on hyperatticism,⁶⁰ while Swain notes that, in the battle between neologism and atticism in this passage, Ulpian is not so much a purist as far as attic usage is concerned but an individual who reaches for any ancient source.⁶¹ It is no accident that Ulpian, who may be the Roman jurist and, if not, is someone who significantly shares his name,⁶² stands out as the chief speaker at the dinner, pronouncing on, amongst other issues, the correct terminology for various dishes when a ham is brought in at the beginning of book 9 (366a-c). The discussion is not merely at the level of apparent pedantry. The virtues of moderation in early Rome, including issues of food and entertainment, are discussed (273a ff.), and in book 12 the dinner guests reject luxurious living as the oriental other (cf. 513 f). Larensis’ dinner party is an occasion in which linguistic and literary regulation translate directly into social practice, as far as the symposiastic community is concerned, and so in which the impact of texts on their community becomes immediately evident. The *deipnosophistae*, as the walking receptacles of their community’s texts and its knowledges, are individuals who literally and metaphorically cut and chop their literary and social worlds into order.

But the indigestibility of second sophistic culture may not be the only critique presented in this work. P. A. Brunt has argued that the supposed renaissance of Greek learning and culture in the second century AD is a mere illusion, a construction in particular of Philostratus.⁶³ The supposed achievements in learning and literature are not as significant as they might otherwise have appeared, and the individuals who supposedly

made the advances are hardly as important as they might have appeared to be from Philostratus' biographies. Athenaeus' *Deipnosophistae* may be read as corroboration that the Second Sophistic is an illusory movement. In any case, the noun 'sophist' is one with a notoriously unstable signification. Brunt observes that at this period when the word 'sophist' did not refer to a teacher of rhetoric or to a *savant*, it had derogatory overtones for authors such as Plutarch and Dio. Accordingly, perhaps for Athenaeus, the *deipnosophistae* are not the skilled and learned individuals that they might initially seem and as the work implies that they might not be but rather charlatans and imposters so that the mediated text is an extremely unreliable one.⁶⁴

Athenaeus' sophists create an illusion of a world obsessed with literary citation, memory, and knowledge, and it may well be an illusion in an even larger sense. James Zetzel has argued that in the second century AD students of grammar and rhetoric required the texts of the masters for their study, and to fill this need individuals began to forge texts, with the creation of Lampadio's edition of Ennius and Tiro's edition of Cicero. As with the founding of the Hellenistic libraries, academic study became the incentive for the appearance of a fraudulent literary culture that attempted to mimic the classics and existed as its shadowy doubled.⁶⁴ Given that more than a few of the fragments and sources cited by the dinner guests appear only in the *Deipnosophistae*, it is perhaps not too far-fetched to suggest that these texts are actually the creations of the dinner guests and that these texts have been invented to meet the needs of the intellectual culture of the dinner party. In as much as the literature of the dinner party mirrors the supposedly real world, then the fraudulent works of these sophists become the signifiers of an equally fraudulent world.

Athenaeus' intellectuals are heirs to a legacy of oralized literary learning and they perform all the anxieties that eventually come to be associated with such a legacy. Their response, however, is one that leads them to play out their anxieties within a largely or wholly fabricated textuality, which threatens to make literary activity a far from potent social force.

CONCLUSION

The 'living library' is a figure who has become a cultural medium. Textual memory re-authors the library's identity as part of a prior and geographically distant world and its texts so that he becomes a nexus of its power and prestige. Note that Aristophanes of Byzantium, Apuleius, and Athenaeus are all inhabitants of communities outside Greece and Rome that nonetheless lay emphatic claim to Hellenic and/or Roman identities.⁶⁶ The Trimalchio of Petronius' *Cena* is a new man trying to make his way into the respectable and moneyed world of Rome, a world that is apparently foreign to him as his unintentional caricatures of it and his outrageous behaviour suggest. The representation of walking libraries in later antiquity suggests that the attempt to accrue literary and political authority has become an exaggerated and ridiculous venture.

But I am going to end on a note of cynicism. I suggest that there is also a danger that the 'walking library' in turn becomes the means of a larger cultural amnesia, for he selects, he edits, he regulates, and therefore he excludes the transgressive, the variant, and the fraudulent. Let me invite you to think of the library as the place where the librarian both makes available books and also tells you to be quiet if you talk out of turn. I end by returning to *Fahrenheit 451* and the remainder of the speech of the leader of the 'books':

'We're book-burners, too. We read the books and burnt them, afraid they' d be found. Micro-filming didn' t pay off; we were always traveling, we didn' t want to bury the film and come back later. Always the chance of discovery. Better to keep it in the old heads, where no one can see it or suspect it. We are all bits and pieces of history and literature and international law, Byron, Tom Paine, Machiavelli or Christ, it's here. And the hour's late. And the war's begun. And we are out here, and the city is there, all wrapped up in its own coat of a thousand colors. What do you think, Montag?'⁶⁷

The Library (as) Book: The Fantasy of the Total Text

A universal library (or at least universal in one order of knowledge) could not be other than fictive, reduced to the dimensions of a catalogue, a nomenclature, or a survey. Conversely, any library that is actually installed in a specific place and that is made up of real works available for consultation and reading, no matter how rich it might be, gives only a truncated image of all accumulable knowledge.

Roger Chartier, from 'Libraries without Walls' ¹

INTRODUCTION

I have explored the extraordinary phenomenon of the person as the walking, breathing library in later antiquity, and in this chapter my intention is to consider the library as an institution with a very particular textuality. The investigation focuses on a curious and remarkable literary product, the compendious (as it often is) and elliptical (as it always necessarily must be) volume that lays claim to the title 'library' (*bibliothèque*), or else that invites a reading of itself as the contents of a library.² This chapter of my study is concerned with what may be regarded as a meta-institution, the category of book that, through a daring boast involving both the impulses of reductionism and totalization, articulates an ideal of book collection. My concerns here are to explore the various dynamics between texts, authors, and audiences, as a means of thinking about this particular form—or rather, these particular forms—of textual artefact and textual reception.

In particular, if a number of narratives concerning the historical library give the impression that antiquity had only one library (see [Chapter 1](#)), and that this library, furthermore, is the origin of all subsequent book collections, my concern here is to consider how *individual* works that dramatize themselves as encyclopaedic or compendious through the title ‘library’ problematize the notion of the totality of discourse. Such texts boast of comprehensiveness where literary knowledge and discourse are the issue; however, they also simultaneously propose such a goal to be a fantasy at best, or an empty and misleading promise at worst. The ‘library’-book, as a trope of fullness, is thus also a figure of deceptive absence. I shall argue that this is the case with the mythological *Library* attributed to Apollodorus—to whom I do not wish to attach a date for reasons that will become apparent later in this chapter—as a ‘library’ that claims comprehensive literary knowledge but is actually drastically and authoritatively circumscribed.

I

The *Library* generally associated with the name ‘Apollodorus’ is, I suggest, a fascinating text for thinking about the dynamics of the library-book—that is, the text that names itself as a library, here *βιβλιοθήκη*. This *Library*, following in a general sense the project of the Hesiodic corpus (to which it periodically refers),³ is a fabulous work; it is a narrative of the gods and of the heroes, their births, lives, and deaths. But, as we shall see, the work is also a remarkable development of the Hesiodic project of myth—that is to say, the stories of gods and heroes. As the editors of the Budé edition, Jean-Claude Carrière and Bertrand Massonnie, observe, where earlier myth of the epic age served as a mnemonic aid for a collective consciousness, the *Library* serves as a mythologization of Greco-Roman myth (‘Apollodore représente une nouvelle étape, peut-être l’ étape ultime, de la mythologisation greco-romaine du mythe’). ‘Mythology’, is not to be confused or conflated with *myth*. ‘Mythology’, as its component parts suggest, is a discourse (*logos*) about *muthos*—that is to say, a language that stands at a remove from the stories about the gods and heroes. Thus Marcel Detienne proposes that ‘mythology is represented as a dissertation concerning myths, a

scholasticism that understands myths in general, their origin, their nature, their essence',⁴ and it will become unmistakably apparent that the *Library* is mythology in the sense that it works with myth and that to some degree its narratives are myth.

The mythological dimension of the *Library*, as a compendium of myth, begins to reveal itself in the epistemological claim made in a prefatory poem to an edition owned by a later 'librarian'. According to the claim, this prose work draws together the myths of an enormous corpus with its variants in order to produce an object purporting to global knowledge ('un objet de savoir global').⁵ It makes this daring statement in the following brief poem, which occurs at the start of this *Library*:

Αἰῶνος σπείρημα ἀφυσσάμενος ἀπ' ἐμεῖο
παιδείης, μύθους γνῶθι παλαιγενέας,
μηδ' ἐς Ὀμηρεῖν σελίδ' ἔμβλεπε, μηδ' ἐλεγείην,
μὴ τραγικὴν Μοῦσαν, μηδὲ μελογραφίην,
μὴ κυκλίων ζήτει πολύθρου στίχον· εἰς ἐμὲ δ' ἀθρῶν
εὐρήσεις ἐν ἐμοὶ πάνθ' ὅσα κόσμος ἔχει,

(Photius Library Cod. 186 p. 142 = Migne pp. 592–3)

Now, due to my erudition, you can draw upon the coils of time, and know the stories of old. Look no longer in the pages of Homer, or in elegy, or the tragic Muse, or lyric verse, and seek no longer in the sonorous verses of the cyclic poets; no, look in me, and you will discover all that the world contains.

(trans. Robin Hard)

These lines are directive, for they present the reader with a number of instructions. They enjoin the reader to draw on 'my education/learning' (ἀφυσσάμενος ἀπ' ἐμεῖο/παιδείης) and thereby to become acquainted with antiquity's stories—perhaps μύθους should not be unproblematically translated as 'myths' here. Furthermore, they ask the reader not to look at epics of Homer (literally, 'the pages of Homer'), to tragedy, to elegy, or to the cyclic poems—that is, at the works that initially produced antiquity's stories. The poem concludes with a declaratory promise: the reader will find everything that the world holds in it. The authorship of this verse is uncertain (as, we shall see, is also that of the *Library* itself). Yet there is a sense in which to

dwell too long on whether or not it was produced by the author of the present mythological compendium or by a later editor is to misconstrue the poem and to be distracted from the larger issues that it raises.

From my perspective the more interesting issue concerns the attribution of the speaking voice. The phrase ἀπ' ἐμεῖο παιδείης may suggest that the possessive pronoun refers to the author, constructing him as receptacle of literary learning, as he doubtlessly is; however, there is a convention of personification with a long history that offers an alternative explanation. According to it, an artefact, often of a monumental nature, assumes a speaking voice. The trope invoked is that of the self-dramatizing voice that is to be associated most obviously and historically with the funerary monument. Here the inscribed object refers to 'itself' in the first person—so 'Eumares set me up as a monument' or 'I am the memorial of Glaukos'.⁶ Through inscription, the original artisan or author has effaced his presence in order that his creation may assume centre stage; the artefact is animated and makes its presence unmistakable to the audience, who, following antiquity's practice of reading aloud, give the artistic or literary object a living voice. I propose that the poem that stands at the beginning of Photius' edition of the Apollodoran library may be an instance of artistic self-dramatization: the 'I'/'me' is to be identified not with the authorial voice, but with the mythological *Library* itself, so that the work becomes an example of the phenomenon of the 'speaking book'.⁷ What argues in favour of such a reading is that it is rather more in keeping with the aim of the verse lines to efface authorial presence—that of Homer, the writers of elegy, tragedy, lyric, cyclic poetry, and, in turn, the author of the *Library*. The last of these is so successful at removing his authorial presence that the authorship of the work must actually and finally be in question.

The embodiment of the work by the attribution of an 'I'—/speaking voice to it is an interesting move. For one thing, it marks the 'librarybook' as a very distinct entity from the phenomenon of the embodied library, where an individual is to be regarded as the mobile embodiment of literary knowledge and textuality. The speaking voice is now encased within writing, and this has the effect of signifying the static nature of the material

that constitutes the ‘library-book’, if we accept scholars’ characterization of writing as a process that monumentalizes knowledge and discourse.⁸ Because writing places emphasis on the specific articulation of the discourse in question—that is to say, the text is to be preserved and encountered in *this* particular form rather than in any other possible form—it is in many senses to be received as an authorized, if not also authoritative, work. This is important to recognize, for the *Library* is a text that asks its reader to disregard the individual authors who have otherwise come to constitute and stand for the canon, and it is a work that demands the ‘death of the author’ through his assimilation and reduction to a mere name and verbal act—so “‘X’ says”—so that the text itself may take precedence.

But this arrogant and arrogating manœuvre is one that has its own inevitable price for the author of the *Library*, for he in turn must surrender his identity to the extent that he is finally left without even a name of his own. The work had traditionally been ascribed to an Apollodorus, known by the epithet ‘the Grammarian’, following Photius’ statement that he read a ‘little book’ of Apollodorus the grammarian (*Ἀπολλοδώρου γραμματικοῦ βιβλιδάριον*, 141a, Migne)—the *Library* happened to be in a manuscript that also contained the fifty *Diegeseis* of Conon, who lived during the reign of Augustus.⁹ Until the later nineteenth century, this ascription was deemed to be supported by references to an ‘Apollodorus’ in the minor scholia of Homer, which contained many brief mythical narratives, a number of which bear notable similarities to the narratives of the *Library*;¹⁰ furthermore, a number of scholia to the plays of Sophocles contain excerpts from ‘the library of Apollodorus’ (*ἐκ τῆς Ἀπολλοδώρου βιβλιοθήκης*).¹¹ This Apollodorus, also given the epithet ‘the Athenian’, was the author of *περὶ θεῶν*, *περὶ τῶν νεῶν* and *χρονικά*,¹² and worked at Alexandria in the second century BC. Yet the author of the *Library* refers to the *Chronicles* of Castor of Rhodes (II.1.3), who published his work in 61 BC and was a contemporary of Cicero.¹³

Accordingly, the author of the mythological compendium must have lived at least a century after Apollodorus the Grammarian of Athens, whom Carl Robert had definitively and authoritatively argued could not be the author of the *Library* in

his 1873 dissertation *De Apollodori Bibliotheca* (Berlin) and dated the work to the age of Hadrian.¹⁴ W. Christ ventured a date for the work as late as the third century AD during the reign of Alexander Severus¹⁵ and the most recent editors of the *Library*, J.–C. Carriere and B. Massonnie, favour the view that the work is late because of perceived resemblances between it and the work of Philostratus of Lemnos,¹⁶ and in a subsequent work Carriere proposes a date of around 200.¹⁷ Other scholars such as J. G. Frazer and Robin Hard more conservatively locate it in the first or second centuries.¹⁸ At the end of it, we have no single authorial name to whom we may attach the *Library*, and perhaps that is as it should be for someone who elects to entitle his work *Library*.

As I read the ‘I’ voice at the beginning of the *Library* it shows the extent of the totalizing impulse in the work, or, at least, in a preface that *might* be attached to the work. The proem demands that its audience disregard the existing physical library of Greco-Roman literature, as denoted by reference to the main poetic genres of epic, elegy, tragedy, lyric, and cyclic verse. It requires the reader to look ‘to me’ (*εἰς ἐμέ*)—that is, to the work itself—to discover that everything that the world holds exists ‘in me’ (*ἐν ἐμοί*). This preface seeks to displace antiquity’s literary canon by this single work, which effectively and presumptuously claims for itself the capacity of the universe (*κόσμος*). Paul Veyne suggests that, prior to the birth of history as a science there was a blurring between reality/the world and the text that speaks of the world, where emphasis may lie either with the book itself or with what the book is about.¹⁹ What this poetic preface to the mythological *Library* suggests is that there is not only a blurring between the book and its substance, but that the substance has been displaced by this book. In other words, the *Library*, as a text that draws its material from, and so cannibalizes, other books, presents itself as taking the place of these books in that it reveals what needs to be known about these works.

Achieving comprehensiveness is not an unknown aspiration in ancient culture. After all, the Hellenistic curriculum of the *enkuklios paideia* could be regarded as a claim to universal, or at least, encyclopaedic knowledge²⁰ but, where the library is concerned, the Alexandrian Museum complex, an institution

whose explicit *raison d'être* was to own all the texts of the Greek—that is, the civilized world—is a far better example. The Ptolemies copied all the books that arrived at Alexandria by sea, and kept the originals while giving the copies to the owners, who were generally in no position to protest (cf. Galen *Comm. in Hipp. Epidem.* 17.1.606 Kuhn).²¹ They even had the Hebrew scriptures translated into Greek for inclusion in the library out of respect for the laws of the Jewish people. The production of the Septuagint becomes legendary for the remarkable concurrence between the translations of the seventy-two scholars who worked on the text and is viewed by Christian authors as testimony to the working of the Holy Spirit in the creation of the Greek version of the Old Testament (cf. Isidore *Etymologies* 6.4.1–2 and Augustine *City of God* 18.43).

But the title *Library* lends a particular authority to the claim of universal knowledge in as much as the author who first used this book title to refer to his own work, the historian Diodorus Siculus, explicitly declared it his aim to produce a history of the whole world (1.1.3; see also [Chapter 5](#) below). The importance of this title did not escape the notice of Pliny the Elder, who commented on its authority-endowing quality—at least as far as Pliny himself was concerned (*NH* pref. 25). Pliny proposes that this historical work and its author have an extraordinary authority. He observes the philologist Apion saying that individuals to whom Diodorus dedicated his works received the gift of immortality (*Pliny NH* pref. 25). In the ninth century Photius recognized the extraordinary power of the noun *bibliothêkê* as a signifier of seriousness where the aim of a work to stand as a receptacle of prior literary knowledges is concerned. In his dedication to his work the Byzantine scholar writes that he presents the synopses of the works he has read in the order he remembers them, not itself a difficult task where individual texts are concerned but a harder one where so many—280—texts are involved. Photius' collection is intended to be seen and used as a mnemonic aid for the reader (also see [Chapter 6](#)).

The 'cosmic' text marks the rejection of the Callimachean aesthetic as an unabashed return of the 'big book' in stark violation of the Hellenistic scholar-poet's preference for the 'small book' and its deliberately spare aesthetics (see Callimachus 1.11–25). As a selfnamed 'cosmic' text, the *Library* marks a radical

transformation of the ‘big book’. Antiquity’s ‘big books’ had traditionally been poetic texts—the Homeric epics, the cyclic poems, and, in particular, works like the ‘fat lady’, that is, the *Nanno* of Mimnermus²²—but, with its material concerned with poetic myth rather than with history, the *Library* is explicitly a big book in *prose*. The mythological *Library* marks a turning-away from the Callimachean epistemology, for, where the earlier and possibly contemporary scholars express anxieties about ‘knowing too much’ (e.g. Heraclitus DK 22 B 40; Callimachus *Aetia* 3.75.8–10; Aulus Gellius *NA* pref. 12), the work’s prefatory poem suggests itself as a total mythological didactic (cf.

ἀπ’ ἐμείοπαιδείης μύθους γνῶθι παλαιγενέας, vv. 1b–2). According to this preface, the text assumes the task of passing on ancient stories (μύθους) as a consequence of its education/learning (παιδείης), such that it produces a patrilineal descent for antiquity’s narratives about the gods and heroes that requires the mediation of education and of book (*Library*) before it reaches the reading audience.

Yet if, in the post-Hellenistic age, displays of literary encyclopaedism tend to adopt prose as their medium—for instance, and in addition to the *Library*, at least some of the works cited in the prefaces to Pliny’s *Natural History* and Aulus Gellius’ *Noctes Atticae*, the *Noctes Atticae* themselves, and the *Fabulae* of Hyginus are examples of prose—it is also the choice of prose that in part makes us aware of these works as discourses that are less complete than they claim to be. Prose is conventionally

designated in Greek by the phrase ψιλὸς λόγος, where the adjective ψιλός has the senses including ‘bare’ (where applied to land), ‘light’ or ‘unarmed’ (where applied to soldiers), and unadorned (where prose is concerned).²³ The use of prose as the medium of the *Library* may perhaps be explained as pointing up the disingenuousness of the library-book to cosmic totality, for, after all, if the Apollodoran ‘library’ of myth makes a claim of fullness, it is also—and dramatizes itself as—ostensibly aetiolated. And it is the case that other works that claim anything like comprehensive literary knowledge where antiquity was concerned are only lists and catalogues, and thus mere signifiers of fuller discourses—that is, the texts they refer to.

For instance, to record the contents of the Museum-Library

Hellenistic Alexandria's librarian and poet Callimachus compiled the *Pinakes*, literally the 'tablets' or 'catalogues', of the holdings at Alexandria. The *Pinakes* ran to 120 volumes and purported to catalogue the entirety of Greek literature (πάσα παιδεία) and the sum of knowledge.²⁴ According to Pfeiffer, Callimachus divided his *Catalogues* into several generic classes—for example, rhetoric (cf. fr. 432), laws (cf. fr. 433), treatises, epic, lyric, tragedy, comedy, philosophy, history, and medicine—and seems to have organized authors within each of these classes alphabetically with brief biographical notes.²⁵ Through biographical and bibliographical information he aimed to identify and classify the entirety of culture/learning (πάσα παιδεία), although the taxonomy itself had to concede the unclassifiable nature of certain works by relegating them to overall categories such as the 'table of various [παντοδαπῶν] things' (fr. 434 = Athenaeus 244a) or 'table of various compositions' (τῶν παντοδαπῶν συγγραμμάτων) (fr. 435 = Athenaeus 643e).²⁶ It is the indices, themselves signifying the supposed totality of library holdings, which assert the fullness of the book collection. Others are more honest about the library's inevitable deficiencies. Pliny draws the preface of the *Natural History* to a close by conceding the work's gaps: much (*multa*) could be added to this text, and, indeed, to all the works that he has published (NH pref. 28). Then, in book 10 of the *De Institutio Oratoria* Quintilian offers to the orator-in-training his 'library' of exemplary authors, a survey of Greek and Roman authors across different genres in what amounts to some twenty pages of the Teubner edition. Quintilian offers characterizations of each of his paradigmatic figures, and is emphatic that his list is selective. Discrimination is a skill that he has exercised and that he expects his pupil to exercise similarly in selecting literary models:

paucos (sunt enim eminentissimi) excerpere in animo est.
facile est autem studiosis, qui sint his simillimi, iudicare, ne
quisquam queratur, omissos forte aliquos, < quos > ipse
valde probet.

(IO 10.1.45)

My intention is to select a few authors, for they are the most illustrious. Nonetheless, it is easy for the studious to judge who

are most like these, in case anyone complains that some, whom he himself thoroughly approves of, have been left out.

These textual compendia of prior literature serve as reference libraries, for the books most frequently used and identified as being ideally most often to be used are those made available to the reader. They might include the 'greatest hits' of literature, but this is also a selection according to merit, as defined by the literati of the time, and those who are educated/being educated have the ability to discern it. This is also a selection according to the perceived prestige borne by the author, so that Homer is to be preferred over some other minor poet. But it is the case that selection results in omissions that may concern an individual, and this suggests that the totalizing project *must* somehow be deficient.

As a prose work, the *Library* of mythological narrative ascribed to Apollodorus is innately and characteristically lacking. Furthermore, as a book that claims for itself the status of 'library', the *Library* inevitably signals itself, and can only be regarded by its audience, as a vastly overstated synecdoche in as much as what must only be a part—a work divided into three not especially large books—presents itself as a sum total of a body of works, here the discourse of Greco-Roman 'mythology'. The work gestures at a comprehensiveness that is achieved through a deliberate policy of omission and selection in as much as its narratives present the bare sketch of events with little embellishment or digression, and so, I suggest, it reveals that the nature of mythology is a construction, a pastiche, bricolage, abridgement, or assemblage of larger pre-existing narratives. This double condition—of simultaneous plenitude and absence—may be the necessary condition of the library—that is, of any library. Certainly, Aulus Gellius declares upfront that his work *Attic Nights* is the result of selections (cf. *in excerptando*) of material that seemed to the author deserving of memory or that was pleasurable (NA praef. 2). The *Attic Nights* is the result not only of passages snatched from other authors, but also of leisure time stolen from the night—hence, the work's title (NA praef. 4 and 12). Aulus Gellius presents himself as reacting against other Greek and Latin authors who seek only 'abundance' (*copia*) without any exercise of discrimination (*sine cura discriminis*), with the result that the minds of their readers become exhausted. His

principle of composition is Heraclitus's saying that 'much learning does not instruct' (πολυμαθίη νόον οὐ διδάσκει cf. fr. 40 Diels, NA pref. 11–12).

II

If the poem that forms the preface to Photius' edition of the *Library* attempts to conceal this necessary fact of the work's absences, albeit only initially, it also irresistably challenges the audience to begin reading this text/these texts by drawing attention to the moments at which it most explicitly dramatizes its status as a *compendium*, a synthesis, of prior literary textuality for the very reason that the text's status as *mythology* becomes obvious here. Claude Calame has spoken of *myth* as a constant static story: 'Soit que le mythe " expression du sacré en mots", est consider comme un invariant narratif...' ²⁷ Myth is the body of traditional knowledge owned by a community and without any obvious or traceable beginning and initially without any negative valorization. It is antecedent to mythology, the latter being the discourse that works from and, perhaps, even against myth. ²⁸ Acknowledgements of origins, whether individual or multiple competing ones, must go against the grain of myth as scholars understand it, and it is precisely such attention to discursive beginnings and sources that characterizes the mythological epitome. Yet it is also precisely characteristic of the library that it is constituted of various numerous origins, which are subsumed within and blurred by the library. The Athenian tyrant Peisistratus gathered up texts, and was emulated by Ptolemy II (Philadelphus) (Isidore *Etymologies* 6. 3. 3–5 ²⁹). By foregrounding the way in which the foundation of the Alexandrian Library is a conscious link to the Greek and Macedonian past, Isidore proposes that the idea of the library, if not the library itself, is transferable across cultures, as we have already seen it to be in [Chapter 1](#). He proceeds in his narrative to observe that Xerxes later took Peisistratus' library to Persia, while the Seleucid Nicanor subsequently returned it to Greece. After this, many other states sought to acquire texts and to translate them into Greek, with the result that Alexander and his successors sought to collect all existing books in libraries.

Genealogy is, it would seem, a central discursive structure of

the mythological epitome, and indeed work by Carriere corroborates the perception that mythological narrative from Homer to Hesiod to Hyginus and Apollodorus is concerned with origins without requiring origin to be pinpointed within an absolute—that is, historical—chronology.³⁰ For Carriere, the genealogical aspect of mythical discourse offers a symbolic point of reference where foundations are concerned.³¹ For example, when Athenaeus cites Zenodotus' *Epitomes*, a work that seems to be an abbreviated synthesis of myth, he does so to give evidence that Lepreus, who challenged Heracles to an eating contest, is a son of Caucon, who is in turn the child of Poseidon and Astydameia, the daughter of Phorbas (Athenaeus 10.412a). And it is certainly the case that genealogy on occasion forms the whole narrative structure, for instance, in Hyginus' *Fabulae*. This work offers the *Library* its precedent (see below), forming the total sum of the event recorded and commemorated in certain portions of the work, as with the catalogue of Priam's children (XC), and the lists of the Athenian rulers (XLVIII), of the Theban kings (LXXVI), and of the Argive kings (CXXIV), while a patronymic narrative structures the naming of the heroes who went to Troy, offering them a context, at XCVII. It is no coincidence, and rather indicative of the self-reflexive nature of the *Library*, that the work is comprised to a notable degree of genealogy. Robin Hard observes that 'the economy of the pan-Hellenic genealogical system recorded in the *Library* is impressive', for the author's provision of full genealogies for each of the six major families points to completeness, albeit one that is achieved at the cost of drastic abbreviation.³²

My focus is upon the *Library* as a genealogical text. The genealogies of the *Library* provide the work with its chronology, even if it is a merely self-affirming one, for mention of a hero's offspring provides the context for events.³³ But, as far as the *Library* is specifically concerned, there are also smaller genealogies within the larger genealogical structure, ruptures in the otherwise breathless narratives of paternity and filiation, of heroic incident, of divine intervention, moments where the author gestures at prior narrative traditions that are different from or alternative to his own. For example, where the author of the *Library* declares that Medea killed her children and fled in the chariot of the Sun, he also acknowledges that others say

(λέγεται δὲ [καὶ]) that she left her infant children as suppliants on the altar of Hera (1.9.28); at 2.3.1 he reports that Bellerophon killed his brother Deliades, although he concedes that others say the victim was Piren (cf. ὥς δέ τινες φασι Πειρήνα) and yet others that it was Alcimene (cf. ἄλλοι δὲ Ἀλκιμένην). Then, according to the author, the *kibisis* of Perseus is a wallet; however, Pindar and Hesiod in *The Shield* say it is a container for dress and food (cf. Hesiod *Shield of Heracles* 223 ff.) (2.4.2); where the author makes Laomedon's wife Strymo, he mentions that others make her Placia (κατὰ δέ τινας) and still others claim ((κατ' ἐνίους)) that the wife was Leucippe (3.12.3). When Poseidon and Athena competed for possession of Attica, Zeus appointed the twelve gods as arbiters, although others advocate (cf. οὐχ ὥς εἰπὸν τινες) the incorrect view that Zeus appointed Cecrops and Cranaus (3.14.1). The author of the *Library* declares that Zetes and Calais, sons of Orithyia and Boreas, were killed when they pursued the Harpies; but he also acknowledges Acousilaus, who says (ὥς δὲ Ἀκουσίλαος λέγει) that they were killed by Hercules in Tenos (3.15.3).

On other occasions, the author refers to other sources to supplement his own narrative with other details, as at 2.1.3, where Hesiod is cited to show that lovers' oaths do not make the gods angry; or at 2.2.2, where he explains why the daughters of Proetus are mad either because they rejected the Dionysiac rites,

as Hesiod says (ὥς μὲν Ἡσίοδος φησιν), or because they profaned a wooden image of Hera, according to Acousilaus

(ὥς δὲ Ἀκουσίλαος λέγει). 2.4.3 tells the reader that some people say (λέγεται δὲ ὑπ' ἐνίων) that Medusa was killed because she matched herself to Athena where beauty was concerned, while 2.5.7 refers to Acousilaus

(Ἀκουσίλαος... φησι...), who says that the Cretan bull that Hercules was commanded to bring was the one that carried Europa to Zeus. 3.10.3 refers to Stesichorus, who provides

evidence (cf. ὥς Στησίχορος φησιν) that Aesculapius had the power to resurrect men, in this case Capaneus and Lycurgus, from the dead. Furthermore, the reader learns that the author of the

Naupactica says (ὥς ὁ τὰ Ναυπακτικὰ συγγραφέας λέγει) that Aesculapius raised Hippolytus from the dead; Panyasis says

(ὥς φησι Πανύσις) that he raised Tyndareus; the Orphics

(ὥς οἱ Ὀρφικοὶ λέγουσι) that he raised up Hymenaeus;
Melesagoras (ὥς Μελησαγόρας λέγει) that he resurrected
Glaucus.^{M3435}

Moreover, the treatment of a hero's birth origin and the source of a myth often coexist as parallel narratives within the *Library*. At these moments, the author acknowledges the existence of divergent accounts of a hero's birth through such phrases as the noncommittal 'it is said' or 'some say' or through the invocation of a poetic authority such as Homer, Hesiod, Acousilaus, or Pherecydes. This is a curious feature if we grant Veyne's understanding of myth as a discourse that requires no origins and is in fact unoriginated: 'as its [myth's] name indicates, it is an anonymous tale that can be collected and repeated but that can have no author.' 35 According to this scholar, the citation of sources is relatively rare even in historical writing, so that textual genealogy is rather a concern of moderns, rather than ancients in the first instance.³⁶ And it is clear from the *Library* that verification or authentication of the myth is not the issue at stake—after all, *μύθος* is to be regarded as a discourse that in many senses speaks for itself. In the light of the length of the work, the ruptures are not especially numerous or frequent, but I suggest that they constitute a significant literary self-consciousness where a 'library-book' and the dynamic between such a work, its author, and audience are concerned.

In particular, they draw attention to the *genealogical* character of myth: the points at which the *Library* turns aside to other texts produce narratological moments that lay the work bare as something that always has the potential to be unpicked and pried apart. Referencing is the textual manœuvre of displaying the compendium as a 'library', as a literary 'institution' in which books may be retrieved in such a way that the 'library' retains authority as a receptacle of (prior) literary knowledge. In order to show what I mean, let me begin by selectively listing several typical moments of alternative literary attribution in books I-III of *The Mythical Library*—I will treat the self-conscious sourcing of the *Epitome*, which derives from a later source, later as a counterpoint that highlights the deliberate manipulateness of the ruptures in books I-III:

The Library

1.3.4

Euterpe is the mother of Rhesus. *But:*

Others say that his mother was Calliope

(ὥς δὲ ἔνιοι λέγουσι, Καλλιόπης ὑπῆρχεν).

1.3.6

Zeus swallowed Metis to prevent her giving birth to a son who would threaten his position. Prometheus released the child—Athena—from Zeus' head.

But:

Some say it was Hephaestus who released the child.

2.1.1

Niobe had by Zeus a son named Argus. *But:*

According to Acousilaus (ὥς δὲ Ἀκουσίλαός φησι), she also gave birth to Pelasgus, whom Hesiod says (Ἡσίοδος . . . φησιν) was a son of the soil (ὥς ἔνιοι λέγουσιν). These alternative traditions are reiterated at 3.8.1, where the author of *The Library* treats the descendants of Pelasgus.

2.4.1

Danae gave birth to Perseus after being seduced.

But:

Some say that the seducer was Proteus (ὥς ἔνιοι λέγουσιν).

Others say (ὥς δὲ ἔνιοι φασι) that she was seduced by Zeus, disguised as a shower of gold.

2.4.5

Alcaeus had Amphitryon and Anaxo by Astydamia, daughter of Pelops.

But:

Some say he had them by Laonome; others that he had them of Hipponome, daughter of Menoecus.

3.1.1

When Europa was carried off by Zeus, disguised as a bull, she then gave birth to Minos, Sarpedon, and Rhadamanthys.

But:

According to Homer (cf. κατὰ Ὅμηρον), Sarpedon was the son of Zeus by Laodamia, daughter of Bellerophon.

3.4.1

The Sparti, the men sprung from the dragon's teeth sown by Cadmus, slew each other in a random quarrel and out of ignorance.

But:

Pherecydes says (Φερεκύδης δέ φησιν) that the men killed each other because they thought that the stones Xung at them by Cadmus were being thrown by each other.

3.9.2

According to *The Library*, after Atalanta and Melanion were married, they entered into the precinct of Zeus and, having made love, were turned into lions. The author of *The Library* goes on to relate how Atalanta had a son Parthenopaeus either by Melanion or by Ares.

But:

Hesiod and others say (Ἡσίοδος δὲ καὶ τινες ἕτεροι . . . εἶπον) that Atalanta was the daughter not of Iasus, but of Schoenus.

Euripides states (Εὐριπίδης) that Atalanta was Maenalus' daughter, and that her husband was Hippomenes, not Melanion.

3.12.6

The sons of Aecus and Endeis are Peleus and Telamon.

But:

Pherecydes says (Φερεκύδης δὲ φησι) that Telamon was Peleus' friend rather than his brother and the son of Actaeus and Glauce.³⁷

III

Heinrichs has suggested that, where scholarship on myth is concerned, one of the pressing projects must be a 'full-fledged' commentary on the *Library*.³⁸ The commentary that Heinrichs envisages is no doubt one that identifies comprehensively the various sources of the work and comments on how they have been cited and adapted to the later work and, accordingly, that completes the project that J. G. Frazer's Loeb edition began. Yet this proposed project may be one that ignores the nature of myth, for Veyne has argued that the precise origin of a myth was not really an issue for the Greeks as it might have been for the 'historian':³⁹ this is to say, I suggest, that origins are not a concern for myth!⁴⁰ It might be argued that the author indicates this to be the case. He does not always seem to be anxious to define the origins of narrative detail in any definitive manner, for he is accommodating, rather than dismissive, of the alternative

traditions he cites, dispelling Carriere and Massonnie's notion that the *Library* sponsors 'en particulier une image coherente et structure du monde mythique' ⁴¹ Where he propounds a particular tradition, he is also sometimes prepared to juxtapose a differing narrative thread. His own narrative presents as a parallel text mythical detail as found in other, older authors such as Homer, Hesiod, Acousilaus, Pherecydes of Athens, a logographer (cf. *FGrHist* 3F17 Jacoby), and Panyassis of Halicarnassus, a contemporary of Herodotus who wrote a poem to Heracles in 9,000 lines.⁴² On a few occasions, the author even adopts as his own the narrative thread that he introduces. At 2.2.1 he informs us that Proteus went to the court of Iobates, or, as some say, to the court of Amphianix, where he marries the latter's daughter Antia (according to Homer), or Stheneboea (according to the tragedians). He continues the narrative by declaring that Proteus had three daughters with Stheneboea, having created a pastiche account from the different traditions.

The author of the *Library* selects among the variety of available discourses; however, it is not just the author who assumes the role of selector. Detienne has suggested that as a written discourse genealogy is a form of narration that forces its readers to become critical. Literary accounts of a family's origins force backgrounds out into the open and, since the families whose genealogies are recounted are inevitably great, they also endow their claims with prestige and they subject greatness to scrutiny.⁴³ So there is a sense in which the selfconsciousness of this mythological compendium deliberately presents itself as something to be found out by its audience. And, perhaps, the fact that the author is writing at a time after which myth no longer has to serve as an aetiology of a city state and its ideology enables him some latitude in exposing 'other' accounts in ways that playfully draw attention to the exposure. It is no coincidence that on several occasions the bringing to light of alternative narrative traditions parallels the bringing to light of other offspring within the genealogical narrative. At 3.11.3 the author introduces further children born to Menelaus and Helen as he also cites other accounts: there is a daughter Hermione, and, according to some, a son Nicostratus (cf. Sophocles *Electra* 539). Menelaus had a son Megapenthes either by Pieris, or by Tereis, according to Acousilaus, the fifth-century genealogist⁴⁴ (cf.

Homer *Odyssey*. 4.10–12), and another one, Xenodamus, by Cnossia, according to Eumelus. Perhaps, the most conspicuous instance of offspring being multiplied as a consequence of multiple narrative traditions is the account of Niobe's children at 3.5.6.⁴⁵ Hesiod is the basis for thinking that Niobe has ten sons and as many daughters; Herodotos, for attributing to her two sons and three daughters, and Homer, for ascribing six sons and six daughters.

Disclosure of mistaken attributions becomes evident where alternative narratives coincide with a revelation that offspring have been misassigned to parents. At 3.10.7 the author of the *Library* rehearses the variant story of Helen's birth to Nemesis and Zeus, in place of his own account of her birth to Leda and Zeus. He elaborates the variant account with an explanation of how Helen is hatched from Nemesis, turned into a swan by Zeus, and brought by a shepherd to Leda, who brings her up as her own daughter.⁴⁶ Later at 3.15.5 the reader learns either that Pandion had four sons, Aegeus, Pallas, Nisus, and Lycus, born to him by Pylia at Megara (the authoritative version), or else that Aegeus was actually born to Scyrius and taken up (cf. ὑποβληθῆναι) as Pandion's son.⁴⁷ The aorist passive infinitive ὑποβληθῆναι is significant. Within the section of the text, it forms a contrasting pendant with ἐξεβλήθη, which describes Pandion being 'thrust out' of Eleusis by the sons of Metion. Beyond the details of the story, however, the verb is one that in the middle denotes the bringing-in of someone's else child as one's own (e.g. Herodotus 5.41; Aristophanes *Thesmophoriazousae* 340, 407, 565; Plato *Republic* 538a; Demosthenes 21.149) and otherwise the taking-up of false words or a misleading account or story.⁴⁸ If the Alexandrian scholars used the metaphor of the illegitimate (cf. νόθος) text by analogy with the illegitimate child born from a slave or concubine,⁴⁹ the author of the *Library* gestures at the concept of the 'adopted' text through two narratives concerning adopted children. The marginalization is no less effective.

Making present in the text other and/or consonant voices at least implicitly invites the reader to elect between the different options—whether the author's or those offered by other authors, either in the absence of detail offered by the author or against it. The audience of the *Library* is apparently given licence to participate in the final assembly of the myth(ological)

compilation, offered the option each time there is a gesture of referentiality to the author's narrative to follow up the alternative literary worlds acknowledged by the compendium. As a partially synoptic construction, the textual library becomes an interactive institution, inviting, or perhaps tantalizing, the reader to assume the role of assistant librarian. Referentiality entices the reader to retrieve the works subsumed/eVaced/annexed within and by the total text. This is a gesture worthy of further attention. On the one hand, the 'library-book' shares its authority—that is, its prerogative in deciding how the mythological compilation should turn out in the end. This sharing of responsibility with the audience is to be perceived as a gesture of respect, for it assumes that the reader knows what is to be regarded as a canonical text of myth—Homer, Hesiod, Pherecydes, Acousilaus, Panyassis, Conon, and so on. The reader is a version of the embodied 'library'. But, in the tradition of the manuscript reviewed by Photius, the bestowing of status of assistant librarian upon the reader is potentially exclusive. The reader has been asked to surrender all these other prior texts. He is to be without the physical resources that will enable him to exercise his critical faculty, and, indeed, the instruction given at the beginning of the *Library* to 'look no longer' at epic, elegy, or tragedy suggests a severe constraining of the possibilities of a literary synoptic view.

But the literary genealogies I have listed above are double gestures where power and control are concerned. They may offer the reader a degree of latitude and responsibility as management of mythological discourse is concerned—the references to earlier authors permit room for choice between various narrative traditions; however, literary referentiality has a more sinister side to it. If W. Ong suggests that the genealogies of losers in any political or cultural struggle tend to become lost or recast,⁵⁰ and Carrière dispels the notion that mythological narrative—at least, as far as Homer is concerned—has 'une focalisation zéro',⁵¹ Jesper Svenbro brings us more quickly to a recognition of the political manoeuvre involved in genealogy when he points to reading in ancient Greek culture as involving the author, text, and reader in a complex dynamic of dominance and submission.⁵² Writing is a process that takes away the voice of the reader, forcing him in the case of ego-statements attributed to objects of art to reduce his voice to that of a piece of stone,⁵³ or

compelling him in the case of written law to interpret the legal text in such a way that complements *nomos*.⁵⁴ Moreover, he points to evidence showing that reading was conceptualized and represented as an act of buggery, that it was thought of as in some ways analogous to penetration of the *eromenos*, or the younger beloved in the pederastic relationship, by his older male lover.⁵⁵ Ancient Greek visual representations of reading postures—bending over or down to read a stele—suggest that the male reader is being penetrated, and reading is expressly an activity that requires the collaboration of its audience so that sexuality/textuality is consensual.⁵⁶

So any apparent abdication of responsibility and authority on the part of the *Library* needs to be reconsidered, or, at least, to have its significations pluralized. If the author of the *Library* admits other voices into his text in a gesture of apparent generosity, he also, as citation makes inevitable, recasts them such that he engages in a game of more subtle domination of his source texts, and, I argue, of the reader too. References to earlier writers, apart from suggesting an archaizing tendency in the work, may be interpreted as helping to colour the discourse of the *Library* as itself old and, thus, originary. That is to say, Homer, Hesiod, Pherecydes, Acousilaus, and the other authorial names are presented as the temporal and intellectual milieu of our much later author, and the treatise *On the Sublime* certainly recognizes the potential for such radical temporal dislocation.⁵⁷ Genealogical narrative may operate as a space in which to write an ancestor's name over that of the progeny—and certainly, the names of the offspring of heroes may say more about the parents than the child.⁵⁸ However, where literary genealogy is concerned in the *Library*xs, I suggest, the move is also an Oedipal one, as indeed the Photian verse preface would suggest that it is. The 'father of the text' is sidelined in the structure of the narrative: the *Library* relates the birth of a hero or other event in his life, and he dissociates from literary lineage the alternative tradition as a juxtaposed utterance—'and/but/also X says'.

Where the alternative genealogies are concerned, the process of literary filiation is frequently interrupted as the author reverts to his own preferred story, so that what the *Library* offers is a series of misidentified narrative 'parents'. The reader learns that Hera gave birth to Hephaestus without sex and that Homer makes

Hephaestus the child of Hera *and* Zeus (1.3.5), but the latter detail receives no further comment as the author proceeds to narrate the albeit markedly Homeric account of Hephaestus being cast out of heaven for disobedience and being rescued by Thetis (cf. *Iliad* 1.571 ff.; 15.18 ff.). The myth of Hephaestus is effectively refounded, while, for the most part, parents in the traditions both authorized and unauthorized by the *Library* recede into the background as the author takes the action forward to the hero's own identity as a procreator or to his death. 2.1.1 stands as one notable occasion where an alternative tradition is followed up subsequently through re-citation at 3.8.1. In the first passage, the author informs the reader that, according to Acousilaus, Pelasgus is the son of Niobe and Zeus, but it is only in the later passage that the reader learns that the author has actually adopted Acousilaus' view (cf.

ὃν Ἀκουσίλαος μὲν Διὸς λέγει καὶ Νιόβης, καθάπερ ὑπέθεμεν). The agreement of the author and Acousilaus is now set against Hesiod's view that Pelasgus was a son of the soil (αὐτόχθονα).

Offering a comparison of the Bible to a 'library' as a selection of books, Italo Calvino goes on to observe:

A library can have a restricted catalogue, or it can tend to become a universal library, though always expanding around a core of 'canonical' works. This is the place the center of gravity resides, marking off one library from another even more than the catalogue. The ideal library that I would like to see is one that gravitates toward the outside, toward the 'apocryphal' books, in the etymological sense of the word: that is, 'hidden' books.

Literature is a search for the book hidden in the distance that alters the value and meaning of the known works; it is the pull toward the new apocryphal text still to be rediscovered or invented.⁵⁹

Calvino offers us a fantasy of a library as an institution of literary discovery such that books and their place in the literary hierarchy are (constantly?) in motion, rather than as a monument of literary accretion. The *Library* obliges this vision to some degree. Despite the claims of universal and comprehensive knowledge in the work's subsequent prologue, this particular mythological 'library' is one that does not expand the canon so much as move out from the conventionally canonical—from Homer, Hesiod,

Pherecydes, and so on—to oVer fleeting glimpses of the great authors as if in a ‘peep show’ and to place them at the margins of the text through references to the alternative traditions presented by them.

IV

A significant number of the external references in the three books of the *Library* concern origins, and comparison with gestures towards alternative traditions for myths in the *Epitome* only throws into greater relief the particular thematic of referencing in books 1–3. The *Epitome* stands as a supplement to the *Library*, and comes down in the Vatican and Sabbaitic versions. R. Wagner printed both these versions as parallel texts in his Teubner edition of 1894, and, in doing so, invites his reader to choose between variant texts and so to assume the role of critical reader. In contrast, J. G. Frazer preferred the Vatican version, as he himself declares, and prints only one version of the *Epitome*, perhaps showing himself (unwittingly?) more faithful to what I have argued to be the reductive manœuvres of the *Library*.⁶⁰ Where the difference lies between the referencing gestures in books 1–3 of the *Library* and the later *Epitome* is in their thematic focus. In the former case, the invocations of alternative, traditional sources tend to involve beginnings (that is, the parentage of a hero) or to supply otherwise unknown information; in the latter case, however, the compiler explicitly refers to other authors in the context of erotic detail—most often, who raped a particular heroine—and endings—how did a particular heroic figure die?⁶¹ *Epitome* 1.16. In the expedition against the Amazon Theseus carried off Antiope, or Melanippe (as some say), or Hippolyte (as Simonides says).

Epitome 3.1. Why was Helen raped?

Epitome 3.4. Some say that Hermes carried Helen oV to Egypt, while Alexander/Paris took a phantom of her to Troy.

Epitome 5.14. Did 50 or 3,000 men hide in the Trojan horse?

Epitome 6.14. Was Neoptolemus killed because he went mad or because he desecrated the temple of Apollo?

Epitome 7.1. Some say that Ulysses wandered about in Libya, or was it Sicily; or about the Ocean, or the Tyrrhenian sea?

Epitome 7.38. Some people say that Penelope was seduced by Antinous and sent away by Ulysses to her father, Icarius; from this union, in Mantinea in Arcadia, she bore Pan to Hermes. Others say Ulysses killed her for allowing herself to be seduced by Amphinomus, while there is yet another tradition that tells how Ulysses submitted the case before Neoptolemus and was condemned by the latter to exile, where he died.

The referencings predominantly concern the major figures and details of the Trojan War, highlighting the disagreements in the mythical tradition over how many warriors hid in the Trojan horse (*Ep.* 5.14) or the reason for Neoptolemus' killing (*Ep.* 6.14) or the geography of Odysseus' wanderings (*Ep.* 7.1). But the compiler is above all noticeably much more interested in female figures than the author of the *Library*. I suggest that the compiler is engaged in an explicitly Herodotean gesture, for it was after all Herodotus who rehearsed parallel erotic myths only to dismiss them as the aetiology of major political events in the *Histories*. The historian surveyed the competing narratives concerning the rapes of Io, of Europa, and of Helen (1.1–5), only to refuse to authorize the accounts of the Persians or the Phoenicians and to return to a male-oriented history. And the epitomizer picks up the Helen story as a topos of parallel accounts in the light of its treatment by Herodotus, but also by Stesichorus (62–3 West)⁶² and Euripides in the *Helen*, raising the question as to why *Helen* was raped—it was the will of Zeus either that Helen would be famous, or that the heroes would become famous (*Ep.* 3.1)—and then reminding us of the tradition of the *eidolon*, or image, which went to Troy in place of Helen, who was in reality in Egypt (*Ep.* 3.4). In book 3 of the *Library* the author is content to mention only that Helen was abducted by Theseus (3.10.7) and then that she was also taken off by Alexander/Paris against the warnings of Oinone (3.12.6). He does not delve into the larger plan underlying the Trojan War.

Penelope is the second female figure who attracts attention from the epitomizer. In the *Library* Penelope is initially introduced as a figure over whom many suitors compete and for whom Odysseus must gain the assistance of Tyndareus in order to win (3.1.9). This detail obviously forms a prequel to the wooing of Penelope by the greedy suitors in the *Odyssey*. The *Epitome* elaborates on *Odyssey* books 20–3, where the contest of the bow

is planned and worked out to enable Odysseus to win back Penelope. At *Epitome* 7.26 ff. the compiler lists the suitors and recapitulates the narrative of the final books of the *Odyssey* and then continues with the narrative of the *Telegony*, which has Telegonus marry Penelope after Odysseus' death (*Ep.* 7.36). It is at this point that the epitomizer inserts and indeed concludes the work with a series of possible outcomes for the myth that disrupt the Homeric portrait of Penelope as the chaste wife. Now she is seduced by Antinoos, literally 'anti-mind', the leader of the suitors, to mother a child, Icarius, by him and, furthermore, begets Pan by Hermes when she is sent away (*Ep.* 7.38). Herodotus 2.145 acknowledges this tradition, while admitting other stories. The compiler of the *Epitome* finally ventures that Penelope was killed by Odysseus himself for allowing herself to be seduced by Amphinomos, mentioned at *Odyssey* 16.397–8 as one of the cleverer suitors. He then closes the *Epitome* with a less than glorious image of Odysseus going to Aetolia to marry a daughter of Thoas (*Ep.* 7.40), so that the marriage of Odysseus and Penelope, so perfect in the Homeric epics, now becomes a tale of adultery, seduction, and remarriage. Desire and death mark the compilation as a work with a distinct sense of an ending, whereas genealogy identifies the *Library* as a work constructed out of beginnings, albeit ones that are to be assimilated within this work in its capacity as a 'canon' of mythological tradition.

V

This chapter has looked at Apollodorus' *Library of Greek Mythology* in order to consider the phenomenon of the library-book, a text that names itself as a book collection and that dramatizes itself as a compendium of other literary works. This library-book, like the larger library, is an entity that lays claim to literary comprehensiveness—the *Library* contains all the mythology produced up to that point—that supposedly renders all prior mythology obsolete, but it also simultaneously betrays this grand claim. The work reveals moments where its apparent all-knowingness acknowledges the existence of alternative traditions, stories that have different accounts of the births of heroes or their fates. The library-book presents itself thus as complete only

because it has engaged in a deliberate forgetting of other parallel discourses.

It also becomes apparent that the author of the library-book has considerable power, a fact that is not surprising when we consider who the original founders of the library were. We have seen that he has the licence to manipulate narrative, subsuming all competing traditions to his own story so that he appears to be the origin and the end of myth. Even the appearance of totalization that the author purports for his text is a political ploy, for the *Library*, as all other libraries, is anything but complete.

The Library of Universal History: Diodorus Siculus and Literary Cosmopolitanism

INTRODUCTION

If one were to write an alternative history of the ancient library, one might draw attention amongst other things to works called the ‘Library’ (as I began to do in the previous chapter) in an attempt to understand this institution more fully. This chapter seeks to continue doing precisely this task by concerning itself with the *Library of History* or *Library of Universal History*, of Diodorus Siculus, the Sicilian historian of the first century BC,¹ which the elder Pliny speaks of as an important work particularly with regard to the manner in which it is entitled by its author. He observes that the author stopped playing (cf. *nugari*) around with silly titles for his book. Others had given their works precious and

overly clever designations, such as a *κηρίον* (Honeycomb), *κέρας Ἀμαλθείας* (Horn of Plenty), *ἴα* (Violets), *Μοῦσαι* (Muses), *πανδέκται* (Receptacles of Everything), *ἐγχειρίδια* (Handbooks), *λειμών* (Meadow), *πίναξ* (Tablet), *σχέδιον* (Improvisation).² Diodorus, in contrast, entitled his history *βιβλιοθήκη* because it encompasses histories of different cultures that could themselves be distinct works, endowing upon his work a remarkable authority through this title.

The work is already extraordinary for claiming for itself the status of ‘library’, or, if one insists upon the more conservative translation of *βιβλιοθήκη*, ‘bookshelf’,³ but I shall venture that, quite apart from its title, it is more notable as an innovative experiment. This chapter argues that the library without walls, which Roger Chartier, historian of the book and textuality, predicts as the library of the future,⁴ has a prefiguration in

antiquity in Diodorus' *βιβλιοθήκη ἱστορική*. Diodorus' *Library* is a text that envisages an albeit necessarily exaggerated and fictional overlap between its own textuality and the world in order to propose a paradigm for a political reality that is precisely without walls or boundaries. The envisioned political paradigm is a 'cosmopolitanism' that sees the world interconnected through its peoples and their interactions. This interconnectedness manifests itself furthermore through the writing of history as an articulation of global knowledge. Diodorus' monumental work, one that originally existed in forty books,⁵ is one that recalls and reads other past and present societies as necessary elements of a larger world, and local knowledge as intertwined within a larger general/universal knowledge.

I

We know very little about Diodorus himself apart from the fact that he was born in Agrigum in Sicily and that he visited Egypt and spent several years at Rome. But these travels may explain why cosmopolitanism is the key to understanding Diodorus' *Library*. In the modern world, we think of cosmopolitanism as a form of voluntary displacement without any particular commitment to a society.⁶ In contrast, in antiquity cosmopolitanism is rather a state of mind and may be recovered from variously articulated political visions. In the fifth and fourth centuries BCE writers made popular the idea that the individual is part of a global community and not just a city state. Democritus of Abdera proposed that the wise man lives in the entire earth and the universe is home to his soul (fr. 247DK), while, according to Cicero, Socrates referred to himself as 'an inhabitant and citizen of the world' (*mundi incolam et civem*) (*Tusc.* 5.108). In Xenophon's *Memorabilia* Aristippus states that he is not confined to his own city state but that he is a guest-friend everywhere, implying that he may inhabit any part of the world (*οὐδ' εἰς πολιτείαν ἑμᾶυτὸν ἀλλὰ ξένος πανταχοῦ εἰμι*, 2.1.13). The basis of cosmopolitanism is present elsewhere in the fourth century. An unnamed commentator on Plato's *Theaetetus* offers a gloss on this vision of human relations when he names the construal of

affinities between all peoples as ‘appropriation’ (*οἰκείωσις*). According to this ancient scholar, *οἰκείωσις* maintains justice, since one treats even the most distant person as a neighbour and one is inclined to be more favourably disposed to him on the assumption that those most closely connected to him have the most ‘appropriate’ relationship to oneself (Anon. Comm. on Plato’s *Theaet.* 5.18–6.31 = Long and Sedley 1987: 350). In this conception of the world order, each element, each individual, is necessarily part of a larger cosmic community.

In the Hellenistic period, cosmopolitanism was stimulated by uncertainty in the city state. Amongst the Cynics, Diogenes of Sinope refers to himself as *κοσμοπολίτης* (B263). Diogenes the Cynic describes himself as a ‘citizen of the universe’ (*κοσμοπολίτης*) in response to a question about his origins in a biographical anecdote (Diogenes Laertius 6.63⁷), and elsewhere is reported as saying that ‘the only good government is that in the cosmos’ (Diogenes Laertius 6.38). The ‘cosmopolitan’ in its purest and most precise form is a citizen not of the world, but of a larger cosmic community. Yet it is also the case that a cosmopolitan perspective enables the philosopher, here Crates the Theban, to claim as his country the whole earth (Diogenes Laertius 6.98⁸).⁹

But it is in Stoicism, as presented in a variety of disparate and often fragmentary texts, that a cosmopolitan consciousness is most pronouncedly articulated. This philosophical school advocates a necessary interconnectedness between individuals and peoples that transcends the boundaries of nationality, of ethnicity, of geography, and, perhaps, even of time. Furthermore, Stoic authors espoused a political vision in which the ‘city’ was not the geographically defined community instanced by the historical city state such as Athens or Sparta, but rather a lawful community of men and gods transcending physical, ethnic, and cultural boundaries.¹⁰ Hierocles declares that man is a social animal and for this reason, necessarily comes together into cities (Hierocles 11.14–18 = Long and Sedley 1987: 347–8). But the Stoic conception—or, perhaps more accurately, the Stoic conceptions of city—requires additional explanation and qualification. According to Clement *Strom.* 4.26, the Stoics

declare the universe (οὐρανός) a proper city quite against the more conventional understanding of what a city is. In his Borysthenic Oration (36), Dio Chrysostom offers what appears to be an account of the Stoic ideal of civic community. Espousing the thesis that the πόλις is a multitude of men who live together under law and who are not foolish (cf. ἀφρόνων, 36.20), Dio proceeds to argue for the existence of a heavenly city in which gods and men live together as adults and children respectively: in this orderly and rational community, men are clearly far from mature in comparison to the gods (36.23).¹¹ Elsewhere, in *De Finibus*, Cicero writes: 'The Stoics hold that the world is governed by divine will: it is as it were a city and state shared by men and gods, and each one of us is a part of this world' (*De Finibus* 3.62–4 and 67–8 = Long and Sedley 1987: 348–9). According to Cicero, the 'city' is a community of humans and divine beings who live in accordance with divine will.

Hierocles (in Stobaeus 4.671–3) provides further elaboration on how to understand this Stoic city. In his account, the city begins with the individual. The individual is surrounded by numerous circles, with the closest circle containing his own body and what the body requires, the next ring containing his immediate family, the next one his extended family of uncles, aunts, grandparents, nephews, nieces, cousins; the next other relatives; the next neighbours; and then those living in nearby towns, his countrymen, and so on in extending circles, so that the whole of the human race is contained in this order. Hierocles goes on to observe that one's goal should be to reduce the distance between these relational circles, with the result that everyone becomes a 'brother', 'sister', 'mother', and 'father' to oneself, and, in keeping with the logic of the analogy, mankind becomes a family.¹²

II

Stoicism potentially puts the individual at odds with the state and its leaders.¹³ It espouses an optimistic view of the world as a single community, which those in power may not hold. Scholars speculate as to how deep the Stoicism of Diodorus Siculus goes. They either work on the assumption that he must be fully

assimilated to this school of philosophy, or, more often, as in the case of Elizabeth Rawson¹⁴ and Kenneth Sacks,¹⁵ they disqualify him from his status as a card-carrying Stoic. I begin with a somewhat different approach to this issue. I argue that cosmopolitanism has its various and varied expressions in Greco-Roman antiquity, so that to measure Diodorus, or, for that matter, any author by a canonical Stoicism, is to risk excluding him or any other author from this diverse and imprecisely defined body of material. If it is granted that Stoicism has its various and individual articulations, my project is to argue that the author of the *Library of History* might be taken to stand as a paradigm, however idiosyncratic, for cosmopolitanism as represented by this ancient literary intellectual.¹⁶

The *Library* begins with the/observation that universal history—that is, αἱ κοιναὶ ἱστορίαι—helps humanity by educating it in its ‘common life’ (cf. ὁ κοινὸς βίος) without any risk or trouble to its audience (1.1–3).¹⁶ Κοινός, -ή is a significant adjective in this declaration. Its recurrence at the beginning of the work makes the point that common, shared stories are testimony to a common, shared, and intertwined life. Despite any spatial, temporal, or cultural separations, mankind has a shared kinship (ἡ . . . συγγενεία) and is ordered into one and the same structure (ὑπὸ μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν σύνταξιν, 1.1.3). Diodorus makes this understanding of humanity the organizing rationale of his historical narrative. Writing history serves divine providence (ἡ θεία προνοία), which has arranged both celestial bodies and human nature into a common relationship (εἰς κοινὴν ἀναλογίαν) and guides them in this order (1.1.3). Where other historians have confined themselves to an account of disparate wars undertaken by one people or by one city (cf. μιᾶς πόλεως, 1.3.2), history should ideally record humanity’s shared experience (τὰς κοινὰς τῆς οἰκουμένης πράξεως) as if they were those of a single city (cf. καθὰ πᾶρ μιᾶς πόλεως, 1.1.3).¹⁷ History is no longer to be a project with a limited horizon but is conceived as a ‘civic’ discourse that supersedes, for instance, the

funeral oration as a rhetorical and literary form that socializes that community into its past, its ideologies, and its values for the present and future. Accordingly, the 'city' is no longer the community instanced as the historical *polis* but rather the lawful community of men and gods transcending physical, ethnic, and cultural boundaries.

According to Diodorus, the historian should be an intellectual cosmopolitan, a citizen of a universal city who inhabits his environment through his literary composition and who enables others to do likewise in the reception of his work. So historical discourse offers the young the wisdom and knowledge of elders, including prior generations; it prepares leaders for their roles; it makes soldiers brave through its examples, and it generally inspires all forms of human achievement (cf. 1.1.4–213; 1.2.5–8). In particular, as a memorial, historical writing has the capacity to extend over the whole civilized world, where time would otherwise dissipate recollection of the past (1.2.5). Diodorus observes that, if there have been individuals who aspired to write comprehensive narratives of the past (cf. 1.3.2–3), they had, nonetheless, fallen short, ending their histories too soon with Philip of Macedon, or Alexander, or the dynasties that succeeded these rulers, the Diadochi and the Epigoni (1.3.3). In marked distinction from such histories, the *Library* itself is a text with an ambitious aspiration: to bring history's cosmopolitan potential to its greatest fulfilment by producing a history (cf.

ὑπόθεσιν ἱστορικὴν πραγματεύσασθαι) that will benefit its readers to the greatest possible extent while least inconveniencing them (1.3.5). Its author writes total history in so far as this is possible, labouring for thirty years and at great trouble and risk to himself in his undertaking of what is cast as an Odyssean project (1.4.1 and 1.1.2).

Diodorus explicitly rehearses the cosmopolitan perspective for his own work. He has written of the deeds of the whole world

order (τοῦ σύμπαντος κόσμου) from most ancient times until the present as if they were those of a single city

ὥσπερ τινος μιᾶς πόλεως, 1.3.6). Slightly later in the introduction, he emphasizes the panoramic concern of his work, promising that he will offer an accurate account (cf.

ἀκριβῶς ἀναγράφομεν) of every race of mankind and what they have done in the known parts of the inhabited world (ἐν τοῖς γνωριζομένοις μέρεσι τῆς οἰκουμένης) from the most ancient times (1.6.2). Historical cosmopolitanism is geographical and cultural. Diodorus' text, a receptacle of literary texts, as its title βιβλιοθήκη denotes, is one that must be understood as drawing together material that is otherwise scattered over time and events in many different treatises (1.3.4).

Charles Fornara notes that universal history makes its appearance in Greece in the fourth century, when an extensive historical, literary critical, philosophical, and antiquarian body of literature had come into being.¹⁸ In other words, the existence of universal history is predicated on the prior existence of the materials that might constitute a library were they to be brought together. Diodorus' work, a textual library, is one that realizes the status of these source materials as library texts. The author speaks of consulting many sources in Rome, which certainly provided him with materials for the Roman elements of his history and also for the Greek and non-Greek aspects of his work (1.4.4–5). At 3.38.1 and 17.52.6 he refers to time spent examining documents and records at Alexandria, presumably those held in the Great Library.¹⁹ Among the named sources are Herodotus and Ctesias, who speak of African burial customs (2.15.2), and who stand as the 'oldest prose writers' referred to as divergent authorities on the Medean empire (2.32.1; 2.32.4–34.1). Anne Burton has named other sources, tentatively identifying Agatharchides of Cnidos as the basis for the geography of book 1, and Hecataeus of Abdera for the first, Egyptian book in general.²⁰ Geer argues that Hieronymus of Cardia, who appears in the narrative as a captive of Antigonos (19.44.3), is the chief source for books 18–20 and the material concerning Eumenes, Antigonos, and Demetrius,²¹ while Duris of Samos provides the material on Sicily in this section (20.41.3 = Duris *FGrH* 76.17; 20.104.3 = Duris *FGrH* 76.18).²²

But this *Library* ideally should not be treated as a reference tool that the reader may consult randomly or piecemeal.²³ This Diodorus makes explicit. A historical composition is frequently referred to by the word συντάξις, a noun that denotes a

structured order, which may include the order of the world (Sosippus 1.31; Chrysippus *Stoic.* 2.293; Strabo 13.1.54). Where Diodorus is concerned, it designates the single narrative at 1.3.8 (cf. ἐν μιᾷ συντάξεως περιγραφῇ). So the author denotes Hermeias of Mytilene's work on Sicily by the phrase ἡ τῶν Σικελικῶν σύνταξις (15.37.3). Xenophon's Hellenica by ἡ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν σύνταξις (15.89.3). He refers to Philistus' συντάξις (15.94.4), and to the second part of Divillus the Athenian's συντάξις (cf. τῆς δευτέρας συντάξεως) as beginning where Ephorus' history leaves off (16.76.6). A σύνταξις may be more than a structure of words, for the noun may denote a human organization or one of nature. Espousing a view in which the universe takes on a distinct order out of an indiscriminate chaos, one that is essentially Stoic, Diodorus states that, as the heavenly and earthly bodies become distinguished from one another, the cosmos assumes a visible structure in its entirety: τὸν μὲν κόσμον περιλαβεῖν ἅπασαν τὴν ὁρωμένην ἐν αὐτῷ σύνταξιν (1.7.1). Thus the literary work as an ordered structure is one that may reflect the larger cosmic order.

For this to be the case the audience must respect the structure of the text. At the outset of the work Diodorus states that he has set out the work's overall aims (cf.

ἐς ἔννοιαν . . . τῆς ὅλης προθέσεως) to deter those who customarily excerpt from works from mutilating the compositions of others—that is, his own text: ἀποτρέψαι τοῦ λυμαίνεσθαι τὰς ἀλλοτρίας πραγματείας (1.5.2).

The verb λυμαίνεσθαι is one that appears earlier at 1.2.5 to describe the power of time as tearing asunder all things, τὸν πάντα τᾶλλα λυμαινόμενον χρόνον.²⁴ Read together these passages suggest that the impatient audience, one that does not observe the order of the text but perhaps leaps around the work, undoes the work of history and of the historian. Diodorus' aim and determination are that the reader should regard the *Library* as a history with a structural integrity that requires acknowledgement of a beginning, middle, and end (cf.

Plato *Phaedrus* 264c) and, accordingly, as a text that is to be read from beginning to end. A historical work has an ‘economy’

(οἰκονομία), which means that its author must not treat extraneous matters in his text, as Timotheus did in indulging in censure in his otherwise chronologically organized and learned work (5.1.3). Consistently, and particularly at 20.1.5, he offers a diatribe against authors who insert wordy rhetorical speeches into their histories. Instead he takes the opportunity to speak of history as something that is simple, consistent, and unified, resembling an ‘ensouled body’ (ἐμφύχῳ σώματι) and that, left as such, provides pleasant and clear reading.

The author of the *Library* has written a work that, in so far as is possible, respects chronological progression and thematic coherence. Diodorus declares that the best history is one that

sustains a continuity (τὸ τῶν πράξεων εἰρόμενον), since it is easier to read and to grasp. Such a history excels to the degree that a whole is greater than a part and continuity is superior to disjunction (1.3.8; cf. 16.1.2). He shows his approval

for the universal history (τὰς κοινὰς πράξεις) of Ephorus, which is not insignificantly the first²⁵ to succeed not only as

regards style but also with respect to the issue of οἰκονομία. Ephorus had each of his books encompass a particular theme

(5.1.4). Following his predecessor’s example, he proposes book 5 as one concerned with islands and begins with his history of Sicily (5.1.4). The idea of the thematically self-contained book is elsewhere reiterated. At 16.1.1 the author proposes that book divisions should fall, such that the actions of states or kings are contained in their entirety

(πράξεις αὐτοτελεῖς ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους), again to keep the reader interested and attentive. Diodorus adopts his own proposal. So, for instance, book 16 is devoted to the life and achievements of Philip of Macedon; book 17 treats history as it pertains to the life of Alexander, an individual whose actions had repercussions for the known world (cf.

ἐν τοῖς γνωριζομένοις μέρεσι τῆς οἰκομένης), such that events are presented as being continuous (

συνεχεῖς also cf. τὰς πράξεις ... κεφαλαιωδῶς

τεθείσας καὶ συνεχῆς ἐχούσας ταῖς ἀρχαῖς τὸ τέλος.
17.1.2; cf. 16.95.5). Book 18 deals with the deeds of Alexander's friends after the ruler's death (18.1.5), while book 19 contains the account of Agathocles' cruel tyranny (cf.

τὰ συνεχῇ τοῖς προειρημένοις προσθήσομεν, 19.1.9).

Diodorus states that his history will include what he deems to be οἰκεῖα—that is 'proper'—to his narrative in summary form (ἐν κεφαλαίοις)—abbreviation and selection are after all the imperative of universal history, which has as its ambit a totality of facts and events (1.6.1). οἰκεῖα is a reading suggested by Vogel in place of εὐοικότα, 'what is probable', which is rather a rhetorical imperative (cf., e.g., Plato *Phaedrus* 266e3 and Aristotle *Prior Analytics* 70a2 ff.).²⁶ Self-referentiality elsewhere in the work certainly supports Vogel's emendation over the manuscript reading. In book 2, for example, the author says that he resists the temptation to digress on Chaldean astrology lest he wander away from what is his *proper* history (cf.

τῆς οἰκείας ἱστορίας, 2.32.10), while at 4.28 he abbreviates his account of the attack of the Sythian Amazons on Athens to return to Heracles—the Scythian Amazons are also treated at, e.g., 2.44–6, 3.52, 4.16. At the beginning of book 20 he marks the transition from his criticism of long rhetorical speeches as disruptive to the flow of a historical narrative by asserting that he will now speak about the times that have been set out as being

proper to his writing (τοὺς οἰκείους τῇ γραφῇ). This entails that he now treat Agathocles' campaign in Libya (20.2.3). What is 'proper' is not merely what temporally follows, but also what is thematically similar or related, especially in the 'mythological' portion of the work. So the narrative of Theseus' deeds logically follows the myth of Heracles because the former

imitated the deeds of the latter (note οἰκεῖον ἂν εἴη περὶ Θησέως εἰπεῖν . . ., 4.59.1). Similarly, retelling the birth and actions of Dionysus from Egyptian sources becomes sufficient—that is, proper—grounds for continuing with the divergent traditions in Greek myth about the god of wine (cf. esp.

οἰκεῖν εἶναι διαλαμβάνο

μεν προσθεῖναι τὰ μυθολογούμενα περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τούτου παρὰ τοῖς

“Ελληνσι, 3.62.1–2). Mention of Charondas, the most learned Thurian, legal scholar, and educational reformer, is ‘not improper’ (οὐκ ἀνοίκειον) for it serves the instruction of the reader (12.11.4 and V.). Charondas, one might speculate, is a paradigm of intellectual and cultural cosmopolitanism, a figure who learns the laws of all peoples and, furthermore, requires that his citizens be educated so as to be able to read and write. Beyond this, οἰκεῖα may also refer to the Stoic doctrine of οἰκείωσις, which holds that each person is concerned for the common good.²⁷

Diodorus consciously marks departures from straightforward chronology only where such divergences are necessary for reasons of context or aetiology.²⁸ Accordingly, at 4.73.1 he comments on the fact that he must revert to earlier times (τοῖς χρόνοις προσαναδραμόντας) and go through the complete myth concerning Pelops, Tantalus, and Oinomaus. In the next chapter he observes that mention of Pelops warrants treatment of the former’s father Tantalus so that nothing is omitted (4.74.1; cf. also 4.46.5 on completeness). After celebrating the courage of the Spartans at Thermopylae, Diodorus decisively moves the narrative on to what follows (ἐπὶ τὰ συνεχῇ τοῖς εἰρημένους)—namely, Xerxes’ aggressions, at 11.12.1. Later, at 17.5.3, he draws attention to a retrospective segment as he shifts from Alexander to the Persian kingdom (cf.

βραχὺ τοῖς χρόνοις προαναλαβεῖν τὴν ἱστορίαν; see also 11.67.1, 18.19.1, and 19.2.1 for the narrative of the childhood of Agathocles of Syracuse). At the fragment that has come down as 10.24 the author states that he digresses to honour, rather than to criticize, Herodotus.

III

The integrity of the *Library of History* deliberately reflects the integrity of human experience; that is to say, it espouses the common quality of what people do across time and different cultures. It is specifically the case that human history is one that is interwoven and interconnected because the actions of diVerent

peoples inevitably impinge for the better or the worse upon each other. What has been conceptualized as the Herodotean ‘other’ is called into question through the conceptualization of the cosmos as a single, world city.²⁹ Furthermore, the impossibility of extricating persons and events from their larger historical context is also a realization that both comes from and in part explains Diodorus’ cosmopolitanism. The historical project is conventionally one that makes this clear in offering a paradigm of past events and actions from which present and future communities may learn, from which they may take models for their own behaviours, or which they may reject as unpalatable with regard to their own social and moral identities.

Diodorus’ narrative draws the past into the ambit of the present by proposing that the former is instructive for its audience. The author of the *Library* speaks in the opening books about the utility of history (cf. 1.1.1; 5.1.1), invoking a commonplace understanding of the historical project.³⁰ And, indeed, writing about the lives of bygone individuals is said to assist mankind in its common/shared life (cf.

τὸν κοινὸν βίον), teaching in the rewards of virtue and the penalties of vice, as we read from the fragment preserved as 10.12.1–2. History is to some degree an epideictic genre; it praises the good and offers criticism of the bad in order to

encourage (προτρέψειν) the good and to dissuade (ἀποτρέψεσθαι) from evil (15.1.1). Diodorus declares that, above all, the historian must seek to draw attention to great achievements and virtue (26.1.3). Accordingly, while other writers, such as Ephorus, Callisthenes, and Theopompus, have excluded mythical material owing to the lack of agreement about its value, Diodorus insists on rehearsing the myths of Dionysus, Heracles, and Theseus because humanity has benefited greatly

from their services (cf. διὰ τὰς κοινὰς εὐεργεσίας, 4.1.3–4; for Dionysus’ benefits, see 4.1.6; but cf. 1.37.3–4). Elsewhere, in book 14, he observes that leaders have lives that are under scrutiny with the result that any evil done by them leaves an

‘immortal image’ (ἀθάνατος εἰκών) as its legacy. Posterity, no doubt as reinforced by historical discourse, builds upon any negative reputations that one may acquire in life (14.1.2–3). Yet

leaders are not always the best men, since democratic communities fear those who have understanding, and it is just such a less-than-outstanding individual, Agathocles, the tyrant of Sicily, who becomes the most notable example of gratuitous cruelty; his wicked actions fill the narrative of book 19 (cf. 19.1.1–10).

In addition to its epideictic function, history seeks to comprehend time by encompassing narrative time and structure as found in works of other historians. Diodorus refers segments of his work to the beginnings and endings of other works, and, moreover, to their overall unities. Thus 13.42.5, which takes the history to 411 BCE, is noted as the conclusion of Thucydides' history in eight books, and the beginning of the works of Xenophon and Theopompus. Then 13.103.3, which relates events in the Mediterranean in 406 BCE, corresponds to the end of Philistus' history of Sicily, covering 800 years in seven books (on Philistus' work, see also 13.91.4). The siege of Perinthus, which is treated at 16.76, marks the end of the history of Ephorus of Cyme, which in turn gives the beginning of the second part of Diyllus' history (16.76.5–6; for Diyllus, cf. also 16.14.4; 21.5; 23.17). These intertextual references emphasize the comprehensiveness of Diodorus' work.

The structure of the *Library* also articulates the coherence of human experience especially across cultural boundaries. Chronology in the work is a synchronicity: the narrative of any particular event has as one of its contexts any series of simultaneous occurrences in other inhabited portions of the world. This system of dating has a precedent in Thucydides, who identifies 431 BCE the first year of the Peloponnesian War by a variety of temporal markers: it is the fifteenth year of the treaty between the Athenians and Spartans after the capture of Euboea; Chryse has been priestess in Argo for forty-eight years; Aenias is ephor in Sparta; Pythodorus is chief archon in Athens for two months (Thucydides 2.1.2). Yet where Thucydides offers comparative dating from within the Greek world, Diodorus cites temporal references across the whole of the civilized world. Beginning from book 11—books 6 to 10 are in a fragmentary condition, existing only from citations by other, later authors—the latter identifies the year we know as 480 BC through the archon in Athens, the consuls at Rome, and the Olympiad and a

victor, where this pertains—that is, every four years. Elsewhere the author acknowledges other notable political events, such as wars (e.g. 11.74.1; 11.79.1; 11.86.1; 12.6.1; 12.27.1; 12.38; 15.25, etc.) or the founding of cities (11.78.5).

The panoramic system of dating reflects the panoramic purview of the narrative, which passes back and forth between the Mediterranean world to Asia to Africa to Europe, including Britain (e.g. 5.22 ff.), as events and personages in them become significant and relevant. So, for example, at 17.73.4–5 the scene shifts from Asia, where the reader has been reading about Alexander's conquest of Persepolis, back to Europe, picking up from 17.48.1 and 17.62.663.4, which were concerned with Greek anxieties about Macedonian power. At 18.50.1 the narrative shifts from Macedonia, following the death of Antipater, to events in Asia, and then back to Europe after 73.3 with the election of Demetrius of Phalerum as the leader of Athens. Then, in the following book, between 19.49 and 19.89 the narrative moves between Asia and Europe on several occasions to trace the various happenings in Greece, the Italian world, and the Seleucid empire. Peace may also warrant comment as part of Diodorus' panoramic perspective, as it does at 12.26.2, where Diodorus observes that most peoples in the inhabited world were at peace, τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην ἔθνῶν ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ ὑπῆρχε.

The scene changing is increased in later books, creating the impression that human events become further enmeshed as history progresses. Hospitality articulates the increasingly complex interrelations in the world. In the survey of the Arabian Gulf, the Debae are described as a people hospitable to strangers (φιλόξενοι), but only where the Boeotians and Peloponnesians are concerned as a result of an ancient tie (διὰ τινὰ παλαιὰν . . . οἰκειότητα) through Heracles (3.45.5). Qualified hospitality is also manifest by the citizens of Arabian Sabae, an extremely affluent town, who were separated from (cf. ἀπεξενῶσθαι) those whose own greed (cf. διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν πλεονεξίαν) makes them think someone else's wealth is their own good fortune (3.47.8). The adjective ἴδια is significant here, for it is private greed that problematizes the community's wealth and, furthermore, erects the boundaries

that obstruct the creation of mankind as a family.

In the following book Diodorus introduces a cluster of narratives concerning the treatment of strangers that further show that the inhabited world has historically not been a cosmopolitan community. At 4.44.7 he refers to the barbarians at

Tauric Chersonese who sacrifice strangers (ξένοι) to Artemis Tauropolis in order to prompt an investigation of why

ξενοκτονία occurs (4.45.1). The aetiology follows directly. At 4.45.2 Hecate, the mother of Medea, is presented as a huntress of strangers who mixes poisons which she tries out on unsuspecting visitors (ξένοι). After killing her own father Perses, she establishes the cult of Artemis and requires strangers to be sacrificed to the goddess (4.45.4). From this point unfolds a retelling of the myth of the Argo, which foregrounds the issue of relations with strangers in its opening. In stark opposition to her mother, Medea devises drugs to assist rather than harm strangers, and has to flee her parents, who kill visitors as a matter of custom (cf. τὸ τῆς ξενοκτονίας νόμιμον, 4.46.1; cf. 4.47.2). Encountering the Argonauts, she befriends them after warning them of the danger at Tauric Chersonese.

The fragmentary remains of book 9 (= Johannes Tzetzes Hist. 1.646–68) rehearse the story of Phalaris and the bull as preserved in Lucian, Diodorus, Pindar, and others (cf. 9.19.1). While this narrative relates how Phalaris murders its creator Perilaus for his cruel invention, it is not implausible that this story was originally cast as a narrative concerning the mistreatment of strangers, as it seems to stand (e.g. in Callimachus frs. 44–6).³¹ Phalaris' father Busiris is after all notorious for his impiety towards strangers, which was characteristic of the Egyptians (cf.

διὰ τὴν τῶν ἐγχωρίων ἀξενίαν, 1.67.11).³² Later in book 13 Diodorus presents us with Tellias, a wealthy citizen of Acragas, who orders his servants to invite strangers into his household, and, in this, does what many other citizens of Acragas also do (13.83.1). The historian proceeds to demonstrate the extent of Tellias' generosity, citing from another writer Timaeus the entertainment of 500 cavalymen from Gela during a snowstorm (13.83.2). Unfortunately, hospitality does not save Tellias or his fellow citizens from death when the Carthaginians under Himilcar invade their city (13.90.4). It is significant that

the bull of Phalaris, which should be taken as an emblem of the unjust treatment of visitors (cf. 13.90.4–5³³), should resurface in this episode as part of the booty sent back to Carthage.

In the ancient world, the guest-host relationship is one of the means of establishing relationships between individuals who would otherwise have no connection or contact. Hospitality entails the extension of goodwill and generosity towards someone who is otherwise an ‘other’ with the understanding that this act of welcome will in turn occasion reciprocal goodwill and

generosity from the former *ξένοι*.³⁴ Aristippus (cf. Xenophon *Mem.* 2.1.13) could not regard himself as a ‘guest’ (*ξένος*) everywhere without hospitality. There is an at least implicit sense that hospitality is one of the structuring mechanisms of a cosmopolitan world with the corollary recognition that violation of its protocols stands as a paradigm of unjust behaviour. This violation has as its counterpart, and sometimes as its consequence, war, the state of affairs in which others are further alienated from oneself. It is thus poignant that the account of Tellias’ hospitality is set within the larger narrative of the Carthaginian attack upon Acragas, an act of aggression that destroys any possibilities of a guest-host relationship between the two peoples and, indeed, the host figures themselves. Likewise, from book 31, as preserved in *Const. Exc.* 2 (1), pp. 281–2, the reader learns of the general of barbarous Gauls who sacrifices the best-looking prisoners taken in war, and furthermore, spears to death the remainder, including those known to him previously through acts of hospitality (

διὰ τὰς προγεγενημένας ἐπιξενώσεις; 31.13.1). Such inhuman behaviour reinforces the characterization of the

victorious Gauls as *βάρβαροι*. There is another instance of inhospitality set against the background of war in book 33. Here sources relate how the cruel Thracian king Diegylis committed outrages on the Greek cities he conquered, including the following extreme example of cruelty, which outdid even Phalaris’ behaviour

(ὡς Φάλαριν . . . ὑπερβάλλειν ὠμότητι) during the celebration of his marriage. He seizes two young travellers—that is, ideally potential guests—and sacrifices them both after the elder has shown affection for the younger one by splitting them

down the middle with an axe (33.14.4–5).

If hospitality obliges that good be returned for good, war is a state of affairs in which evil and cruelty, rather than good, are returned for evil and cruelty according to the logic of retributive justice. Several episodes give support to this principle. In the section preserved as 10.25.1 the reader discovers that the Persians learned of the burning of temples as revenge for like violence, making the point that harm is revisited by harm. Slightly later, at 10.25.4, the source develops this thematic of justice when the Persian Artaphernes replies to Hecataeus that Persian violence done to the Greeks (after the battle of Lade (494)) gives the former cause for concern about resentment and Hecataeus responds that, if ill treatment produces bad faith, then kind treatment should produce good will, at which Artaphernes restores laws and fair tributes to the Greek cities. At 14.52.1–2 the citizens of Motye despair when they are defeated by the Sicilian Greeks under Dionysius for the reason that they had in

the past treated cruelly (*τὸ ὡμῶς κεχρησθαι*) Greek captives, and this despair impels them to fight bravely although to no avail (cf. 14.52.3–7). Certainly, when Dionysius' army breaks through, they slaughter everyone, returning cruelty for cruelty (*ὡμότητα ὡμότητι σπεύδοντες ἀμύνεσθαι*, 14.53.1).

Cruelty may alienate individuals within communities from each other such that the community is at war with itself, or at least in a state of revolution. Book 19 offers a paradigmatic instance of stasis, or civil war, in the narrative of the return to power of Agathocles in Syracuse (317 BC). After gaining support against the ruling Six Hundred Agathocles creates a situation in which the citizens kill each other, no longer distinguishing between friend and enemy (cf.

οὐ διέκρινε φίλον ἢ πολέμιον) as they take out their grudges and envy on each other (19.7.1–3). Diodorus continues by remarking that these crimes occur in what is otherwise peacetime with Greek fighting Greeks such that kinship (*οἰκεῖοι κατὰ συγγενῶν*), oaths, and the gods are disregarded (19.7.4; 19.8.1 ff. for continuation of the violence).

Later books of the *Library* offer what seems to be a breathless catalogue of cruelties and outrages committed by leaders in the

inhabited world apart from Rome. In book 33 the Syrian ruler Demetrius sinks to a tyrannical savagery (cf.

εἰς ὀμότητα τυραννικήν, 33.4.1), which surpasses even his father's, with the result that his house is hated by the citizens and the rival house is loved for its equity

(*διὰ τὴν ἐπιείκειαν*, 33.4.2–4; cf. 33.9.1). Ptolemy (VIII Euergetes II) is strongly hated by his subjects for his cruelty and lawless treatment of them

(*διὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχομένους ὀμότητα καὶ παρανομίαν*) such that his people look for an opportunity for revolt. The next example of cruelty is the Thracian king Diegylis, who alienates his subjects, treating them not as friends or allies (cf. *ὡς φίλων καὶ συμμάχων*) but

cruelly (*ὀμῶς*) as if they were slaves or the captive enemy (*ὡς ἀργυρωνήτων ἀνδραπόδων ἢ πολεμίων αἰχμαλώτων*, 33.14.1). The vocabulary emphasizes the ruler's violation of community, and, indeed, the following paragraphs portray treatment that resembles the capture of an enemy city in war (33.14.2–33.15.2). Contrasts with the humanity of Attalus (II, king of Pergamum, 160/59–39/8 BC) (33.15.1)—namely, the actions of the Roman consul Pompeius in freeing the Numantians from oppression (33.17.3)—and the clemency of King Arsaces, the founder of the Parthian empire, close the unsavoury portrait of Diegylis at this point and reveal the political benefits of just behaviour with respect to one's enemies and subjects.

In book 34/5 Damophilus, a wealthy citizen of Enna, is a brutal head of household who imitates the inhumanity shown by the Sicilians towards their slaves, cf.

τὴν εἰς τούτους ἀπανθρωπίαν καὶ βαρύτητα

(34–5.2.34)—here the noun *ἀπανθρωπία* strongly suggests that cruelty ultimately calls into question the humanity of the one

who practises it, and, after all, *ὀμότης* and its cognates are to be associated with animals rather than people, or perhaps more accurately this vocabulary serves to emphasize the inhumanity of human cruelty. Damophilus refuses to feed or clothe his household, as does his wife, and beats them, with the result that

his slaves rise up to the detriment of the whole state (34–5.2.33). Diodorus implies the classical analogy between household (*οἶκος*) and state here, and, indeed, the logic of retributive action is no less in operation than in the larger political arena. The source material observes that human nature instructs in the repayment of both kindness and vengeance, and insists that the slaves' murder of their masters is due not to inborn savagery (*οὐ δι' ὀμότητα φύσεως*) but rather to the injustice of their masters (34–5.2.40). Again, cruelty is set in relief against kindness of another individual related to the perpetrator of cruelty, this time Damophilus' daughter, who tends the slaves beaten by her parents in what is characterized as an act of hospitality (cf.

τῆς προγεγεννημένης χάριτος ξενολογησάσης, 34–5.2.39). If there is a moral to be derived from this and the other synkrisis, it is that cruel and brutal behaviour need not be—and certainly is anything but—the basis of affinity or relationship between human beings.

IV

The Diodoran cosmos is an ordered one, for arrogance and cruelty are ultimately punished (cf. 20.13.3 with 20.77.3; 34–5.2.47). People, especially those in positions of power and responsibility, may not act without consequences in the ordered world envisaged by the Roman author. At the least, one's actions, whether for the good or the bad, produce one's reputation, an indelible memory, after death (cf. 10.12.1–3), and the framing of many of the portraits in the *Library* as paradigmatic of vice or virtue confirms this axiomatic principle (see, e.g., 11.11.4 (for Charondas); 14.1.2–3; 15.1.1–2; 19.1.6; 37.4.1). But, in life itself, the vicious and unjust individual is plagued by insecurity: among others, Agathocles fears the loss of his kingdom (20.77.1–2); Antigone's loss of kingdom and death is presented as a consequence of his wish to expand his empire unjustly by Diodorus' epitomizer (21.1.1); the cruel Ptolemy (V Epiphanes) has his throne imperilled by his cruelty (28.14.1).

The narrative of the *Library* repeatedly offers examples of dramatic reversals of human fortune—a thematic of Greco-Roman

history since Herodotus—as the basis of its order. There is the case of Ballonymus, who, originally of royal descent, rises from a case of extreme destitution to become king of Tyre and a friend of Alexander and who, after Hephaestion's initial nomination of his guest-friend to this position, turns down his offer (17.47.1–6). This story Diodorus describes as occurring ‘through the paradox of reversal’ (cf. *διὰ τὸ τῆς περιπετείας παράδοξον*, 17.46.6) and he concludes the episode by offering it as instruction in the unexpected changes of fortune (cf.

τὴν τῆς τύχης παράδοξον μεταβολήν, 17.47.6).

Another lesson in the vicissitudes of fortune is offered this time to Alexander, who reminds one of his slaves that this individual was formerly the slave of the defeated Darius when a table belonging to the latter is placed under the new ruler's feet as a footstool. The comment prompts Alexander to reflect on the change (cf.

τῆς ὅλης . . . μεταβολῆς) that has come over the Persian kingdom, and to be anxious that his use of the table as a footstool is an act of arrogance (17.66.37). Later, in book 17, the suicide of the athletic victor Dioxippus after he has been framed by Alexander's friends offers another warning about the power of fate (cf. *ἡ τύχη*) to change one's standing (17.101.2–5).

Reversals in human fortune are also prominent in the later books of the *Library*. Book 31 begins with cautionary reflections that the tables may be turned on one even at the peak of one's success and accomplishment as an incentive for people to be prepared to show mercy to those they have defeated (31.3.3; see also 30.23.1). As book 31 now stands, this observation is followed

by reference to the work *Concerning Fortune* (*Περὶ Τύχης*) of Demetrius of Phalerum in which that author writes about vicissitudes of fortune that have brought the Macedonians to power and the Persians under their rule (31.10.1–2). This is the book that provides us with Ptolemy (V) living in squalor in Rome after being ousted by his brother as an example of fortune's transforming hand (31.18.3).³⁵ No less do the extraordinary metamorphoses presented in book 32 whereby young women suddenly grow testicles and turn into men illustrate the power of fortune to surprise (32.10.2–12.3).³⁶

But war is not the greatest threat to the conception of the

world as ‘one city’. The more serious obstacle to the cosmopolitan ideal of affinity (cf. *οἰκείωσις*), in which each person and community envisages itself as intricately with every other person and community, is the ethnic or cultural group that defines itself through distinction from all others, such that the rest of humanity is effectively alienated from it. Diodorus seems to provide us with an example of such a people, the Jews, in book 34/5 of the *Library*. Here the author relates the siege of Jerusalem (134 BC) by King Antiochus (VII Euergetes). The king is urged to destroy the city for the reason that the Jews alone do not associate with any other people and, in fact, regard everyone else as enemies (cf. *μόνους γὰρ ἀπάντων ἔθνων ἀκοινωνήτους εἶναι τῆς πρὸς ἄλλο ἔθνος ἐπιμιξίας καὶ πολεμίους ὑπολαμβάνειν πάντας*, 345.1.1).³⁶ The advisers further justify this extreme course of action, observing that the Egyptians drove out the Jews for their impiety and disfavour with the gods (cf.

ὥς ἀσεβεῖς καὶ μισουμένους ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν ἐξ ἀπάσης τῆς Αἰγύπτου πεφυγαδευμένους) in a retelling of the biblical Exodus narrative: the Jews are characterized as being among the lepers and otherwise ‘unclean’ people expelled from Egypt (34–5.1.1–2). The speakers continue by noting that, when the Jews settled Jerusalem, they entrenched misanthropy in their laws and established a series of customs that isolated them from every other nation (cf.

συστησαμένους δὲ τὸ τῶν Ἰουδαίων ἔθνος παραδόσιμον ποιῆσαι τὸ μῖσος τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους· διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ νόμιμα παντελῶς ἐξηλλαγμένα καταδείσαι, τὸ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἔθνει τραπέζης κοινωνεῖν μηδ’ εὐνοεῖν τὸ παράπαν, 34–5.1.2–3).³⁷

It is important to stress that this passage does not express anti-Semitism in the sense of hatred of the Jews *per se*, but rather shows that hatred of the Jews, as placed in the mouths of Antiochus’ advisers, is due to their isolationism and uncongeniality. The subsequent part of the narrative supports the latter interpretation, for, when Antiochus enters the temple, he desecrates the holy books, which are described as ‘hospitality-hating’ (*μισόξενα*) and which are viewed as the basis for the King’s ‘Jewish problem’ (34–5.1.4). Then, following the work’s convention of synkrisis, which throws anti-cosmopolitan

behaviour into relief against human generosity, the source goes on to declare that Antiochus did not destroy the Jews because of his magnanimity and mild manner; rather he offered them the option of changing their laws, and thus coming closer to the rest of humanity (34–5.1.5).³⁸

V

If the world is in any sense ‘one city’, there must be an affinity, or at least a set of relationalities, that extends beyond those of one’s immediate community and even beyond the guest-host relationship, and this is the one produced by kindness

(ἐπιεικεία), even in situations where kindness is not to be expected. The idea is developed in the later books, where Rome comes into being as a powerful but also generous player on the cosmic stage. The mediated portions of book 27 portray a Scipio (Africanus) who uses kindness (ἐπιείκεια) to overwhelm the Carthaginian enemy, who had previously attacked Roman envoys (cf. 27.12.1). Scipio urges the Romans to spare rather than kill their captives. This action inspires the moral observation that kindness (ἐπιείκεια) accomplishes more than revenge.

especially in the light of instability of one’s fortune (τύχη) (27.15.1–2). After all, a kind favour (εὐεργεσία) has the power to transform an enemy and turn him into a φίλος (27.15.3). Reasonable behaviour, and indeed, benefits granted to conquered peoples are what grant Rome the everlasting gratitude and praise of her defeated enemies (31.4.1; see also 31.3.1–3).

Yet, as Diodorus’ political vision unfolds itself, there is a basis for seeing cosmopolitanism as ultimately nothing but a form of imperialism, for Rome is explicitly privileged in the work as being *the* city that extends her generosity to the bounds of the inhabited world and in this sense is to be understood as a truly cosmopolitan city (cf.

ἡ γὰρ ταύτης τῆς πόλεως ὑπεροχή, διατείνουσα τῇ δυνάμει πρὸς τὰ πέρατα

τῆς οἰκουμένης, 1.4.3). If Philip of Macedon (5.221–179 BC) and Antiochus (3.223–187 BC) meet with disaster because of their cruelty, then the Romans, who undertake only ‘just wars’

(δικαίους ἐνιστάμενοι πολέμους) and maintain their oaths and treaties, enjoy the favour of the gods for their righteous behaviour (28.3.1; cf. Perseus' demise because of his cruelty to the Celt, 30.21.3). When Rome defeats Philip and Antiochus, it does not exact revenge from them but forgives and makes these individuals 'friends' (cf. φίλους, 31.8.1). Furthermore, that the consul Aemilius (Paullus, or Marcus Aemilius) shows clemency (cf. ἐπιεικῆ, 30.23.2) to the conquered Macedonian leader Perseus emblemizes Rome's generous treatment of her enemies and ensures the city's leading role in the inhabited world (τὴν τῆς οἰκουμένης ἡγεμονίαν, 30.23.1–2). The following book, 31, gives further evidence of the generosity of Rome towards the conquered Macedonian people. The latter are set free rather than made slaves (31.8.2 = *Const. Exc.* 2 (1), pp. 280–1; 31.8.4), while their leader Perseus is cast into a wretched state of captivity only to elicit the sympathy of even the poorest Romans. The magnanimous Marcus Aemilius³⁹ admonishes the senate for the punishment and, warning of Fortune's changeableness, eases the confinement of Perseus, who dies after two years of captivity (31.9.1–7).

At 37.4.1 ff. Diodorus is reported as declaring that he will offer examples of moral and just behaviour in order to encourage the good to aspire to fine conduct. The *Library* seems to have offered portraits of Quintus Scaevola, who governed Asia fairly (37.5.1); Mucius Scaevola, who righted corruption (37.5.2–4); Lucius Asyllius, who rose from a humble position to become the governor of Sicily to right wrongs there (37.8.1–4); and Marcus Livius Drusus, who combines oratorical skill with fairness (37.10.1 ff.). The *Library* is not just a catalogue of cruelties and injustice visited by individuals upon other individuals.

Jason König and Tim Whitmarsh observe that cosmopolitanism generally leads to a strong sense of place, one that is centred on a cultural centre such as Athens or Rome.⁴⁰ Certainly, this is the case with Diodorus. Rome is the city that makes possible the author's own literary cosmopolitanism, and it is the historical, political community that instantiates the author's social and philosophical ideal. Perhaps, Rome makes one aware of the possibility of coexistence with its influx of 'others',

including Diodorus himself. But, apart from this, at the very basic level of intellectual resource, Rome is the physical receptacle of materials—essentially, the ‘library’—which forms the basis of the literary *Library of History* of the author, who originates from Agyrium in Sicily (1.4.3–4).⁴¹ There is, furthermore, also a sense in which Rome’s cosmopolitanism is enacted by the literary library. Just as Rome’s leaders reconcile the rest of the world to the city through their equitable behaviour, history, as practised by Diodorus Siculus, urges men towards affinity with one another despite any cultural, political, or ideological different. Through a metaphor that highlights the analogy between the writing of history and Rome’s political agenda as characterized by Diodorus, the author refers to history, the ‘prophetess of truth’

(τὴν προφήτιν τῆς ἀληθείας), as it were, the ‘metropolis of philosophy as a whole’

(τῆς ὅλης φιλοσοφίας οἶονεὶ μητρόπολιν, 1.1.2).⁴² A ‘metropolis’ is literally a ‘mother-city’, the community that establishes colonies elsewhere and stands as the origin of these younger communities, and so that holds at least residual ‘parental’ authority over the latter. History is the mother-city of morality and wisdom, just as Rome implicitly is, and history stands in stark contrast to the vice of greed or ambition

(πλεονεξία), which is described in the fragments that constitute 21.1.4a (= *Const. Exc.* 4, pp. 343–4 and *Exc. Hoesch.*, p. 489 W) as the ‘metropolis of injustice’

(μητρόπολις οὖσα τῶν ἀδικημάτων) and/or injustice (ἀδικία), which is cast as the ‘metropolis of evils’

(μητρόπολις οὖσα τῶν κακῶν) in a reflection on Epicurus’ *Principal Doctrines* at 25.1.1 (a fragment drawn from *Const. Exc.* 4, p. 352, and *Exc. Hoesch.* p. 509 W). History, as metropolis, ideally colonizes the rest of the world with its political ideals.

But there is perhaps implicitly a sense in which the historical project encompasses and transcends Rome as far as the cosmopolitan ideal is concerned. For one thing, it literally contains Rome in its narrative, but history is produced from the very building blocks of human society—namely, language. Diodorus takes pains to relate how men acquired verbal language

that enabled them to communicate with each other in limited groups (1.8.2–4) and, then, how the god Hermes presented mankind with a common language

(τὴν γε κοινὴν διάλεκτον) together with the alphabet (1.16.2). Hermes, the messenger god, is significantly the deity who introduces the practice of negotiating truces and peace in war, and so who must be identified with the historian's larger moral vision (5.75.1). If Hermes invented writing—that is, the alphabet (1.16.1; although cf. 1.9.2)—the author nonetheless acknowledges the Egyptian claim to have invented writing (1.69.5; cf. 3.3.3–4) and later presents writing as a development shared by the Muses, the Syrians, and the Phoenicians (5.74.1). Writing is a medium that has a common history as far as gods and mankind are concerned, and is furthermore a medium that draws gods and men together with a view to an understanding about actions and their consequences.

With a view to this latter capacity of writing, it is a medium closely associated with the law and justice, essentially the normative moral vision of the *Library*—Diodorus picks a conventional set of associations in ancient political thought (see especially Isocrates 3.5–9 and 15.273–7). In Egypt, the law is written down in eight volumes, and legal process takes place through the medium of writing, with accuser and defender engaging in literate submissions lest oratory cloud judgement and the truth (1.75.6–76.3). In book 11, Diodorus surveys the writing of law by the Greek legislator Charondas (12.12.3–18.5), a figure whose broad knowledge of the laws of all peoples perhaps makes him a suggestive counterpart to the author of the *Library* (12.11.3–4). He notes that the lawgiver creates a piece of legislation that required all the sons of citizens to be educated to read and to write at state expense, since these skills made possible orderly interactions amongst the citizens and between states (12.13.1–4). Significantly, education in letters is viewed by Charondas as a 'therapy/healing' for the soul that is otherwise afflicted by lack of education (cf. ὁ δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς τὰς ὑπ' ἀπαιδευσίας ἐνοχλουμένας ἐθεράπευσε, 12.13.4).

The metaphor of written law as a therapy for the soul is striking, for it recalls another therapy for the soul offered through writing—namely, the sacred library (cf.

τὴν ἱερὰν βιβλιοθήκην) of the Egyptian king Osymandyas at 1.49.3. The sacred library is described as bearing an inscription ‘the healing place of the soul’ (ψυχῆς ἰατρεῖον), and running along the library are statues of the gods, to whom the king—that is, Osymandyas—offers gifts as if he were submitting evidence of his just and pious actions towards men and gods before a council of Osiris (1.49.3).⁴³ Again, a literary construct, this time a library, is closely associated with law and justice, and the sacred library is an image of particular poignancy in the work as a whole. For, it may be the case that the βιβλιοθήκη stands as a self-conscious analogy for the Rome of the work, represented as enacting justice and law throughout the inhabited world, but, more importantly, also for Diodorus’ *Library of History*, a work that submits to its audience the works, whether just or unjust, of leaders and other men for scrutiny as to their effects upon the community of the inhabited world.

CONCLUSION

The *Library of History* is an instrument that offers to its audience, Rome of the first century BC, a cosmopolitan ideal—a city that extends its influence over the inhabited world and, with it, the kindness and justice of its leading men in mindfulness of the retributive power of the gods. But the historical Rome is not the ultimate instantiation of cosmopolitanism as envisaged by Diodorus Siculus, for it is a community with a limited chronology as far as universal history is concerned and its influence is an imperial one, albeit justified as being in the interests of ‘just war’, and, in the light of the tendency of power to lend itself to abuse, is at best fragile. The *Library* is accordingly not a simplistic apology for Roman cosmopolitanism. Rather it is simultaneously a case for and an example of comprehensive history as the means for drawing humanity and its experiences of justice and injustice, kindness and cruelty, together over time, geography, culture, and political different through a narrative that operates as a school in humanity as the inhabitants of a single, ‘civic’ community. With the work of Diodorus Siculus, the ancient library becomes simultaneously an image of the best that the world could be and the worst that it has been. The ancient library conceptually

becomes a world without walls, where all barriers and borders ideally come down.

As an afterword, I note that the title *Library of History* is extremely poignant. The physical library provides this literary library with a textual collection that serves as a model for human experience that one can consult in the service of knowledge and learning. But, if the physical library serves as a paradigm, the *Library of History* is, nonetheless, unique as a work in explicitly articulating the search for knowledge as an ideal for human interaction: learning about one's own past and that of others ideally supplies an incentive for humanity and humanitarianism.

Memories

6

Inside and Outside the Library: The Memory of Canon

In this chapter I consider the degree to which the library comprehends the whole of textuality. In other words, is the library identical with the sum of extant textuality? Or is the library smaller than the sum of textuality, in which case it refers outside itself, to a world of other texts that it does not encompass but acknowledges? I suggest that the key to this consideration is memory, both of the librarian and of the library itself: to what extent is this individual and the institution of the library able to comprehend extant textuality, for memory is how the written word is transmitted to the reader? The object of memory may differ in the library. It is either the texts themselves or else material more or less connected with the text. In both cases, memory helps in the preservation or the creation of the canon. This chapter will focus upon Photius, the Byzantine patriarch and scholar, who elects to grant memory the role of emphasizing details surrounding the works with which his book is concerned rather than the works themselves.

I

The earliest and best-known libraries are state institutions, ones set up and financed by the rulers of states, such as the Ptolemies at Alexandria or Augustus at Rome, or else by well-known scholars, such as Aristotle. With the Alexandrian library the issue is comprehension, to encompass all the textuality in the known world. Alexandria already palimpsests earlier book collections, above all that of Aristotle. But the story continues that Peisistratus had the Attic tragedies that arrived on ships at Alexandria copied, and the copies returned to the owners while the originals were kept and a deposit forfeited (*Comm. II in Hipp.*

Epidem. 3. 239–40). Otherwise, the Alexandrian ruler pays for lines of Greek texts with the consequence that people start to forge works for money (cf. *Comm. in Hipp. De Nat. Homin.* 1.44.105¹). Ptolemy translates the Hebrew scriptures into Greek and deposits them into his library (Josephus *Jewish Antiquities* 12.47–9)—again this suggests gentile regard for Jewish culture. He perhaps also has Ethiopian, Persian, and Hindu writings brought into the library. All writing is fair game for the Alexandrian library, and this suggests an acknowledgement that writing is a human activity that must be maintained and preserved.

The emphasis here is on the amassing of texts rather than on their recollection. Yet memory has always been important in ancient text culture, above all, at the symposium, where attendees show their familiarity with high culture by reciting it from what they can recall. Where the ancient library is concerned, it becomes an issue because of the individual who becomes the first librarian at Alexandria, Aristophanes of Byzantium. Ptolemy has a competition dedicated to the Muses and to Apollo adjudicated by seven educated judges (*iudices literati*). The first six of these choose as victor the poet who is most gratifying to the crowd, while Aristophanes selects as winner the one who least pleased the onlookers. The reason for this is that the other six have chosen an individual who has plagiarized his piece, while Aristophanes has chosen the only original poet. What makes it possible for Aristophanes to determine this is that he has carefully read all the books in the library and, one assumes, memorized them so that he knows when an illegitimate copy circulates (*De Architectura* 7, pref. 5–6; see also Chapters 2 and 3 above). Here memory keeps a check on the size of the library by excluding subsequently produced and plagiarized material. It seems that the Alexandrian library was not as large as it would later become, or that Aristophanes had a phenomenal recollection, or that a combination of these two factors contributed to the outcome.

What this story demonstrates is, as I have argued in [Chapter 3](#), that the ancient library requires the supplement of an individual who knows its contents. The ancient library does not itself remember. It is in itself insufficient as the receptacle of textuality because it requires a discriminating presence, in this case the

librarian. But this individual is important in signifying the existence of a textuality outside the library, a fraudulent one, as opposed to the legitimate one, which is the library proper while officially representing only the library itself. Where the legitimate textuality of the library is concerned, memory coincides completely and perfectly with it. There is no acknowledgement of or reference to other, external works, and there is no introduction of extraneous facts and details here. The task of memory is to help in the discernment of what should be included in the library (because it is legitimate) and what should not (because it is not legitimate).

II

What does it mean to memorize a text? This is no doubt a remarkable feat, and antiquity provides us with anecdotes of numerous memory feats. Plato reports the sophist Hippias boasting that he could recite back fifty names after hearing them once (*Hippias Major* 285e). Jacqueline de Romilly, amongst others, credits Hippias with a mnemonic system.² More noteworthy is the elder Seneca, who claims that he could recall 2,000 names or 200 disconnected verses in the order given or in reverse order (*Controversarium Libri* 1, pref. 2). Quintilian informs his readers of a man who would watch an auction during the day and be able to recite the objects sold, their price, and the buyer (*De Institutio Oratoria* 11.2.24).³

There were techniques for memory in existence discussed by various authors.⁴ A fragment known as the *Dialexeis*, dated to about 400 BCE, speaks of memory as a great and beautiful invention. It advises paying attention and hearing something on numerous occasions better to recall. But, more interestingly, it advocates association as a means of recollection. It advises placing words on what one knows better to remember. So the name 'Chrysippos' would be placed on gold (*χρυσός*) and a horse (*ἵππος*) and a glowworm (*πυριλαμπής*) on fire (*πύρ*) and shine (*λάμπειν*). Furthermore, 'courage' is to be placed on Mars, god of war, and Achilles, and metalworking on Vulcan, god of metalwork. In *On Memory* Aristotle emphasizes the need to establish a starting point and then to move through

changes to the object of memory (452^a12 ff.). In other words, the philosopher is recommending association and the construction of narrative sequence as the device for memory. Other writers recommend the 'place system', whereby one memorizes a place, real or imaginary, such as a room in a house or a street, and one then locates the things to be remembered on items or locations in the memorized place, such as a table, a chair, or a house. This is a Roman system in particular and is discussed by the author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (3.16–24), Cicero (*De Oratore* 2.353–5), and Quintilian (IO 11.2.17–26 and 11.2.32–3). One can memorize different details over the same places. The 'place system' had a particular prominence in rhetoric, in the memorization of *topoi* in an argument.

The author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* writes that those who have learned mnemonics can place on backgrounds (*in locis*) what they have heard and produce it by memory (3.16). He is of the opinion that the backgrounds should be set in order (*ex ordine*) so that one is not confused by their series and can recite the terms wherever they occur in the series (3.16). He also advises using association so that, if one has to remember an acquaintance named Decimus, literally 'tenth', one would place him in the tenth background (3.18). One may use already existing backgrounds but one may also invent them (3.19). Images (cf. *imaginibus*) can resemble the likenesses of words (cf. *verborum similitudines*, 3.21) and the writer advises using the images that remain most firmly in the mind (3.22). Overall, the author of this treatise recommends an unrelenting exercise to ensure that one's powers of memory are increased (3.24).

Cicero gives the famous example of Simonides, the founder of menemotechnique, who is asked to recite a poem in honour of his host and also in honour of Castor and Pollux at a dinner party given by Scopas of Thessaly. Scopas rather meanly paid Simonides only half his fee and told him he would have to get the rest from the gods, to whom he had dedicated praise in part. During the banquet the poet is called out with the message that two men wish to see him. He gets up, goes and sees no one. In the meantime, the room where the dinner party was taking place collapsed and all died. When they wished to bury them no one could tell to whom the bodies belonged except Simonides, who recalled the order in which they were sitting. After relating this

anecdote, Cicero goes on to say that the order of place (*locorum*) maintains the order of things and that we use the *loci* as if they were wax and the likenesses (*simulacra*) as if they were letters (*De Oratore* 2.354). The fruit, usefulness, and power of memory are that thoughts can be fixed in the mind and speeches are inscribed (*inscribere*) in the mind (*De Oratore* 2.355). The senses, especially hearing and sight, are important for transmitting to and impressing upon our minds the thing to be recalled (*De Oratore* 2.357). The memory of words (*verborum memoria*), Cicero states in particular, is distinguished by a greater variety of images, and there are many words that join the parts of a speech as if they were joints. The orator states that we comprehend thoughts (*sententiae*) by images and their order by place (*loci*) (*De Oratore* 2.359).

In *De Institutione Oratoria* Quintilian also speaks of the need for *loci*, which may be imagined or taken up (from reality) and for images (cf. *imaginibus*) and likenesses (*simulacris*), which are imagined, for the art of memory (11.2.21). He refers back to Cicero's statement that we use *loci* as wax and *simulacra* in place of letters. These structures are what jog the memory into recollection of what, given the context, are to be understood to be rhetorical speeches. Later Quintilian writes that one should memorize (*ediscere*) by reading from the same wax tablets on which a work is written. So it is most effective to learn a text in its original context. This person will then have certain tracks to follow and will follow with his eyes not only the pages but even the individual lines as if he were reading it aloud. Even if there is an erasure, an addition, or a change, there are signs that will keep one from straying (*IO* 11.2.32–3). The orator recommends recreating the situation in which one first encounters the text as a more expeditious and effective means of learning one's text. For difficult passages Quintilian recommends placing certain marks to help the memory (*IO* 11.2.28–9).

What this material suggests is that, for Aristophanes of Byzantium, reading the works of the library at Alexandria involved more than just reading. He probably also employed a mnemonic technique that involved either the place system or association or a combination of the two. This is how the librarian-to-be at Alexandria knew the contents of the works and was able to identify what did not belong to the library. The narrative

suggests that Aristophanes had a recognition knowledge rather than the ability to recall the texts word for word. And it is the techniques of recollection that subsequent scholars will also employ in coming to terms more intimately with their book collections.

III

Between Alexandria and much later libraries in antiquity, there are, as we have seen in [Chapter 3](#) with the ‘walking libraries’, numerous individuals who have come to embody the library through their memories. It would seem that these individuals are able to do more than just recognize texts or passages in a text or a collection; they can actually know the texts in question. There is Longinus, the teacher of Porphyry, who is called the ‘breathing library’ and ‘walking museum’, because he is able to authenticate works and fill in missing portions of them. There is Nepotianus, who knows the ‘library of Christ’, and there is Apuleius, who carries a library that is both physical and in his head. But, later, relying on the role of memory, as recollection of surviving texts, undergoes a change. We see this with Photius, patriarch of Constantinople in 856–67 and in 878–86, who produces the latest library considered in this study. The work he wrote is entitled *Bibliotheca* or *Library*. This library stands as a collection of notes of 280 works, ranging from the fourth and fifth centuries BCE in Greece to the Hellenistic and Roman imperial period to the Byzantine period. The manner in which it conceives of itself is revealed in the work’s dedication to a certain Tarasios. Photius writes that the *Bibliotheca* is the response to Tarasios’ request to have a written account of the contents of the books that were read in his absence. He has read the books, understood their contents, and recorded them in his memory. He does not treat the commonly available books as being too easy to access. This library is a rather personalized construction. The author writes that he has put together an account of all that his memory has preserved and the works are ordered as his memory recalled them rather than by genre. The purpose of this is to allow the addressee to refer to any topic he wishes in the works. In the conclusion to the work Photius again states that the *Bibliotheca* is the result of his memory of the books that he has read in private.

The work is not a triumphant construction nor is it intended to be, unlike, say, the earlier *Library* of Apollodorus, which makes no apologies for any omissions or deficiencies and simply proceeds with its narrative.

Photius' *Bibliotheca* is not part of the tradition of comprehensive collection and inheritance that comprises the libraries of earlier antiquity. It relies on Photius' memory, and deficiencies in the work are due to the shortcomings of his memory. He comments that Tarasios should not be surprised if he finds that the contents of his work are incomplete or mistaken when he compares the work to the original texts. In fact, the *Bibliotheca* is so dependent on Photius' reading that it is an *ad hominem* construction, particular to this individual, his likes and dislikes and his ability at recollection: it is, as he says at the very beginning of the work, 'an inventory and enumeration of the books read by us' (emphasis added). The *Bibliotheca* does not in any way purport to be a metonymy of the whole of textuality, and the conclusion acknowledges that what is read is not the works studied for crafts and skills, although he does, in fact, include some texts on medicine and one on agriculture.⁵ Moreover, it does not seek to preserve the texts studied in the school curriculum, and one can surmise that either these texts were preserved in the memory of pupils or else were easily accessible from a body of maintained books. This work does not claim to preserve texts for a community or a civilization and is therefore not canonical in that sense but is rather alternative to the standard canon. It refers to a body of writing outside of itself, so that the library stands as a selection, and a rather personal and arbitrary one at that, for a particular individual, Tarasios.

A few more words about the issue of the canon and the uncertain canonicity of the *Bibliotheca* are in order here. John Guillory notes that the admission of newer works into a body of texts is a noncanonical move.⁶ So Photius is precisely non-canonical as far as the classical canon is concerned in admitting later Christian texts and authors such as the Council of Nicaea (88), Eusebius (127), and St Basil (191), for instance, but it could also be argued that by showing his ideological preference for significant Christian writers and works the author is propagating canon as 'a discursive instrument of transmission', which is linked to a school.⁷ Photius is concerned, perhaps, with establishing a

Christian canon and certainly with assimilating a Christian body of texts to the classical one. But, as Guillory notes, the theory of canon formation cannot be reduced to the social identity of an author, and it is certainly true that Photius does not lend much to the explanation of the *Bibliotheca* as a canon beyond his Christianity and still less true that the addressee with his personal tastes, Tarasios, explains the work as somehow canonical.⁸

IV

I observe that the *Bibliotheca* occasionally makes the text read its sole focus. This is particularly true with regard to the codices that concern ancient novels. In codex 72 on Ctesias, Photius engages in recapitulation of the *Persica*, dealing with Cyrus, Cambyses, Darius, Xerxes, Magabyzos, and later. From 45a to the end of this codex he deals with fabulous and incredible topics concerning the places he discusses, such as India and Persia. For example, in codex 94 on Iamblichus the author retells the story of Sinonis and Rhodanes and the various adventures that befell the latter in some detail. The only moment where the author ventures outside the text of Iamblichus is at the beginning of this codex, where he evaluates the indecency revealed in the novel against that shown in Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus. Iamblichus ranks in between these other two authors. Codex 166, which is concerned with Antonius Diogenes, *Wonders beyond Thule*, summarizes the work in some detail relating the travels of a certain Deinias. It remains with the story of that text until the penultimate paragraph, where Photius offers a comparison to the apparently later Lucian, Lucius, Iamblichus, Achilles Tatius, Heliodorus, and Damascius, arguing that these authors owe a debt to Antonius Diogenes. A similar summarization of a work occurs in codex 186 on Conon's *Narratives*, a work that contains fifty stories. Yet dealing with the text so directly comes with a proviso. He treats the first three stories but then suddenly stops, and asks why he should virtually transcribe these works. In his view a much more summary approach is needed.

So Photius recapitulates narrative in his work, but this stands in marked contrast to his treatment of other genres, where he places the work in the context of other texts and authors and where he offers biographical detail that is not otherwise offered

in what he reads. As an example, the author observes that Sopatros the sophist has compiled his *Miscellaneous Extracts* from other histories and other writings. So he observes that book 1, which treats the gods of Greek mythology, is based on Apollodorus *On the Gods*; book 2 on the *Epitomai* of Pamphila; book 3 on Favorinus' *Miscellany*; book 4 on the *Miscellaneous Notes* of Aristoxenus, and so on for twelve books in total (codex 161). In codex 163, on Vindanios Anatolios, he begins by telling his reader that this author has drawn on Democritus, Africanus of Tarentum, Apuleius, Florentius (or Florentinus), Valens, Leon, Pamphilos, and the Marvels of Diophanes for his work on agriculture. Little more is said except to criticize the work for incredible and irrational elements. Codex 189, which concerns Sotion's *Scattered Notes on Extraordinary Facts about Rivers, Springs, and Lakes*, constantly refers beyond that work. Photius states that he also read a work by Nikolaos, which dealt with some strange customs. He also read Akestorides *Myth about Cities*, a work in four books. The codex also contains references to Konon and Apollodorus. The *Life* of Pythagoras in codex 249 leads the author to discuss Plato and Aristotle on the soul, so that the earlier author is contrasted and compared with his successors (440a). The effect is to make these authors from different periods contemporary with each other.

The author also frequently comments on the style of the author he is discussing. He comments that the historian Olympiodorus has clear diction, but he also notes that the author is without power and energy and displays a tendency for careless and cliched language (codex 80). He opines that Olympiodorus was a poet from Thebes, but he does not seem to have written his work with any beauty at all. Codex 191 on St Basil compliments the purity of the author's style (153b). It adds that there is an allusiveness, as the author does not like delving into details, with the result that proofs and syllogisms are not well presented. In the entry on Iamblichus (codex 94) he comments that the novelist's style is flowing and easy-going and his diction is excellent, as are his composition and narrative order (73b). Codex 189 deals with Sotion, the Peripatetic philosopher. Photius comments that the style resembles that of Protagoras and Alexander and then he launches into a discussion of Nikolaos of Damascus, whose work is contained in the same volume. Nikolaos

is concise and brief and he writes about strange material. Photius also states that in the same volume he read Akestorides' *Myths about Cities* and tales gathered by Konon or Apollodorus, author of the *Bibliotheca*. The result is that this rather brief entry on Sotion is not so much on Sotion as it is on other authors.

Photius also introduces details that owe their origin to tradition or to external knowledge and therefore are extratextual. At codex 7 on Nonnos the author feels compelled to comment on the climate change between Aue and Axum, which is like the difference between summer and winter. While it is summery and dry at Aue, between the two places there are severe storms so that Axum is wintry. In codex 60, the brief discussion on Herodotus ends with Photius revealing that, when the *Histories* were read in public, a very young Thucydides was reduced to tears, with the result that Herodotus told the former's father that the youth was devoted to learning. This anecdote is said to be reported in Diodorus Siculus (cf. 2.32.2). Interestingly, Photius does not do much with the text of Herodotus apart from very quickly mentioning the Persian rulers, Cyrus, Xerxes, Cambyses, and Darius, that the historian deals with. The next codex, 61, on Aeschines, presents anecdotes about the orator. We are told that he was one of the ten orators, and we learn of his disagreements with Demosthenes, his family, and his hearing of Plato. The entry on Josephus at codex 48 leads to a comment on a marginal note, that the work *On the Universe* was after all written by Gaius, a Roman presbyter who is said to have worked during the time of Popes Victor and Zephyrinus, was elected pope of the gentiles, and wrote against the heresy of Artemon and against Proclus (12a).

Photius shows that he is also able to assess the merit or non-merit of his authors. For instance, in codex 179 on Agapios, Photius strongly criticizes the writer, a Manichean, for his views on Christianity. Agapios is faulted for his treatment of the Old Testament, his understanding of who Christ is, of Mary, for his advocacy of fasting and the avoidance of marriage. The writer has twisted the gospel and the letters of St Paul and shows a reliance on pagan philosophical thinkers (125a). Photius criticizes Agapios from an ideological viewpoint as a Christian thinker and demonstrates that he far from an impartial assessor of other writers. He reveals a similar tendency to fault his authors in the

following codex, on John of Lydus. Here he states that *On Divine Portents* is little more than a collection of tales and goes on to observe that John uses figures of speech excessively and often in poor taste (125a). Furthermore, he observes that the author's vocabulary can attain the level of Atticism but it can also be careless and colloquial. Photius produces a largely non-ideological but stylistic assessment of his author here, and this approach is prevalent throughout the *Bibliotheca*.

Photius assumes that one actually reads the texts he is discussing, and each codex begins with the injunction 'read x work'. The extraneous details that he offers supplement one's knowledge of the work. Even despite the initial acknowledgement of the shortcomings of memory, which are apparent in the work of Photius, there is an acknowledgement of a larger textuality than that which his work encompasses. This is not surprising. The Alexandrian rulers, who endeavoured to preserve as much writing as possible, were attempting to encompass the sum of textuality in their age, encompassing the writing of Homer, the classical era, and some external literatures, such as the Jewish writings, while Nepotianus is concerned, above all and as Jerome informs us, with Christian writings, but Photius is writing almost 1,300 years later, when so many more texts have been produced, including those of the Christian and early medieval age. His library can refer to only a portion of what has been written, but even so there is no sense that his memory fails. His references beyond the texts he is dealing with, whether intratextual, anecdotal, or biographical, point to a larger memory beyond the library itself.

V

Memory is important in the constitution of the ancient library, either in authenticating the collection as valid, as in the case of Aristophanes of Byzantium, or else in forming the collection, as in the case of the subsequent librarians. Memory thus plays an important role in forming the canon, the body of generally accepted texts that stand for a community's literature. In the case of the Alexandrian library, the Ptolemies and their scholars gather the texts, but it is Aristophanes who verifies the works as original and therefore as deserving of inclusion in the canon. The

librarian is not the 'author', so to speak, of the collection but its validator. The interesting thing is that his authority comes simply from the act of reading the collection and recalling the works, and showing off this facility in the competition of the poets as related by Vitruvius. It is not otherwise an external source of authorization.

The subsequent librarians also have the authority to determine that what circulates in the community is valid and therefore canonical. Longinus, the walking museum and breathing library, is entrusted with the task of judging ancient authors—that is to say, determining whether they are good or not and legitimate or not. Nepotianus, similarly, has the power of judging which author a particular text comes from and the style of the author. Thus he also has the authority to exclude from the canon what does not belong or is not acceptable.

In the case of Photius, memory, rather than a political authority, is what constitutes the canon. His library is the sum of what he recalls and what he chooses to recall. His canon contains the orators from the fifth century, including Isocrates (codex 260), Lysias (codex 262), Aeschines (codex 264), the historians Ctesias (codex 72), and Herodotus (codex 60), various novelists such as Antoninus Diogenes (codex 166), Achilles Tatius (codex 87), Heliodorus (codex 73), and Lucian (codex 128), and religious authors such as Josephus (codex 76), Eusebius (codex 127), Irenaeus (codex 120), and Clement of Alexandria (codices 109–11). Photius does not ostensibly acknowledge generic distinctions nor does he aim at exhaustiveness in the periods he treats, nor are the authors discussed grouped according to their time period. This is because the work is the product of his memory. But, interestingly, he does expand the canon chronologically from the Greek period to the Christian fathers. He assumes an acceptability for a literature, one of apology and polemic, that is very distinct from the classical literature of the Greek and Roman periods. Beyond this, however, for all the authors that he deals with Photius creates a canonicity for extratextual facts. He places the biographical detail, the piece of information about a place mentioned in the text, or a mention of a custom on the same level as the work he is discussing by simply including it in his *Library*. In so doing he expands the canon on one level.

But it is the case that these pieces of information may not be quite on the same level as the works treated in the library if we regard them as ‘metadata’, or information about information, which is a concern of the modern librarian, archivist, and information specialist.⁹ Metadata are said to share characteristics with the cataloguing that occurs in libraries, museums, and archives, and may involve details about the author, place, and date of publication, and description of the work, amongst other topics. In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries metadata have become an important concern for the information sectors, and there is a concern to have different schemes for classifying the different types of metadata. They are a means of gaining access to a more primary body of information. For instance, I may know a detail about an author and enter it into a search engine. The search engine would then provide all references that match my detail and so enable me to search for my particular subject. Metadata are also important for framing a particular piece of primary information, supplying it with a context. Thus, for example, they provide the piece of information with an origin or with a cognate body of information. It could be argued that Apollodorus, the Hadrianic author of the *Library*, was producing metadata in his work if we regard his narrative as being strictly *about* the characters he is relating to his audience. The occasional comments on the source or make-up of narrative are included, and those certainly are metadata. In any case, Apollodorus seems to be offering a metanarrative or a narrative about a narrative, for he is not interested in writing art or poetry, and one can assume that he is working with the written text at hand. Neither Apollodorus nor Photius would have been familiar with the term ‘metadata’, but the latter is essentially producing it when he offers biographical anecdotes, geographical details, and other ethnographical information in his treatment of the authors he discusses. These bits of information become not so much a device for searching for an author or his text as a means of embedding the author and his work in a body of textuality that has been generated by the author of the *Library* and not by the original author—in other words, a body of secondary textuality. It provides a context for his discussion of the works and the authors discussed in his work.

Metadata become an essential part of the *Library*, because that

is what Photius is left discussing if he is not to contain all the works he treats in his work—that is, if he is not simply to reiterate or recapitulate them. It is true that he does do this to some degree with the novelistic works such as that of Antonius Diogenes or the history of Ctesias, but, as he comments in his treatment of Canon's *Narrative* (codex 186), he should stop doing so because he is merely transcribing the work. Transcription is, thus, not a concern of the *Library*, because that would mean that the work stands as the sum total of all the works and the authors he discusses. Thus metadata are the only other option. It is interesting about Photius and the *Library* that the author provides us with a written account of his memory. By contrast, we are told only in literary sources that Aristophanes of Byzantium, Longinus, the teacher of Porphyry, Nepotianus, and even Apuleius (by his own account) had the ability to recall vast tracts of text. We have no account or dramatization of their actual recollections. It is the purpose of Photius' work to enact memory and in the process to stimulate the recreation of the library for Tarasios by ensuring that he will read the works.

Metadata ensure that the *Library* of Photius is a very different type of construction from the library up until that point. The word-for-word memorization that other individuals engage in in order to merit the label 'library' or 'museum' makes the person the library or museum. The individual is the receptacle of the works. This may be, and probably is, the case with Photius, for he states in his introduction that he reads, recollects, and writes about the works. But the *Library* as a work is not the receptacle of texts. It signifies the text and assumes that the reader reads the text independently. Interestingly, each codex begins with the injunction 'read x work'. It writes about the work but does not write the work, and, after all, transcription is not what Photius wants to engage in. It is interesting that by engaging in the production of metadata the author actually preserves more of the writers he is concerned with and their works than the 'libraries' and 'museums' that memorize texts word for word. Metadata make the individual with textual authority less important for textual preservation because it exists independently of that individual once he has committed it to pen and paper, so to speak. That is why Photius' work, rather than Photius himself, is called the *Library*. Moreover, it gestures at the work and its

author, writing around them.

Where individuals such as Aristophanes of Byzantium, and particularly Longinus or Nepotianus, are concerned, the library both exists in tandem with the scholar and exists entirely apart from them, as in the case of the latter two scholars. They do not commit their memories to writing, for then they would simply be transcribing the original works, but have a version in their memories. The transcription would also be incredibly vast. There is, moreover, an element of competition between the actual library and the walking library—which is the more authoritative, the library or the scholar? Where individuals are less successful at recalling works, such as the dinner guests at Larensis' party in Athenaeus' *Deipnosophistae*, the library is only very partially preserved, if at all.

Memory thus makes the library an essentially intangible institution. It recalls the earlier libraries and reduplicates them in scholars and librarians—the library otherwise exists as a physical entity—ensuring their authenticity, but, in the case of much later authors, such as Photius, memory is concerned with what is around the library and associated with it (that is, metadata) rather than with the library itself, the books of the community. What one draws from this is that the library proper cannot be reduplicated in writing but that it must stand alone as a body of writing and with individuals who support it with their memories to be what it is. That is in part why no ancient library exists today. It is only with the modern era, where writing is the authority of the library, that the institution, immobile and unchangeable, stands by itself.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has considered the role of memory in establishing and authorizing the library and its collection. Memory is important, even critical, in maintaining the body of texts gathered within the community, and people are authorized or authorize themselves to be the community's instruments of memory. But the role of memory shifts somewhat between classical Greece and Rome and the Christian era. Librarians change from people who recollect a whole library collection, whether they have recognition knowledge or can recreate the

collection from memory, to individuals who do not seek or even try to encompass the sum of textuality. Photius, perhaps assuming the disinclination and the inability of memory to recall all the community's texts and certainly not those that are part of the curriculum, assumes the latter position. He does not claim to recall textuality so much as to remember details and facts about textuality and its authors. In fact, pure recollection is not at all the aim of Photius' *Library*. Photius creates a context surrounding his texts and, in this way, expands his canon on one level. So what one sees with this author is a legitimate growth of the acceptable body of texts through memory.

Physicalities

7

Picture Libraries: Statues among the Books

According to an ancient etymology, the word *image* should be linked to the root *imitari* ... the image is representation, which is to say ultimately resurrection.

Roland Barthes, 'Rhetoric of the Image' 1

INTRODUCTION

Jas Elsner has observed that in Greek the verb γράφειν means both 'to draw an image' and 'to write a text'.² Images and writing are verbally linked in both Greek and Roman culture, and this is something demonstrated patently by the ancient library, where there is a notable juxtaposition of art and text in the classical and Hellenistic periods, as libraries are decorated by physical art to the extent that libraries resemble art galleries—the Roman library, in particular, sought to be an impressive place for passers-by and for users.³ In this chapter I want to consider how art—in particular, statues—extends and supplements the manner in which a library can signify. In particular, I want to look at how the juxtaposition of book and image paradoxically unfixes the materiality of culture at the very point that culture seems to be most fixed—that is, instantiated in bricks, books, statues, and paintings. My argument will be that the location of the art object among books recognizes the cultural institution—that is, the library—as a doorway into a subjective imaginary domain.

I

The juxtaposition of art and text is a prevalent phenomenon in the classical and Hellenistic periods. According to ancient sources, in 330 BCE Lycurgus, the Athenian official responsible for

the preservation of the works of the great tragedians, is said to have had bronze statues (*χαλκαὶ εἰκόνας*) of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides erected in the Theatre of Dionysus—portraits that emphasized their civic identities⁴—and authoritative editions of their works kept in the public depository (cf. Plutarch *Mor.* 841F and Pausanias 1.21.1–2). It would seem that the presence of statues speaks to the identities of the authors of the works in Lycurgus’ collection.

Pliny wrote that there is some uncertainty as to whether the kings of Alexandria or of Pergamum were the innovators of the library image, giving evidence that art was a feature of the Hellenistic book collection (*NH* 35.2.11).⁵ Indeed, in his study of Hellenistic art, Jerome Pollitt suggests that the Hellenistic age saw that texts might have relations to art, both paintings and statues. In the post-classical age, art assumed a scholarly dimension as the important social division was no longer ethnic—that is, between Greek and barbarian—but rather cultural—that is, between educated and uneducated, refined and unrefined. (Incidentally, in this post-classical period the representation of the intellectual—poet, philosopher, thinker, and so on—qua intellectual also comes into being.⁶) Art became self-conscious, and there was a recognition that art might be read in different ways, and certainly as possessing an intertextuality with literature.⁷ Canonical texts, such as Hesiod’s *Theogony*, could provide the subject material for the Altar of Zeus in Pergamum, while the Pergamenian kings Attalus I and Eumenes II assembled artists and thinkers in the construction of their capitals.⁸ According to Aelian (*Var. Hist.* 13.22) a statue of an enthroned Homer was placed in a temple built by Ptolemy II Philadelphus at Alexandria;⁹ while the Alexandrian library of Ptolemy II began to produce illustrated papyrus scrolls, which may have been the influence for narrative relief on silver bowls and on sculptural monuments like the Telephos frieze from Pergamum. ¹⁰ Ammianus Marcellinus reports that the Serapeum, which contained the daughter library of the Alexandrian collection, held statues (22.16.12).

But the relationship between art and text might also be a geographical one. Eumenes II, the Pergamenian king, established his library in the same building complex as the temple of Athena and a theatre, which Pollitt proposes might be understood ‘as a

physical projection of the literary tradition preserved in the library'. Altogether this complex was to be regarded as the symbolic summit of Pergamum.¹¹ Pollitt goes on to note that Eumenes II, the son of Attalus and ruler of Pergamum, placed a modified version of Pheidias' Athena in his library at Pergamum, an action that reveals the Hellenistic intent to rework classical subjects and motifs in a distinct manner. On the assumption that the Pergamenian library was a wholly secular building, Martin Robertson notes that this constitutes a very different approach to art, which was originally otherwise designed to be placed in religious buildings, above all temples.¹²

The library-cum-art gallery has important precedents in the history of the Roman public library. The first public library at Rome was that of Asinius Pollio, the aristocrat and poet (cf., e.g., Horace *Sat.* 1.10.85). In keeping with the idea of the library as 'theft', Pollio uses money from war booty (*de manubiis*) to found a library that contains both Greek and Latin works in the Atrium Libertatis as part of the renovation of this building that contained the offices and records of the censors (cf. Suetonius *Augustus* 29). The elder Pliny identifies Asinius Pollio as the individual who initiated the practice of placing statues and images in libraries. The Atrium Libertatis housed a sculpture collection that seems to eclipse the book collection on the basis of Pliny's description of it in the following book of the *Natural History*.¹³

In book 36 Pliny offers the beginnings of an explanation when he observes that Pollio wanted his monuments to be seen: *Pollio Asinius ... sic quoque spectari monumenta sua voluit* (36.33). Statues are an attention-getting strategy, as Aristides understood when he stated that people make statues of what they regard to be important (

ἀ γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐν ἀγάλμασι δεῖξαι σπουδὴν ἔχει, 1.364). Pliny replicates the deictic gesture intended by Pollio in his creation of the sculpture collection—did the figures draw attention only to themselves, or to the overall collection of sculptures and books? To ensure that the reader of the *Natural History* is aware of the contents of the library-gallery, the author goes on to catalogue the various sculptures in the collection, which includes—apart from the author portraits mentioned at Isidore 6.5.2—the centaurs carrying nymphs by Arcesilas, the Muses of Helicon (the 'Thespiadae') by Cleomenes, Ocean and

Jupiter by Heniochus, the nymphs of the Appian water by Stephanus, the busts of Hermerotes, Jupiter patron, Zethus, Amphion, Dirce. The description runs for several sections at 36.4.32–6. Earlier, at 36.4.23–4 Pliny also mentions that Pollio's collection contained images of Sileni and a Venus.

The figures are the subject of Greco-Roman mythology, or else, like the nine Muses and Apollo, are to be identified as the divine sources of literary discourses, so that the sculptures may be regarded as the physical counterpart of the texts in the library or, as far as the Muses and Apollo are concerned, as a self-conscious depiction of literary origination and production, no less than the invocations to the gods in the poetry or Hesiod's description of Helicon at the beginning of the *Theogony*. The notion that statues might stand as self-conscious gestures of textual origination is further supported by the presence of the images of authors—that is, of the individuals who create the texts housed in the library. In his discussion of libraries Isidore writes:

primum autem Romae bibliothecas publicavit Pollio, Graecas simul atque Latinas, *additis auctorum imaginibus*, in atrio [Libertatis] quod de manubiis magnificentissimum instruxerat.

(Isidore *Etymologies* 6.5.2)

At Rome, Pollio was first to build public libraries, both Greek and Latin ones in the atrium [of Liberty], which he constructed most magnificently from booty, and he added the images of authors. The only other information we have regarding the identity of the authors represented comes from book 7 of Pliny's *Natural History*, which declares that the images are those of dead authors with one exception. The only statue of a living author is that of Varro:

M. Varronis in bibliotheca, quae prima in orbe ab Asinio Pollione ex manubiis publicata Romae est, unius viventis posita imago est.

(*NH* 7.30.115)

An image of Marcus Varro, the only living individual, was placed in the library, which was the first opened in the world as a public building at Rome from war booty.

The Roman statesman takes his lead from Cicero's friend Atticus, who is said to have a passion for portraits (cf. *imaging amorem*)¹⁴

In the Roman Empire, busts in libraries were controlled by the emperor and brought the author great prestige.¹⁵ And, indeed, one library that in particular merits comment from ancient authors for its splendour and extravagance is Hadrian's decorated library. The emperor Hadrian undertakes a building programme at Athens, and, apart from temples and stone columns, he erects a library, a monument of literary learning and visual art, that is cited by ancient authors as a high point in cultural achievement, recalling the Peisistratēan founding of the library. It is an act of euergetism on the part of the emperor, as so many libraries were.¹⁶ In this way, Rome unwrites Horace's scathing dictum *Graecia capta ferum captum victorem cepit et artis | intulit agresti Latino* ('captive Greece took the savage victor captive and brought arts to the uncultivated Latin'), giving back to Greece through the construction of a library the very texts that it had taken from it through the conquests of, amongst others, Aemilius Paullus and the consul Lucullus. How to read the gesture poses a variety of options. Is the library a consolation prize? Is it a gesture that recognizes the value of Hellenic culture? Is it an act of oneupmanship on the part of the conquerors? Hadrian donates to Athens, the historical seat of learning and intellectual culture for the Greco-Roman world, a structure of collecting: the library is a receptacle of books but also a showcase of art, sculpture, and paintings. As for the remarkable nature of Hadrian's library, I cite the testimonials of three writers, Aristides, Eusebius, and Pausanias:

πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις βιβλίων ταμιεῖα οἷα οὐχ ἑτέρωθι γῆς φανερώς, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν Ἀθηναίων κόσμος οἰκίος, καὶ οἷα τῆς παρουσίας ἔχουσας καὶ διαίτης, λουτρὰ τε σεμνότητι καὶ τρυφῇ νικῶντα καὶ δρόμοι καὶ γυμνάσια

(Aristides *Panathenaicus* 1.354)

In addition to these things, [there were] storehouses for books such as nowhere else to be seen on earth, and this was a proper ornament for Athens; and furthermore, such things are suitable for the city's present affluence and lifestyle, baths pre-eminent for their grandeur and luxury, race tracks, and gymnasia.

Hadrianus, cum insignes et plurimas sedes Athenis fecisset, agonem edidet bibliothecamque miri operis extruxit.

(Eusebius *Chron. Ol.* 227)

After Hadrian had erected many splendid buildings in Athens, he established a contest and built a library of wondrous craftsmanship.

Ἀδριανὸς δὲ κατεσκευάσατο μὲν καὶ ἄλλα Ἀθηναίοις, ναὸν Ἥρας καὶ Διὸς Πανελληνίου καὶ θεοῖς τοῖς πᾶσιν ἱερὸν κοινόν, τὰ δὲ ἐπιφανέστατα ἑκατὸν εἰσι κίονες Φρυγίου λίθου· πεποιήνται δὲ καὶ ταῖς στοαῖς κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ οἱ τοῖχοι. καὶ οἰκήματα ἐνταῦθ' ἔστιν ὀρόφῳ τε ἐπιχρῦσθ' καὶ ἀλαβάστρῳ λίθῳ, πρὸς δὲ ἀγάλμασι κεκοσμημένα καὶ γραφαῖς· κατὰκειται δὲ ἐς αὐτὰ βιβλία. καὶ γυμνάσιόν ἔστιν ἐπώνυμον Ἀδριανοῦ· κίονες δὲ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἑκατὸν λιθοτομίας τῆς Λιβύων.

(Pausanias 1.18.9)

Hadrian built as well other buildings for the Athenians: a temple of Hera and Zeus Panhellenios, and a shrine common to all the gods, and most resplendent, a hundred columns of Phrygian stone. Walls were constructed and the colonnades were made of the same material. Also there were chambers there with a golden roof and alabaster stone, decorated with statues and paintings. Books are stored in them. There are also a hundred columns cut from Libyan stone.

The dual functions of the library as book depository and as museum are at the forefront of the descriptions by ancient authors cited above. Aristides describes the building as a

‘storehouse of books’ (βιβλίων ταμεῖα) like no other in the world, a ‘fitting ornament’ (κόσμος οἰκείος) for Athens (*Panathenaicus* 1.354). The noun ‘ornament’ (κόσμος) connotes here wealth or beauty in the form of artistic embellishment. An earlier part of the same paragraph mentions that the statues of Athens hold the highest place in the highest form of art, a point that is reiterated at 1.364, where Aristides observes that the city has the finest statues. After noting Hadrian’s expansive building project at Athens, Eusebius comments in particular on the library as a construction characterized by ‘wondrous workmanship’ (*miri operis*, *Chron. Ol.* 22). It is, however, Pausanias, that useful eyewitness of the Greek cultural achievement, who offers us the most detailed account of the library of Hadrian and of its artistic contents. He speaks of rooms (οἰκήματα) with a golden roof and

alabaster stone, decorated with statues and paintings (πρὸς δὲ ἀγάλμασι κεκοσμημένα καὶ γραφαῖς). Almost as an afterthought, he adds that books are stored in it, and for the first time the reader of the *Description of Greece* realizes that Pausanias is giving us a description of Hadrian's library: κατὰκειται δὲ ἐς αὐτὰ βιβλία (Pausanias 1.18.9).

II

So what is the significance of the image in ancient culture and how might this significance speak to the library? These questions are significant because art and text were not always complementary to one another but rather at odds in terms of what they were perceived to achieve. Indeed, Plato critiqued representational art as ontologically and epistemologically deficient in book 10 of the *Republic*, while Isocrates denigrated plastic representation. Isocrates' aim was to establish the superiority of the literary portrait in capturing the moral character of its subject over the statue, which depicts only the physical likeness, and thus declaring the superiority of the literary text as a pedagogical medium. The Athenian rhetorician observes that it is in any case impossible for anyone to make their physical bodies resemble statues and painted portraits, although the individual who wishes to become good may imitate the character of someone who has been represented in words (cf. τὰς ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ἐνούσας τὰς φύσεις). Written portraits also have the capacity to be circulated throughout a community and abroad, while physical images must stay put where they have been set up (*Evagoras* 73–7).

According to Plutarch, Numa prohibited the use of images, both painted and sculptural, of either men or animals in temples and shrines for the reason that it was unholy to compare divine things to baser things or to approach the divine through any means other than the intellect. Plutarch notes that no painted or sculpted representations were produced at Rome for the first 170 years of its history—that is, during the eighth and seventh centuries BC (Plutarch *Numa* 8; cf. also Augustine *De Civ. Dei* 4.31; Tertullian *Apologeticus* 25.12–13).¹⁷ Suspicion of representative art persisted past Rome's earliest history. Plutarch relates how

Cato the Elder scorned those who delighted in having bronze statues and paintings of themselves, insisting that citizens carry around the best portraits of themselves in their souls. Cato, nonetheless, had a change of heart when the people honoured his censorship by erecting a statue of him in the temple of Wellbeing (*Salus*, Plutarch *Cato* 19).

Even as late as the second century AD, after the Romans had accommodated art into their cultural life, the African sophist Apuleius continues to question the authority of statues and paintings as representational media. When, in his self-defence speech, the *Apology*, Apuleius considers the authority of certain modes of representation, he draws attention to the limitations of conventional plastic and graphic art. Mud, stone, and paintings are all lacking important aspects: liveliness (cf. *vigor*), character (cf. *color*), and motion (*motus*) respectively, so that, like a corpse, they possess only one rigid and fixed expression (*Apology* 14). This passage significantly encapsulates the suspicion that the sophist bears towards material representation, for elsewhere in his writings having a statue erected of oneself becomes an event that threatens one's identity, and, in fact, also one's life.¹⁸ At *Florida* 16 the dedication of a statue to Apuleius coincides with an accident that leaves him temporarily incapacitated after dislocating his ankle on the wrestling ground (16.67–8), and the narrative of this mishap triggers an inset story about the comic poet Philemon, who is found as a stiffened corpse (cf. *obriguerat*) at home after he has missed a performance of his work (16.63–6). In the *Golden Ass* a statue is once more associated with death or loss of control over one's own identity when in the Risus Festival episode the citizens of Hypatia dedicate a statue to the novel's protagonist Lucius after making him the defendant in a mock murder trial. Sculpture comes to stand metaphorically for the violation of Lucius' personhood. The trick had caused its victim to become as if a victim for slaughter (cf. *velut quandam victimam publica ministeria producunt*, 3.2) and its discovery as a joke turns him to 'stone', *At ego...fixus in lapidem steti gelidus, nihil secus quam una de ceteris theatri statuis vel columnis* (3.10). The petrified protagonist is one who has all but died, and must be brought back from the dead (cf. *nec prius ab inferis emersi quam Milo hospes accessit...*, 3.10).¹⁹

III

So art is static, immobile, and incomplete as far as the representation of a great individual and, for that matter, any other object is concerned. It is this quality of art that actually qualifies it for its presence in the library, in contrast with and to complement far more mobile art. One enters the library and one sees the same portrait in exactly the same position and stance each time, so that the statue or, more rarely, the picture is a fixed reference point within the library. There were psychologies of the image in antiquity which recognized that a static representation of an individual could affect the viewer in some form or other. For instance, as Matthew Nicholls observes, this fixed reference point could bring the subject of the image as a presence into the library, and as a consequence a dead author might be conceived as speaking to a reader in the library so that there is a continuity between past and present.²⁰

In one of the earliest accounts of a visual aesthetics Gorgias writes of the capacity of statues to provide a ‘pleasant disease’ (*νόσος ἡδεῖα*) to the eyes of the beholder, sometimes causing grief and at other times delight. Visual perception is one of the defences that the author produces in favour of Helen, who may have found herself utterly overwhelmed by desire at the sight of Paris (*Helen* 18–19). Sight effectively inscribes (*ἐνέγραψεν*) on the mind the images of what has been seen (*Helen* 17). The terms that Gorgias employs in his description of how people might receive images suggests that this is a materialistic theory of viewing. Sight writes on the mind as if it were a wax tablet or writing material, producing a discourse (*λόγος*). Jim Porter argues that Gorgias allows the different reasons for the rape of Helen—namely, persuasion through *λόγος*, physical force, divine necessity, and desire—to dissolve into each other by analogy and approximation.²¹ The discussion of sight has been subsumed by analysis of *λόγος*, which, despite its own minuscule bodily presence (cf. *σμικροτάτῳ σώματι καὶ ἀφανεστάτῳ*, 8), reshapes or else beats (*ἐτυπώσατο*, 13) the soul—speech has tremendous physical power, as is argued by the defence of Helen.

The power of the image to effect psychological change is also

recognized by Plato and Aristotle, and, furthermore, it also underlies the immensely influential and powerful critiques of art offered by them. In the account of Eros in the *Phaedrus* Socrates describes the effect that seeing the beloved might have on the lover: he shivers, experiences fear, looks upon the former reverentially as if it were a god, and would worship it as *if it were a statue* (ὡς ἀγάλματι, 251a4–6; also cf. 254b3–d1). The effects of vision and desire are both physical and psychological. Viewing in the context of homosexual desire as described here is beneficial because it eventually leads the parties involved to philosophical fulfilment (256b–e). The visual aspect of certain dramatic forms accounts for either their prohibition from or acceptance in the pedagogical programmes idealized by the philosophers. Hence the deficient images that Plato bans from his ideal state in book 10 of the *Republic* threaten to leave a faulty impression upon the souls of the viewer, and to disturb the knowledges already implanted by the state’s authorized education.²²

Aristotle seeks to regulate the visual aspects of existing culture in Greek society. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he speaks of buffoons as seeming to exceed what is funny

(τῷ γελοίῳ ὑπερβάλλοντες) and to be base

(φορτικοί), with the result that they are not suitable entertainment for the educated citizen that the philosopher idealizes here and elsewhere (1128^a4–36). From the *Poetics*, where Aristotle considers the visual aspect of dramatic art, it is evident that the author is concerned as much with the optical as with the literary dimensions of this genre in his analysis of the buffoon. Certainly, in the latter work, he speaks of the comic mask, part of the drama’s visual staging, as base and distorted, although in a way that does not signify pain,

οἶον εὐθὺς τὸ γελοῖον πρόσωπον αἰσχρόν τι καὶ διεστραμμένον ἄνευ ὀδύνης (Poetics 1149^a35–7). Further

evidence of Aristotle’s sensitivity to the impact that seeing particular modes of representation might have on the viewer’s character comes elsewhere from the *Politics* 1340^a36–8, where the philosopher prohibits young people from viewing the work of Pauson, while permitting them to see the works of the sculptor

Polygnotus since the latter convey character (cf. ἡθικός).

Another materialistic aesthetics, that espoused by the

Epicureans, later gives further voice to the notion that images may reorder and reorganize the mental processes. In his life of Epicurus, Diogenes Laertius gives an account of the Epicurean doctrine of perception. Images result from particles that stream off the surface of bodies or objects—to be replaced by other particles lest the body or object be diminished—and these particles then come into contact with either our minds or other sense organs (Diogenes Laertius 10.48–50). Visual perception, according to this account, is something that has a physical impact upon individuals, and this may be at the level of thought or emotion, which are also physical conditions. In *De Rerum Natura* Lucretius speaks of the way in which images of objects, actually thin films of atoms from the objects themselves, are perceived by the mind and stir up the desire to act (4.880–5).²³ In the materialistic world view of Epicureanism, seeing images entails the transformation of one's mental condition, and, certainly, the Epicureans themselves put to use the distinct psychology of perception.²⁴ Bernard Frischer has analysed the way in which portraits of Epicurus may project onto the unconscious of the viewer the figure of the philosopher as the wise old man—he frequently holds a book scroll in his left hand and his right hand appears to be making a gesture as if to communicate to the audience²⁵ or else the left arm is wrapped in a toga to denote restraint, while his pose is balanced to represent the calm and quiet that is *ataraxia*²⁶—and, as the wise man who has achieved likeness to god, a key aspiration of the sect (cf. Diogenes Laertius 10.135; Lucretius 3.322; 5.49–51; Diogenes of Oeneanda fr. 52 col. III–IV).²⁷ Pollitt has also read the image of Epicurus as one that suggests introspection through its body language, and as coming to offer a model for the figure of the philosopher in Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic antiquity.²⁸

The villa of the papyri at Herculaneum, discovered in 1750, shows how the plastic image might complement the literary text in this philosophical culture. The villa, built sometime in the first century BC, was found to contain a library of Epicurean scrolls, the bulk of which were by Philodemus. What is significant is that more than eighty busts and statues were also found in the villa (now housed in the Museo Nazionale in Naples), among which is a bust of Philodemus' teacher, Zeno of Sidon.²⁹ Following D. Pandermalis, Marcello Gigante advocates a connection between

the Villa's decorative programme and the cultural agenda of the library, especially the works of Philodemus. According to Gigante, the busts of the Hellenistic monarchs Demetrius of Phalerum, Archidamus III of Sparta, Ptolemy II (Philadelphus), Demetrius Poliorcetes, and Phileterus of Pergamum are present as the patrons of what has become the library's intellectual culture; the images of Aeschines, Isocrates, and Demosthenes have their counterpart in Philodemus' *On Rhetoric*; while the sculptures of Homer, Sappho, Panyassis, and Antimachus signify Philodemus' broad poetic interests.³⁰ Consistent with the counter-culture nature of this philosophy, portraits of Epicurus proliferated as a call to retirement from public life when *images* had all but died out (cf. Pliny *NH* 35.2–5). It would appear from the Epicurean understanding of what viewing does to an individual that statues and busts would function as incentives for the viewer to become *like* the represented subjects, who in turn resemble the otherwise unapproachable gods. Viewing an image of a wise and moral man is a proreptic, a call, to wisdom and virtue.

The logic of the paradigm presumes a will or intent to emulate or imitate. Seeing a bust, however stereotypical, of the philosopher Epicurus, should spur the viewer to embrace Epicureanism and become as the philosopher, a wise man, a sage, a teacher, and withdrawn from the world, and seeing Varro or any of the other authors who grace the library edifice should serve as an incentive to the reader to become as his author. Certainly, there is evidence that such a function was attributed, if only in a partially conscious way, to the library image. Suetonius recounts how the emperor Tiberius wrote poems after the fashion of Euphoriion, Rhianus, and Parthenius, poets who particularly pleased him, and dedicated portraits of these individuals to stand amongst the portraits of other esteemed authors in the public libraries (Suetonius *Tiberius* 70.2). Here the poets honoured by statues are also the individuals who serve as the models for the verse that the emperor, a great patron of the arts, writes. Pliny the Younger speaks of seeing Trajan's statue in a library built by the orator Dio Chrysostom, which was in Prusa, so that the patron of the literary arts was also memorialized by means of plastic art (*Ep.* 10.81).

By contrast, among the Roman emperors, Caligula is the one who threatens to break with the convention that holds images as

paradigms to be imitated. Suetonius relates how Caligula overturned and scattered the statues placed by Augustus in the Capitoline, and prohibited any statue or image of a living person to be erected unless he was consulted. Suetonius goes on to tell us that the emperor came very close to removing the writings and busts of even Virgil and Livy from all libraries (*ex omnibus bibliothecis*), for the reasons that the first of them had no genius or inspiration and very little teaching, while the second was wordy and careless as far as the writing of history is concerned (*Caligula* 34). Caligula's destructive impulse has a significant rationale—namely, the recognition that art and text may furnish social and cultural norms that he wishes to destroy, and this is brought to light by mention of the emperor's thought to abolish the poetry of Homer, citing as the authority for this action Plato's wish to evict the epic poet from his ideal state. For Plato, understanding the extent to which education was based on traditional literary texts entailed that these texts had to be scrupulously regulated.³¹ The emperor, like the Platonic philosopher-king, is the individual who controls knowledge, making it available and censoring it, in his world.³²

Cicero seems to acknowledge the power of the visual image to influence the viewer's mental state. In a letter addressed to Gallus (*Ep. ad Familiares* 7.23) he chastises the addressee for purchasing statues that he does not wish at a great price, or, as he puts it, for an amount that would have enabled him to buy the whole world's statuary. Gallus has bought some Bacchantes, which are inappropriate even for Cicero's gymnasium, rather than Muses, which belonged to a Metellus (who is mentioned at *Verrines* 2.2.50 for restoring the Syracusan senate house) and which would have suited his library as thematizing his literary pursuits and interests. Cicero goes on to fault Gallus' acquisition of a statue of Mars, the god of war, given his characterization of himself as the author of peace, and suggests that a statue of Mercury might have been better (see *Ep. ad Familiares* 7.23.1–3).³³ Mercury is the god not only of commerce, but also of communication, as would be appropriate for an orator and statesman. Cicero's correspondence reveals a perception of the visual image as something that might both speak to his character and activities and also influence who he is and what he does. At *Ep. ad Atticum* 1.8 and 1.9 Cicero speaks of raising money for

statues of Megaric marble and Hermes, and asks for all statues that will suit his Academy (*cf. Ep. ad Atticum* 1.10). Elsewhere, at *Ep. ad Familiares* 7.23.3, he writes that he has built reading rooms (*exhedria*) in his Tusculan villa that he intends to adorn with pictures that will give him pleasure.

IV

Images are part of the ancient mechanism of memory. They connect the viewer with the past. As Nicholls notes, images can be commemorative, recalling, for instance, the authors and statesmen who had their busts in the libraries.³⁴ Busts and statues were also a good way to memorialize the donor of the library, ensuring his immortality along with the authors contained within the book collection.³⁵

But images help to remember in another manner. Knowing where to find things in the library has always been a major concern and task of the librarian (as we have seen in [Chapter 2](#) and as we shall see in greater detail in the next chapter). As we have seen, the narrative concerned with the selection of Aristophanes of Byzantium as head librarian of the Alexandrian library highlights the importance of knowing where to locate works in a large book collection. The story suggests that the library itself functioned as a memory landscape, perhaps one marked by works of art, as the figures of gods dining at a banquet in the vicinity of the Alexandrian library certainly were (*De Architectura* 7, pref. 5–6).

Richard Neudecker has argued that in the second century AD galleries of hermes were arranged in alphabetical order to be ‘marble encyclopaedias of classical learning that the viewer could commit to memory as he strolled back and forth’.³⁶ The library image assists the reader in identifying the location of works. Pausanias states that the laws of Solon stand next to icons of Peace, Hestia, and other deities on the Acropolis (Pausanias 1.18.3)—that is, representations that symbolically speak to the character and concern of Solon’s laws, which sought to reconcile parties in contention at Athens and to restore disenfranchised and dislocated Athenians to their own land (e.g. Solon 4 and 36W). From Plutarch’s comment that Lycurgus erected bronze statues of the three major Athenian dramatists and ordered that written

copies of their works be kept in the public depository (Plutarch *Mor.* 841 f), it is clear that art and text are linked in this author's mind if not also geographically.

Certainly, it was the case that Roman culture regarded a background and objects within it as a landscape on which memory could be mapped. In his extensive discussion of memory, the author of the rhetorical treatise *Ad Herennium* distinguishes between natural memory and artificial memory—namely, that which method and art strengthen (*quam confirmat inductio quaedam et ratio praeceptionis*, *Ad Her.* 3.16.28). He goes on to observe that artificial memory involves places or backgrounds (as in Caplan's Loeb translation) and images: *constat igitur artificiosa memoria ex locis et imaginibus*. What qualify as *loca* are houses, intercolumnar spaces, recesses, arches, and similar space, while images are figures, marks, or likenesses of what we wish to remember (3.16.29). Furthermore, backgrounds should be relatively uncluttered and distinct lest they become confused with the images set in them (3.19.31), while it is important for images to resemble the object to be remembered either thematically or verbally (3.20.33). Later, in *De Oratore* 2, Cicero has Crassus recount the famous story of how Simonides managed to remember who the dinner guests were after the roof had fallen in on the party and to identify them. According to Crassus, it is necessary to grasp the places (*loci*) for locating objects, which may be fashioned (*effingenda*) in the mind and placed in each of these places. Again, mnemotechnics is seen to involve the conceptualization of another order of space and object that corresponds to the reality to be remembered. The order of the places (*loci*) keeps to the order of things (to be recalled), so that the *loci* are employed as the wax of a writing tablet and the likenesses (*simulacra*) are utilized in place of letters (*De Oratore.* 2.353–5).³⁷ What is most effectively impressed upon our souls is transmitted and formed by our senses, in this case (mental) sight, *ea maxime animis effingi nostris, quae essent a sensu tradita atque impressa* (2.357).

When Quintilian deals with the topic of the memory arts in book 11 of the *Institutio Oratoria*, he introduces the narrative of Simonides, the purported founder of mnemotechnics, and the disastrous dinner party that enables the poet to display his talent. The story permits the orator to emphasize the role of place (*loca*)

in artificial memory, and, then, to describe a house of memory in which there are capacious spaces marked in distinct and various ways to enable the speaker to run through his topics without hesitation, *loca deligunt quam maxime spatiosa, multa varietate signata, domum forte magnam et in multos diductam recessus* (IO 11.2.18). Quintilian goes on to detail how the practitioner of the memory arts might assign a topic to the ‘vestibule’ of his house of memory, another to the atrium, then navigate the impluvium, the bedrooms, and the sitting rooms, and then, in turn, visit the statues and the likenesses to which he has presumably attached portions of his speech (cf. *sed statuis etiam similibusque per ordinem committunt*) (IO 11.2.20). Both background—that is, the house of memory—and the images and likenesses—for example, the statues and other effigies—belong to the realm of the imaginary, in which they have been fabricated (IO 11.2.21).

Scholars including Bettina Bergmann and Diane Favro have drawn attention to the ways in which Roman houses serve as a mnemonic landscape, serving as emblems of an assimilated cultural past.³⁸ But, if a house may serve as an extension of a person’s memory,³⁹ I suggest that it is not the only physical building that may operate in this manner. After all, a public library is precisely the sort of space that might constitute an ideal memory house with its spaces defined by books and marked by artwork. If so, in the *Ad Herennium* and Cicero’s *De Oratore*, it is uncertain as to whether the statues in a library might constitute the background or the images of the landscape of memory, although, in Quintilian, it is quite clear that statues and portraits constitute the images on which the subjects to be remembered may be attached, while Elaine Fantham notes that the Romans located busts of authors above the shelves of their works.⁴⁰

V

I wish to continue reading the collocation of art and text by turning to the imagistic presence of Varro, the only living individual thus represented and for this reason an uncharacteristic instance of the library image, in the library of Asinius Pollio to show how it resonates with multiple meanings and references on a variety of different levels because of the particular social and intellectual identity of the individual

depicted. In the first place, as Nicholls observes, getting a statue in a library was a major accolade.⁴¹ In his conspectus of Greek and Roman literature, Quintilian speaks of Varro as the ‘most learned of Romans’ (*vir Romanorum eruditissimus*), who composed many learned books and was most skilled in the Latin language, all antiquity, Greek things (*IO* 10.1.95). Vitruvius (9 pr. 17) draws attention to Varro’s eminence for Roman literary culture when he names Varro’s *De Lingua Latina*, together with Cicero’s *De Oratore* and Lucretius’ *De Rerum Natura*, as the three learned monuments of a previous generation.⁴² According to Elizabeth Rawson, Varro wrote some 75 works in 600 volumes, sufficient to fill a small personal book collection.⁴³ Among his vast body of writings was a work on libraries in three volumes, *De Bibliothecis*, which is no longer extant like most of his compositions and was partly inspired by Pollio’s own library project.⁴⁴ Varro writes about the libraries, but he is also the first Roman to be identified with the creation of a public—that is, state—library. In his life of the deified Julius, Suetonius writes that Caesar assigned to Varro the enormous task of overseeing the collecting and sorting of two book collections, essentially two different libraries, one Greek and one Latin, which were to be open to the public (*Julius* 44.2);⁴⁵ This library is never actually finished, because Caesar dies, so that there is a sense in which Pollio’s collection in the Atrium Libertatis fulfils the vision of Caesar and Varro, as Rawson rightly observes.’⁴⁶ The presence of the bust of Varro acknowledges this individual’s status as the paradigmatic Roman librarian, but, as representation may also constitute a form of ownership, it possibly also stands as a gesture that the Caesarian library has been subsumed by the creation of Pollio.

The image of Varro in the library speaks to his identity as a founder of this institution at Rome, but it also operates at a number of other semantic levels within a very particular cultural context. The image of an author like Varro may owe much to the Alexandrian library, for this institution was one in which the (dead) author was retained as a textual image. Rudolf Blum has recently written of the phenomenon of ‘biobibliography’ in the Ptolemaic library whereby librarians, beginning with Callimachus, as it seems, catalogued the vast number of works in terms of genre and author as described by biographical data and some critical notes.⁴⁷ The biographical catalogue seems to have

been the product of a view held by ancient critics and readers that knowing about an author's life assisted in understanding what he wrote and, implicitly, that an author's personality or character determined his writing at least to some degree.⁴⁸ The most explicit articulation of this 'biographical fallacy' was attributed to Aristarchus as the principle that it was necessary to interpret 'Homer from Homer' (cf.

Ὅμηρον ἐξ Ὁμήρου σαφηνίζειν...),⁴⁹ although circularity enters into exegesis as the author's life was too frequently derived from his writings with disregard for its fictions.⁵⁰

The Alexandrian image of the writer apart, the author has been depicted in a medium more normally reserved for dead people, the death mask or *image*.⁵¹ Polybius writes that the Romans used to keep the portraits of the deceased in household shrines, and he observes that the wax *imago* of an individual, carried in his funeral procession, served to spur the young on to emulate that individual's deeds and character (6.53). According to Pliny, the death offered the 'closest possible likeness' (*qua maxime similes in aevum propagabantur figurae*) of the dead person to be handed down to subsequent ages (NH 35.2.4). Representation clearly has a pedagogical function. Elsewhere, Sallust cites Quintus Maximus and Publius Scipio amongst other illustrious men of his time as saying that portraits of the ancestors (*maiorum imagines*) kindled their minds to thoughts of virtue. He goes on to say that it is not the wax itself of the death mask, nor the figure, that has this great power, but rather it is the recollection of the deeds (*memoria rerum gestarum*) accomplished by these memorialized individuals that inspires their hearts to strive until they rival the actions of their ancestors (*Iugurtha* 4). Sallust is here offering a traditional view of the visual image as a paradigm for human behaviour (cf., e.g., Aristotle *Politics* 1336^{a-b} for art as a negative paradigm), one that is generally taken for granted as an axiom of Roman education. The Roman *imago* significantly departs from a concept of plastic image as an image simply to be reproduced by the actions and character of the viewer, in marked contrast to an understanding of the image as a medium that was to be received in an unmodified form and uncritically by its audience.

Varro is a figure who gestures at the past and its dignity. Cicero speaks of the author as a ‘most diligent researcher of antiquity’ (*diligentissimus investigator antiquitatis*, *Brutus* 60). Quintilian mentions his antiquity as a category of knowledge apart from Greek and Latin language and literature (*IO* 10.1.95). Varro textualizes the Roman death mask (*imago*) and the statue in *Hebdomades vel de imaginibus*,⁵² a work containing 700 portraits of illustrious and notable Greek and Roman ancestors, including poets, sculptors, architects, intellectuals including philosophers and statesmen, so that their likenesses would continue to be known to men (*NH* 35.2.10–11).⁵³ (The practice of circulating portraits in albums overcomes the deficit of the physical image as a static icon criticized as such, for instance, by Isocrates (cf. *Evag.* 74–7).) Perhaps, Varro’s role in image-making and in the didacticism that it implied for the Romans is recognized by the presence of his own image, even as that of a living author, among the figures of the deceased writers in Pollio’s library.⁵⁴ The *Hebdomades* was a widely circulated text (cf. Pliny *NH* 35.1154), and it was not the only type of work of the genre, for Cornelius Nepos produced an *Exempla*, Hyginus offered portraits of esteemed citizens, and Valerius Maximus wrote his *Facta et Dicta Memorabilium* (*Deeds and Words of Memorable [Men]*).⁵⁵ No less than Greek culture, Roman culture, above all the *mos maiorum* and so on rooted in the past, was inculcated through exemplarity as presented in literature and in visual image.

The image of the living Varro in Pollio’s library furthermore reinscribes the meaning of the conventional *imago*. It literally brings the death mask to life, and makes what would otherwise have, and should have, been the past now present, even alive.⁵⁶ As a representation of a living individual, Varro’s statue becomes a trope that calls into question the inferiority of the copy as set against its original, and perhaps anticipates the assignment of lifelike qualities—motion (2.3; 3.2; 6.3), breath (1.3; 11.2), suppleness (3.2; 5.5; 8.2; 11.1), emotion (8.5; 11.4; 13.1; 14.1), voice (7.3; 9.1)—to statues by Callistratus in his *Descriptions*. In [chapter 2](#) of book 35 of the *Natural History*, where Pliny draws attention to a novel custom, namely the setting-up of gold, silver, and bronze images in libraries—that is, of the authors whose books are contained in the libraries—he observes that it is so that the spirits of the commemorated subjects may speak in the same

places and even more, so that desire produces images that have not otherwise come down to us:

Non est praetereundum et noviciū inventum, siquidem non ex auro argentove, at certe ex aere in bibliothecis dicantur illis, quorum immortales animae in locis iisdem loquuntur, quin immo etiam quae non sunt vnguntur, pariuntque desideria non traditos vultus, sicut in Homero evenit.

(NH 35.2.9–10)

We must not fail to mention a new invention if likenesses made, if not from gold or silver but at any rate from bronze, are set up in libraries for those whose immortal souls speak in those very places, and rather those which are imaginary are modelled and desire produces faces which have not passed down to us, as happened in the case of Homer.

This account of the intentionality that lies behind the erection of images in book collections is fascinating in the light of the poetic and aesthetic discourses that implicitly underlie it. The plastic images have several functions, which may be achieved only in the context of a library. Juxtaposed with texts, they allow the ‘immortal souls’ (*immortales animae*) of authors to speak, a capacity that is conventionally granted to literary texts.

VI

Pliny observes that the Greek originators of painting and sculpture used to place on their completed works authorial ascriptions that suggested that these were still works in progress rather than *faits accomplis*: so ‘Apelles was [in the process of] making this’ (*Apelles faciebat*) or ‘Polyclitus was [in the process of] making this’ (*Polyclitus [faciebat]*) (NH pref. 26). This observation is helpful in enabling us to think how the collocation of art objects and texts in the ancient libraries has a temporality that transforms the physical institution into a conceptual space that effectively inhabits past, present, and future. As the image is the paradigm that, as the Roman funeral mask, may inspire zeal to emulate historical examples of virtue and intellectual achievement, it draws together past (example) and future (the viewer’s identity-to-be) in the present moment of viewing,

physical and intellectual. As the image that, as a feature in the architecture of memory, has the capacity to prompt the processes of recollection, it ensures that the works of authors are brought to mind both as regards their position in the library and as regards their subject matter. The library statue becomes a point of reference that opens up the institutional sphere to the discursive realm that comprises the scrolls of the book collection.

The important and early art and text collection of Asinius Pollio transforms the old Roman archives into a literal treasure house. The later imperial library of Hadrian at Athens is a building that presents itself as a κόσμος—that is, wealth, ornament, order. These are not the only examples. In the biography of Tiberius, Suetonius states that the emperor placed the writings and images (*imagines*) of all authors among the famous, old writers in the public libraries, with the result that the majority of learned people sent him much of their work in the hope that it would earn a place in these collections (*Tiberius* 70). Suetonius also draws attention to the opulence of libraries when he notes that, when Domitian repaired the libraries that had been destroyed by fire, he spared no expense (cf. *impenissime reparare curasset, Domitian* 20). Then, at Ephesus, there is the library of Julius Aquila Polemaeanus, consul, and son of Julius Celsus Polemaeanus, proconsul of Asia, who founds the Celsian library from his own wealth, and adorns the building with every decoration (σὺν παντὶ τῷ κόσμῳ), offering, and with books (Platthy 128; cf. 130). As Matthew Nicholls observes, the opulent library, part of an imperial public complex in the Roman period, is one that indicates the expectation that a large number of people would frequent them.”⁵⁷

CONCLUSION

I bring this exploration to a close by suggesting that the library image is the artefact that both articulates and substantiates the material and cultural wealth that a library is. The buildings and institutions are physical receptacles of past culture, and also resources for the creation of present and future literary and intellectual culture as the source of research material and as the latter-day ‘shrine’ to the Muses. The physical wealth of the library is a doorway into the much larger and more opulent wealth that

exists in the spheres of memory and imagination. I have interpreted descriptions of libraries—in large part from the Roman world—as material that forms the basis for a series of readings regarding the relationship of the written word to other forms of artistic representation, citing as its point of departure the discourses of literary and artistic poetics rather than any supposed intentions for the juxtaposition of literary and non-literary art. What I hope has emerged is not only a more inclusive understanding of the relationship between various forms of representation in a series of institutional settings, but also the sense that a library is never *simply* a library.

8

The Sociality of the Ancient Library

INTRODUCTION

Part of what this book seeks to demonstrate is that books, and especially books *en masse* or the representation of books *en masse*, have the power to alter the ways in which people live their lives and to signify the vision of a life lived differently. Libraries are often the consequence of significant political events, marking, for instance, the reign of an individual who seeks to make a cultural display of his own or his community's authority, or they come about as a result of war, with books as war spoils; libraries signify a community's literary achievement and its aspirations; they may even, as in the case of Diodorus Siculus' *Universal Library of History*, offer a fantasy of a united world without borders. Where scholarly attention might traditionally be focused on which texts are present within a collection and on how they get to be there, in this chapter I shift the concern rather to how books gather people around them and reconfigure the relations of the people to each other. My argument is that book collections, far from being just a place where lifeless documents are consulted, possess their own unique socialities that in turn have the capacity to transform relationships in the world beyond them.

I

It is possible to view the world of the library as one in which the associations are foremost amongst books. Texts are gathered together with each other to form collections and libraries, and their gathering leads in turn to the generation of other texts, as collections and libraries make possible the book-based research that is necessary for the writing of certain works, and it furthermore enables literary modelling, which underlies the writing of other types of works, particularly literary ones.

Presages of books standing as the basis for the creation of other texts may be found as early as the Athenian dramatist Euripides. Aristophanes has his comic Euripides declare in language that is itself patently bloated that he administered a remedy to Aeschylus's swollen tragedy by straining a cure from books (

ἀπὸ βιβλίων, cf. *Frogs* 941–3). Aristophanes alludes to the tragedian's bookishness, and, indeed, the latter is himself credited with possession of one of the earliest personal book collections—that is, libraries by Athenaeus (*Deipnosophistae* 1.3a). N. P. Perez declares that Euripides' library is one 'où la matérialité des livres a déplacé les Muses. Mais nous serions sans doute plus proche de la perception des choses par les Anciens en considérant la bibliothèque comme une "possession" et non comme un "espace". En ce sens nous pouvons dire que pour Euripide les livres en sont venus à suppléer au don des Muses.' ¹ Euripides is thus an example of a laicized, professional poet. His library has displaced the gift of divine inspiration offered through the Muses, and the literary text has a material basis—other texts—to which it is already bound by influence, citation, and allusion, and which to some degree overdetermines its discourse.

Again later in the post-Hellenistic period the library becomes one of the focus points of literary production. Elaine Fantham observes that the culture of Cicero's generation is due to ownership of, or access to, libraries, which were the result of Roman conquest of the Greek world. A century earlier Scipio Aemilianus had his own library, which was the share of the spoils taken by his father Aemilius Paullus from the defeated Perseus of Macedon, while, following the conquest of Athens in 85 BC Sulla acquired from the affluent Apellicon the library of the Aristotelian school, including the philosopher's *Rhetoric* and other works. Cicero had access to this library through his friend Faustus Sulla, and, as his letters to Atticus reveal, himself was given the books of his friend Papirius Paetus, which contained the Greek and Latin collection of the latter's cousin, the grammarian Servius Clodius.² Cicero speaks of conversing with his books in the solitude of his villa at *Ep. ad Atticum* 12.15, suggesting that composition is necessarily an intertextual exercise.

The library becomes an especially important resource for the prose author. In his life of *Demosthenes* Plutarch observes that the

individual who wishes to write history ideally lives in a city where books are plentiful and available (ὡς βιβλίων τε παντοδαπῶν ἀφ' θονίαν ἔχων) and where he may come into contact with all sorts of information that would otherwise be unavailable to him (*Dem.* 2.1). This observation is verified by Diodorus Siculus, who acknowledges the importance of research materials for his historical project. It is in explicit reference to literary and documentary research as the basis for his composition that Diodorus' work bears the title βιβλιοθηκη, and the same claim may be made for Apollodorus' *Library of Mythology*. With Polybius' observation in mind that one may consult books without danger or trouble provided one lives near a town rich in documents or has a library nearby (Polybius 12.27.4 = 45 Platthy³), he mentions that he has examined sources in what must have been the Library at Alexandria on two occasions (3.38.1 and 17.52.6), and he speaks of Rome, which he makes his home base, as crucial for supplying him with the Roman, Greek, and non-Greek portions of his work (1.4.4–5).⁴ Polybius, however, writes disparagingly of Timaeus of Tauromenium for electing to work at Athens, where a good library makes research effortless (Polybius 12.25).⁵

Others who write about the orator and his art also emphasize the importance of a book collection for this individual. Book 10 of Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria* surveys the body of Greek and Latin texts that may assist the public speaker. The catalogue of works is intended as rhetorical *copia* (e.g. *ex copia rerum ac verborum*, 10.1.6; 10.2.1), that is, as the body of material to resource discursive invention. Other works concerned with the training of the orator rehearse what amounts to a library catalogue. *Oration* 18, 'Concerning Training in Rhetoric', of Dio Chrysostom treats works important for the public speaker, and significantly after praising the orator as an individual looked upon favourably by the gods no less than ancient poets (18.3). Then, the body of texts analysed as productive of the sublime in the treatise *On the Sublime*, a work written for the orator (ἀνὴρ πολιτικός, e.g. 1.2), may be read with very much the same perspective. Here literary imitation approximates divine inspiration as [Longinus] speaks of the manner in which ancient authors like Homer or Plato give off emanations as if from 'holy

mouths’

(ὥς ἀπὸ ἱερῶν στομίων ἀπόρροιαί τινες φέρονται).

Literary imitation of sublime texts is akin to consultation of the Pythian priestess at Delphi (13.2).

II

Texts have always had the ability to gather people around them, and generally in civic contexts. In the archaic period the recitation of the Homeric poems would be an occasion at which the city would gather to hear rhapsodes perform the texts that above all denote Hellenic history and ideology. The victories of athletic competitions such as the Olympic, Pythian, Nemean, or Isthmian games were commemorated by the singing of epinician poetry composed specifically for the occasion. Here the whole community would gather to celebrate the honour and glory of the patron and his athlete. In the classical Greek city, men would gather at symposia or drinking parties and recite amongst themselves poetry and drinking songs, such as the verse of Archilochus, Alcaeus, Xenophanes, and the bits of verse that now come down to us as the *scholia*. Tragedy, as it was practised, was also a discourse of the city, with tragedians using mythological material to reflect social and political ideals and predicaments that were pertinent to contemporary fifth-century Athens.⁶ Apart from poetry, the polis offered opportunity for the oral presentation of prose texts to the community as a whole. Wars provided the moment for the writing and declaration of the funeral oration, or *epitaphios*, which the existing examples by Thucydides’ Pericles and Lysias, for example, show to be an honouring of the war dead that occurs through a recollection of the history and character of Athens and her citizens, past and present. The law courts at Athens were the place where litigants would present speeches, often written by logographers or professional speechwriters, that more or less explicitly pleaded cases by appealing to civic ideology and ideals. If David Cohen declares that Athenian litigation should be viewed as part of a process of self-definition,⁷ this process is one that asserts the Athenianness of the speaker. The audience of such speeches were the juries, who sat as a representative body of the city’s overall citizenry.

With the exception of the symposium, which was generally constituted by a gathering of the city state's elite males and which could be a venue for the expression of subversive thoughts, the sociology of the presentation of the oral text in ancient Greece suggests that this occasion is to be perceived as a moment where the city comes together to celebrate or to reinforce itself and the structures of thought and lifestyle that make the city what it is. The text, inevitably oral and understood in this manner, is one that is made to speak to the civic community regardless of the intentions originally attributed to it by the author as a consequence of the staging of the performance and as a consequence of the context provided by the audience.

In the Roman period one can also find the state to be a controlling factor in the production and practice of oral discourse. Martin Bloomer has argued that declamation, the school exercise that required male youths to speak and to argue in character on any number of topics, demonstrated the *libertas* that was so important to Roman Republican ideology and also helped turn young men into true Romans.⁸ Similarly, Mary Beard has also argued that declamation offered a discursive space in which the practitioner could learn, practise, and recollect 'what it is *to be and think Roman*', albeit in a manner that allowed for the debatability of the representation of Romanness.⁹ Declamation required those practising it to examine the categories and roles central and important to their being part of the state, exposing youths to voices from lower social classes, for instance, and also enabling those who came from the provinces, as the Spaniard Seneca showed so well, to locate themselves as centrally Roman.¹⁰ Declamation is a peculiarly Roman exercise, and one notes that it is not staged before the city state as such but in the context of an individual's education, which needs to be viewed as an important dimension of this individual's socialization as a citizen and therefore as a discourse that embodies and reflects civic concerns.¹¹ In particular, declamation was, as Mary Beard has observed, a focus for the elite Roman of the first centuries CE¹²

The other form of public discourse that merits attention at Rome is the oral recitation, or *recitatio*, through which writers could introduce their works to audiences prior to their actual publication.¹³ *Recitatio* might involve all forms of writing, but

never included philosophy. ¹⁴ According to Seneca *Controversiae* 4, pref. 2, Asinius Pollio was the first to introduce the institution of public recitation at Rome:

[P]rimus omnium Romanorum advocatis hominibus scripta sua recitavit. First of all Romans he recited his own writings to men he had invited.

While the majority of scholars think that this passage means that Pollio invented the institution of recitation, Alexander Dalzell observes that this line might mean either that Pollio invented the recitation for Rome, or else that he was the first to issue invitations to recitations.¹⁵ Dalzell goes on to point to Horace *Satire* 1.4.73–4, where the poet states that he recites to no one except to his friends and even then, only when he has been forced to do this.¹⁶ In this scholar's view what Pollio achieved was to introduce recitations on a more formal basis, possibly using the library in the Atrium as a venue and thus taking as his precedent the poetic competitions that inaugurated the Library at Alexandria, at least according to the narrative of Vitruvius (7, pref. 4–7).¹⁷ What I observe about the *recitatio*, and particularly as the account of it as staged by Pollio suggests, is that it is a discursive occasion that does not admit everyone in the community but only a few, probably elite members. As Florence Dupont notes of this institution, it required *amici*, one's friends, and took place in a private space. ¹⁸ Thus the recitation is not a literary practice that speaks to the city state and its interests, and part of the reason for this, I suggest, has to do with its associations with the institution of the library at Rome and the power of this institution to transform social relations.

III

Unlike the single, orally presented text, which by and large reinforces the structure of the pre-existing community, the library in antiquity reconfigures social and political relations and creates alternative possibilities for them, which may nonetheless mimic civic ideals. This is an important difference to note, because it qualifies the previously written history of the library in antiquity. Indeed, one of the narratives that has been told about the book collection in GrecoRoman antiquity is the establishment of public libraries, where 'public' proposes the possibility of access to texts

and documents for the wider community. But it is also the case that the public library might lend itself to more private gatherings, as in the case of the medical scholars who collected around Galen at the Templum Pacis.¹⁹

If, in Greece, libraries were for the most part just collections of texts, as Lionel Casson notes, in Rome they were places that considered the needs of readers.²⁰ Where a public library might indicate the democratization and broad dissemination of knowledge—or at least, its possibilities—and the common ownership of a body of writings by a literate community, the reality is probably quite distinct. The public library, at least in the Roman period, constitutes a trope of possession and even possessiveness no less than its personal, private counterpart, which seeks to imprint the name of its patron(s) and founder(s) indelibly on textuality, in some ways overwriting the designations provided by the work's original authorship. Furthermore, the ancient library, whether public or private, is going to be accessible only to a few because of low literacy rates and because social and economic conditions entailed that only the elite of the Greek and Roman worlds had the time and interest to concern themselves with literary matters.²¹ The library in the pre-modern world was thus an institution that catered to the needs of a very few in ancient society. It is, in fact, an institution that renders our own distinctions between 'public' and 'private' problematic in that it does not offer an easy counterpart to these categories as we use and understand them.

One of the earliest individuals to write about the impact of written texts on their audience is Plato, and his description of reading is not flattering as far as the text is concerned. In the *Phaedrus*, the dialogue that has been taken to be the philosopher's condemnation of writing, either outright or else self-refuting (as in Derrida's ingenious reading of the work²²), Socrates observes that writing is like painting (ζωγραφία). The offspring of painting seem to be alive, but, if one asks them anything, they remain silent. Likewise, writings appear to have some sense, but, if the reader asks them a question, they merely say the same thing over and over again. Furthermore, written texts are transported everywhere, both to those who know something about what they say and to those who know nothing, and they do not know to whom they should speak and to whom they should not. When

written texts are abused, they require the help of their father—that is, their author—because they cannot defend themselves (Phaedrus 275d4–e5). Socrates presents the literary work as indiscriminately sociable—it will talk to anybody at all—and, for this reason, it is vulnerable, like a little child, but he also depicts writing as unsociable, in that it is not the focus for gatherings or communities of readers. The textual ‘children’ move around together and encounter individual readers; however, they are not the basis for people coming together to talk or study. And, in fact, the written text’s ability to repeat only the same thing is to be regarded as detrimental to conversation, which, as Plato ideally envisages it, ought to be philosophical dialectic of the kind that Socrates practises with his interlocutors. Plato writes in the fourth century BC, at a time when the oral text still predominated in society and had greater authority than writing.

Where the depiction of the library in antiquity is concerned, suspicion about the written word disappears and collections of literary texts become important points of social interaction. The initial libraries in antiquity, those attributed to Polycrates of Samos, Eucleides of Athens, Nicocrates of Cyprus, the kings of Pergamum, Euripides, Aristotle, and Theophrastus (Athenaeus 1.3a), were book collections of individuals, and there is considerable doubt as to whether Peisistratus’ library, purportedly the first institutional one in the Greek world, could have been accessible to all the Athenians, despite Aulus Gellius’ retrospective optimistic comment that books of the liberal arts were provided for the public to read (cf. *libros Athenis disciplinarum liberalium publice ad legendum praebendos*, Aulus Gellius 7.17). After all, Peisistratus was a tyrant and his Athens was unlikely to have been a highly literate society. Even in the Hellenistic period the library was an institution for the privileged, highly educated few—namely, Ptolemy’s scholars, who formed an alternative community within the city of Alexandria. The now privileged narrative generally attributes the formalization of literary scholarship and study as a socially useful activity to Ptolemy I (Soter). When the monarch professionalized literary study, he specifically committed himself and the Museum to a recognition of the scholar-poet’s importance as teacher and as cultural guardian in a way that was wholly unprecedented. Plutarch writes as follows: ‘Ptolemy the First brought together the

Museum' (Moralia 1095d).²³ The participle 'brought together' (*συναγάγων*) has been the object of scholarly speculation. Pfeiffer argues that the participle is suitable in the light of Strabo's description of the Museum as an 'assembly' (*σύνοδος*) (of scholars),²⁴ but *συναγάγων* is also appropriate for denoting the gathering of books and might appear to refer to establishment of the Library.²⁵ After all, Strabo uses the phrase 'bringing together [*Ψυναγαγων*] books' (13.1.53) to denote book collecting, while Athenaeus speaks of 'the multitude of books ... and the gathering in the Museum' (203e).²⁶ Thus, when Ptolemy I creates his library, he also gathers a body of scholars as part of his academic collection, introducing them into the books.

The figure in charge of the scholarly community of the Museum is a priest-cum-head librarian appointed by the kings and, in Strabo's time, by Caesar. The priest-critic ministers to his books as if they were divine objects, and Panaetius, the Rhodian philosopher, extends the metaphor of priesthood to include interpretation. He describes the grammarian and critic Aristarchus as a prophet (*mantis*), who earns this description as a result of his exceptional ability to divine (cf. *katamanteuesthai*) the meaning of poems (Athenaeus 634c-d). Like the king, the Alexandrian literary intellectual is a significant political figure. He is such by virtue of being linked to the political establishment through a structure of patronage.²⁷ In *Idyll* 17 Theocritus, the poet, announces that he takes his beginning from Zeus, and then proceeds to celebrate Ptolemy II (Philadelphus) as the noblest mortal (17. 1–7). In view of the Hellenistic king's claim to divine ancestry, the poet in effect declares the coincidence of divine and political patronage for his writing.²⁸ Through patronage, the Ptolemies establish and maintain the scholarly community, and they do so, not by separating it from the larger world, but by incorporating the emblems of the political community into the scholarly one: the outside world is brought into the scholarly institution.

In book 17 of his *Geography*, Strabo observes that, in the Ptolemaic Museum at Alexandria, the scholars who work there, described as 'men who love words' (*philologoi andres*), had a common mess and shared their goods in common (17.1.8). In his life of Dionysius of Milete, Philostratus suggests that subsequently

meals given at public expense were synonymous with intellectual prestige and honour. He refers to Hadrian enrolling Dionysius amongst the knights who received meals in a latter-day Museum, which he glosses as an 'Egyptian dining-table which summoned the most famous men in the earth' (VS 524). The common mess and property shared by the scholars affirms the recognition made by authors of the archaic and classical periods that literary culture has an important role and value in the community as a whole. The communal ownership of goods signifies the idealism of the community by enacting the proposal for public ownership of material goods in the ideal city of Plato's *Republic*.

Furthermore, the mess was a feature of the Spartan state, and its establishment in the Museum suggests an implicit analogy between the poet and the soldier, one that corrects what Xenophanes had observed to be the traditional privileging of physical over intellectual prowess in the Greek city state. It is perhaps not surprising that Jaroslav Pelikan ventures that the Library at Alexandria is a precedent for the modern university, which for him is a community that engages with social concerns.²⁹

This creation of an intellectual community around a book collection is historically remarkable, for what Ptolemy does is to bring together individuals who are united by nothing but a strong interest in literature, unlike, say, the Lyceum of Aristotle, which gathers individuals who are concerned in common with philosophy and the teaching of their master. The community is something of a state within the state with a community leader who is to be closely identified with the king, with the structures of community drawn from philosophical writing and from historical state, and with an economy of common ownership. But, if the Museum community makes deliberate and obvious allusions to statehood in the face of the collapse of the unity of the Greek world³⁰ it is a curious polity. Paul Zanker has argued that it is only in the Hellenistic period that the representation of the intellectual—poet, philosopher, thinker, and so on—qua intellectual comes into being;³¹ otherwise, one is above all and only a citizen. But the development of the idea of a distinct intellectual identity—poet, philosopher, literary scholar—is clearly connected with the phenomenon of the Museum-Library, and especially in Alexandria, where the Ptolemies sponsor a

professional intellectual class, and also in Pergamum. Indeed, what qualifies an individual for inclusion in this society is his intellectual ability and standing: the inhabitant of the Museum-Library at Alexandria must be a scholar, and he certainly comes to be known as such through his association with the Museum-Library. In fact, so effective is this institution in constructing ‘intellectual’ as a valid category of identity that we no longer know anything about any of the scholars identified with the Library other than that they studied this or wrote such and such a work, whereas the artistic representations of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides from the pre-Hellenistic period present them above all as citizens and not poets.³²

One suspects, however, that intellectual identity was not entirely comfortable for those to whom it had been given. Sources testify to tensions and difficulties among the inhabitants of the Museum-Library. Callimachus, one of the librarians, tells the *philologoi* not to be jealous of one another, suggesting that rivalries and competitiveness existed among the scholars (fr. 191 = *Diegesis* 6.2ff.). Most damning of the witnesses to the life of the Alexandrian library is that of Timon of Phlius (320–230 BC), who attacks the Ptolemaic scholars in his *Silloi*, where he speaks of them as ‘cloistered men versed in books, endlessly bickering in the birdcage of the Muses’ (

βιβλιακοὶ χαρακίται ἀπείριτα δηριόωντες Μωσείων, fr. 12 Diels = 60 Wachsmuth).³² Timon’s description of the inhabitants as individuals cloistered (i.e. *χαρακίται*) in a birdcage suggests that this critic deems them to be cut off from everyday social and political life. The image of the birdcage is one that suggests the institution of the library as one that not only contains its inhabitants but also excludes those who live in Alexandria and beyond. If Alexandria is a public library, it can be one only in the sense that its founder is a public, political figure and not in the sense that it is readily available to everyone. Furthermore, Timon’s observation that the scholars incessantly fight—

δηριόωντες is Homeric vocabulary imported into an extremely unheroic context—presents the sociality that they experience as notably dysfunctional. Life among books is far from the ideal polity that the Ptolemies and the various subsequent literary testimonies to this life might have portrayed it as being.

Rather it is awkward and troubled, and perhaps this is due to the absence of other identities apart from that of intellectual in a world where this role had just been inaugurated.

IV

There are other less ambivalent narratives concerning the library as a focus for social relations in the ancient world. Libraries existed in Roman bath-houses such as the Baths of Trajan, of Caracalla, and perhaps of Diocletian.³³ The audiences of these baths were large and non-specialist, as Nicholls observes,³⁴ and perhaps the act of reading was incidental to taking a bath for the majority of individuals. But it is also the case that the inclusion of the library in bath complexes marks the incorporation of the tradition of the Hellenistic gymnasium with its intellectual, cultural, and bodily concerns.³⁵ This provides the Roman library with another link to the past.

In the *De Officiis* Cicero refers to the magnificence of the villas of Marcus Licinius Lucullus (cf. *villarum magnificentiam*, 1.39.140), while Plutarch speaks of this individual's opulent homes, the walkways, the baths, and the paintings and statues (*Lucullus* 39.2).³⁶ Part of their grandness is due no doubt to the private libraries that he established in his abodes after he had brought to Rome the book collections of the kings of Pontus after capturing Amisus in 70 BC (cf. Plutarch *Lucullus* 42 and Isidore *Etymologies* 6.5.1). In his biography of the general, Plutarch declares that the notable thing about the libraries is Lucullus' acquisition of them, which was better than their creation. The words he writes next show what he means by this statement. According to Plutarch, the libraries, despite being private, were open to all, with study rooms and cloisters made available to Greeks, who went there to spend time with each other. Lucullus himself also went there to associate with the literary visitors, and he helped either rhetoricians or statesmen—the translation depends on how one chooses to translate the Greek noun *τοῖς πολιτικοῖς*—to obtain what they needed. Plutarch goes on to state that Lucullus' house was a home and a prytaneum for the Greeks who had come to Rome:

Σπουδῆς δ' ἄξια καὶ λόγου τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν βιβλίων κατασκευήν. καὶ γὰρ πολλὰ καὶ γεγραμμένα καλῶς συνήγεν, ἣ τε χρήσις ἦν φιλοτιμότερα τῆς κτήσεως, ἀνειμένων πᾶσι τῶν βιβλιοθηκῶν, καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὰς περιπάτων καὶ σχολαστηρίων ἀκωλύτως ὑποδεχομένων τοὺς Ἕλληνας ὥσπερ εἰς Μουσῶν τι καταγώγιον ἐκείσε φοιτῶντας καὶ συνδιημερεύοντας ἀλλήλοις, ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων χρείων ἀσμένως ἀποτρέχοντας. πολλάκις καὶ συνεσχόλαζεν αὐτοὺς ἐμβάλλων εἰς τοὺς περιπάτους τοῖς φιλολόγοις καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς συνέπραττεν ὅπου δέοντο· καὶ ὁλως ἐστία καὶ πρυτανεῖον Ἑλληνικὸν ὁ οἶκος ἦν αὐτοῦ τοῖς ἀφικνομένοις εἰς Ῥώμην.

Plutarch *Lucullus* 42.1–2

The construction of the library is significant and noteworthy. For he [Lucullus] collected many writings in a fine fashion, and their use was more estimable than their acquisition, for the libraries were open to everyone and the walkways around them and the study rooms readily received Greeks who went there as if to a refuge of the Muses and spent time with each other in pleasurable flight from their other pressing needs. Often he himself spent time there going on walks with the literary scholars and he obtained for the political individuals what they needed. On the whole, his house was a home and a Greek prytaneum for those arriving at Rome.

Lucullus' libraries may be private, but Plutarch's account of them problematizes any contemporary concept of private—that is, reserved for its owner—as opposed to public—that is, open and available to anyone. The supposedly private libraries transform Lucullus' house into a common, public space, for it is in principle open to everyone (cf.

ἀνειμένων πᾶσι τῶν βιβλιοθηκῶν), although it is doubtful that any random individual at Rome could have walked into Lucullus' house to consult its book collections. Lucullus entertained Greeks who came up to Rome for many days at a time (Plutarch *Lucullus* 41.1), and it is the libraries that in particular provide hospitality for these individuals and over them a home away from home. The comparison of the general's abode to a Greek prytaneum insists upon this point. The prytaneum was the *κοινὴ ἐστία* or 'common hearth' of Athens, and what it reflected was the ancient custom of kings inviting guests to dine with them. Dining at public expense was an honour granted to victors in the Olympic games, to generals, to members of certain distinguished families, to visiting dignitaries, and to the children of the war dead,³⁷ and other individuals request this honour as

acknowledgement of their own contributions to civic life. The archaic poet Xenophanes asserts that he deserves meals from the city for his wisdom, which is better than the strength of the athletes who conventionally receive this reward for their achievements (fr. 2), while Socrates and Isocrates, in imitation of the earlier poet, both lay claim to publicly funded meals (cf. Plato *Apology* 36d7 and Isocrates *Antidosis* 95). Through his description of Lucullus' home as a prytaneum, Plutarch presents it as one that recognizes and rewards the contribution of the visiting Greeks, whether they are dignitaries (cf. *τοῖς πολιτικοῖς*) or literary intellectuals (cf. *τοῖς φιλολόγοις*), to Roman life, and he daringly does so by implying that this Roman statesman has recreated an aspect of Greek, and specifically Athenian, culture at Rome. The library, which is imported from elsewhere, from Macedonia, into Rome, reconstructs the sociality of the general's home, making it distinctly other than Roman.

The reference to the prytaneum suggests that the general's books are not the only focus of his text collections: Lucullus' libraries become the pretext for the social gatherings that take place in the general's home. Certainly, Plutarch's narrative does not explicitly mention that the visitors made use of books, but it addresses the fact that they and Lucullus come to the text collection, the study rooms, and the cloisters to spend time with each other—that is, to engage in *διατριβή*. The written texts generate further spoken conversations among those who 'use' the libraries, regardless of whether or not anyone reads the text, and thus provide a context for the performance of private discourse. Plutarch offers a portrait of community at Lucullus' house that is welcoming and congenial, unlike the fraught life of the scholars at Alexandria. This sociality may be due in large part to the fact that the general and his visitors are not necessarily first and foremost intellectuals, although Plutarch does take care to note that the host was trained to speak Greek and Latin fluently and that he devoted his youth to liberal culture and developed the contemplative side (*τὸ θεωρητικόν*) of his nature (Lucullus 1.3–4). Some of the guests are indeed *φιλόλογοι* but others are *οἱ πολιτικοί*, individuals who concern themselves with affairs of the state, probably as public speakers. *οἱ πολιτικοί*, after

all, is the phrase that [Longinus] employs to refer to orators in his treatise *On the Sublime* (cf. *On the Sublime* 1.2, 1.4; 8.3; 9.3; 11.2; 12.3; 15.10; 17.1; 30.1; 32.3; 32.8).³⁸ These are people for whom books and intellectual pursuits over otium, leisure, from their busy pursuits, and Plutarch describes them as running away with pleasure from other pressing needs (cf.

ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων χρείων ἀσμένως ἀποτρέχοντας).

Cicero often refers to study and writing as rest and recreation from his otherwise hectic public life (e.g. *De Oratore* 1.1.1–2 and *Tusc. Disp.* 1.1). To gather around a book collection is to identify oneself as unconcerned for the moment with public affairs and to be engaged with activities that have no bearing on the larger community, although Plutarch's portrait of the Lucullan library suggests that its patrons have formed themselves into an alternative, political community that mimics aspects of the classical Athenian state.

Perhaps, Lucullus' library is an emblem of the general's importance in facilitating social and intellectual relations among individuals in Republican Rome. When he took the town of Amisus, Tyrannio, the individual who was to be so central to the organization of Cicero's own library, was captured and acquired by Murena, one of Lucullus' subordinates. Plutarch tells his reader that Murena gave Tyrannio his liberty, but in doing so dishonoured Tyrannio as such a learned individual: in Lucullus' view, Tyrannio was not to be freed as a common slave (*Lucullus* 19.7). The story, as told by Plutarch, is one that goes to demonstrate the excellence of Lucullus' character by contrast with that of Murena. It is more than likely that the general had a central role to play in Tyrannio working with Cicero, for the two Romans were good friends (*Lucullus* 41.3). Lucullus was also notable as the patron of the Greek poet Archias, for whom Cicero pleads a case for citizenship in his speech *Pro Archia Poeta*. In this oration Cicero observes that the auctoritas and the gratia of the general helped Archias (*pro Archia* 4.6), and elsewhere he cites the latter's support for the poet (cf. 12.31), who had treated the war with Mithridates and commemorated the deeds of both Lucullus and of Rome (*pro Archia* 9.21).

Cicero's relationship with his own libraries is an interesting matter because it is one that emphatically articulates the texts themselves as part of the community in question. Cicero is an individual who spends his life in the law courts and the senate of Rome, and, as he represents it, he is overwhelmed with *negotium* from which reading and writing offer the only refuge. He begins the *Tusculan Disputations* by telling Brutus that he is now returning to the study of philosophy because he is finally free from his roles as legal defender and as member of the senate (*Tusc. Disp.* 1.1), while *De Oratore* commences with a lengthier apology that the turbulent affairs of state have prevented the author from returning to the arts to which he had been devoted in his youth—namely, oratory. Whatever amount of time the fraud of his enemies and the court cases of his friends leave him is devoted to writing at this point in order to satisfy the requests of his brother Quintus (*De Oratore* 1.1.3–2.5). Cicero presents himself as someone who retreats into intellectual life, into reading and writing texts, as an activity that is distinct and apart from his life in the city of Rome.

In his corpus of letters Cicero writes about his relation to his books and his libraries in such a way as to suggest that these are very important aspects of his private life. There are references to the purchase and acquisition of the books of others—for instance, Atticus (*Ep. ad Atticum* 1.4, 1.10, 1.11), of L. Papirius Paetus (*Ep. ad Atticum* 1.20; 2.1), of Vibius (*Ep. ad Atticum* 2.20; cf. 2.22.7)—or allusions to his use of other people's books, such as Faustus' library (*Ep. ad Atticum* 4.10) and Atticus' books (*Ep. ad Atticum* 4.14). Literary work is what gives Cicero release from his sorrows and worries (*Ep. ad Familiares* 5.15.3–4), and he writes on more than one occasion of the enjoyment that he has from spending time reading (cf. *Ep. ad Atticum* 2.6, 4.10). At *Ep. ad Atticum* 1.7 he asks Atticus to procure a library for him so that he can enjoy himself when he does have some leisure (*otium*), while at the end of *Ep. ad Atticum* 1.20 he states that he takes refuge in his studies more each day as his juridical duties and obligations permit, *ego autem cotidie magis, quod mihi de forensi labore temporis datur, in iis studiis conquiesco*. At *Ep. ad Atticum* 12.3 he writes that he is with his little books (*cum libellis*), while at *Ep. ad Familiares* 9.26.1 he asks how he could possibly live if he does not live among letters, *aut possem vivere, nisi in litteris viverem*? This is also the letter in

which he notes that each day he either reads or writes something. In an epistle to Sulpicius (*Ep. ad Familiares*. 13.28a.2) he speaks highly of Mescinius, noting that this individual is devoted to those literary pursuits in which he used to delight but by which he now lives (*tum studia illa nostra, quibus ante delectabamur, nunc etiam vivimus*). Literary pursuits are more than *otium*: they are something essential to Cicero's being.

Devotion to literature helps to determine and define the author's social relations with others. In *Ep. ad Familiares*. 3.10, composed while he is at Laodicea, he writes of his friendship (*amicitia*) with the epistle's addressee Appius Pulcher, proposing that their bond is above all an intellectual one. The letter-writer and his audience are bound together by 'similar studies, a sweetness of custom, pleasure in life and lifestyle, communion in discourse, and deep literary research' (*studiorum similitudo, suavitas consuetudinis, delectatio vitae atque victus, sermonis societas, litterae interiores*, 3.10.9). Elsewhere, in *Ep. ad Familiares*. 13.30, addressed to Manius Acilius Glabrio, Cicero speaks of L. Manlius Sossius, whom he describes as 'most familiar' (*familiarissimum*) and as being among his most intimate and closest friends (*in meis intimis maximeque necessariis*, 13.30.1–2). What determines this relationship, it would appear, is that Sossius is endowed with the very desires for letters and learning in which Cicero takes the most pleasure (*his studiis litterarum doctrinaeque praeditum, quibus ego maxime delector*, 13.30.1). Sociality is one that is constructed around similar intellectual pursuits where Cicero is concerned, but literary activity, reading and writing, as performed in the home and library, appear to be something solitary and unsocial, in distinction from the more communal environments offered by the Alexandrian library and by Lucullus' home. The only other individuals who have anything to do with his library are the library slaves (*librarioli*) who are employed to glue pages and make the *syllibae* for the scrolls (cf. *Ep. ad Atticum* 4.4a), and Tyrannio, who is responsible for arranging and identifying the texts (cf. *Ep. ad Atticum* 4.4a, 4.8). Cicero also mentions a slave named Dionysius, who had charge of his expensive library and who stole a large number of books. Thinking that he would be punished, Dionysius fled, and Cicero asks his friend Sulpicius Rufus to catch the slave for him (cf. *Ep. ad Familiares* 13.57.3).

These individuals are not Cicero's social equals but rather men

who either work for him or are owned by him: thus the library is not a space into which he invites his contemporaries or familiars. Yet the author's own representation of his library suggests that at another level it is a site of sociality. At *Ep. ad Familiares* 9.1.2, a letter addressed to Terentius Varro, he refers to his texts as 'old friends' (*veteres amici*) that he has ignored because of the pressures of his political life. He is somewhat angry with these companions, because they have made him ashamed of himself for engaging in untrustworthy matters, but now they have called him back into his pure association with them (cf. *revocant in consuetudinem pristinam*), although they say that Varro is wiser (*sapientiozem*) because he remained true to book learning all this time. Through this personification of the books, the Ciceronian library is a community comprised of books and their owner and reader, rather than being a community of readers in all the senses that the word 'reader' may entail in Greco-Roman antiquity, and it is a community in which those read and the one who reads converse with each other after a fashion.

Amici is a word wrought with ethical significance for Cicero. In *De Amicitia* Laelius declares that *amicitia* or friendship is an 'agreement of all divine and human things with benevolence and love' (*omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum cum benevolentia et caritate consensio*, 6.2). Friendship is a condition in which conflict is absent and harmony is present. In *De Officiis* Cicero writes that the most important thing for humankind is that we have the devotion of friends who love and admire us (2.8.30), something that is impossible for the author's library to do to the author but something that the author, as reader, can do for his texts if they are truly his friends. More interesting is what he says about the factors that constitute friendship. According to him, there is nothing more noble or powerful than when men who are similar in character (*moribus similes*) are joined in friendship, and it is the case that the honesty and virtue of another will attract us (*De Officiis* 1.17.55–6). At *Ep. ad Atticum* 1.18 Cicero complains to Atticus that he is deserted by all. After his morning levee he goes into the forum to be among a throng of friends but can find no one with whom he can joke or whisper freely. It would appear that a friend is someone with whom one can converse comfortably. If Cicero's books are in any sense his *amici* and if the statements in *De Officiis* have any general bearing on the

discourse of friendship, then the implication is that the texts that are the reader's friends are ones that display virtue and that are similar in character to him. There are citations to the author who is the basis of every educated individual's reading, Homer—for instance, at *Ep. ad Atticum* 9.5.3 (to *Iliad* 18.96–9) and at *Ep. ad Atticum* 9.8.2 (to *Odyssey* 3.22). But, among the authors whom he names in his epistles, the one who stands out is Plato. The Greek philosopher is described as 'that prince of genius and learning' (*ille quidem princeps ingeni et doctrinae*) and cited for his view that political states should be ruled by a wise and just man (cf. *Ep. ad Quintum* 1.1.29), and elsewhere refers to the inspired words of Plato, *quae sunt apud Platonem nostrum scripta divinitus* (*Ep. ad Familiares*, 1.9.12). Admiration for Aristotle is suggested by Cicero's comment that he has written his work *De Oratore* in an Aristotelian manner (*Aristotelico more*) at *Ep. ad Familiares* 1.9.23, where he also refers to Isocrates as another rhetorical model, and at *Ep. ad Atticum*, where he cites both Plato and Aristotle as models for his own writing. At *Ep. ad Atticum* 12.40 he mentions that he owns copies of the books of Aristotle and Theopompus. At *Ep. ad Atticum* 4.14 he seeks permission to use Atticus' books, and especially his Varro, who is indeed not only a book here but also one of the author's correspondents (e.g. *Ep. ad Familiares* 9.1.2).

Cicero's textual 'friends' are authors who might be considered centrally canonical, or, if not yet canonical, as in the case of Varro, regarded as authoritative at Rome. His association with these authors, I suggest, serves in part to validate Cicero's own literary standing at Rome. It is, after all, not insignificant that authors who do not have any standing are located outside the privileged circle of *amici*. Thus Alexander of Ephesus, whose poetry Cicero receives from Vibius and which he criticizes as being terrible, is excluded from the sociality of the library (cf. *Epp. ad Atticum* 2.20, 2.22.7).

VI

There is another account of an individual reading books that redefines sociality in quite an interesting manner. In book 6 of the *Confessions* Augustine describes Ambrose reading to himself. The bishop's activity merits comment because it is unusual: Ambrose runs his eyes over the page and takes the text into his

heart, but he does not give voice to the book he is reading. This is the only way in which the bishop is seen to read (6.3.3). Historically, Augustine's account of this scene is important, as it offers testimony to the fact that reading books was a voiced affair in antiquity³⁹ and thus that sitting in an ancient library was not necessarily to find a place of peace and quiet. Augustine speculates that Ambrose's practice of silent reading is to prevent other people from interrupting him with questions on what he is perusing, and to find rest from the problems of other people. After all, it is the case that Ambrose reads to replenish his mind after dealing with the crowds of people who seek his help and advice. He also supposes that this enables him to read more and also to save his voice, which would otherwise be used for preaching. One notable thing about this passage of the *Confessions* is what it does not regard as unusual. Augustine states that Ambrose did not stop anyone coming into his study, and did not expect visitors to be announced. It would appear from the narrative that the eyewitness author is only one of several people present while the bishop reads his texts, so that it would appear that there is no assumption that reading should be a solitary, and so unsocial/ble, activity. In fact, Ambrose reading seems to be the reason for everyone else's presence in the room.

There is another relationality that is present as a consequence of silent reading, apart from this community that is constructed around the act of reading. This is a spiritual communion between the reader and God. As I have written elsewhere, the unvoiced text is the spiritual one that enables the reader to listen to the 'inner teacher', namely God.⁴⁰ The account of how learning occurs in *De Magistro* offers a reading of the silent 'voice'. In this dialogue the interlocutors, Augustine and his son Adeodatus, establish that language is a medium by which teaching and learning occur in that it serves to signify reality (e.g. *De Magistro* 1.1 and 9.26). Here Augustine proposes that receiving the words themselves does not constitute the act of learning, since the realities that spoken or written words signify may not be understood. The example he gives is of hearing foreign words or names, such as those of the three youths Ananias, Azarius and Misael, who are thrust into the Babylonian furnace, and of failing to understand what they might mean (cf. 11.36). Understanding, and so learning, take place thus, not through the externalities of

language—that is, speaking and hearing language—but through an interior truth that ‘presides over the mind itself from within’ (trans. R. P. Russell, 11.38). Learning is an interior process that takes place above all through the agency of God, the divine Teacher, so that the role of human teacher is to ask the sort of questions that make it possible for the student to ‘hear’ the Teacher who instructs from within (12.40). If this is the case, it follows thus that prayer and silent reading or meditation will be the forms of discourse that most approximate the language by which we properly learn.

In the *Confessions* Ambrose reveals to Augustine a particular relationship between text and thing or action that is distinctly Christian and unlike anything he has previously encountered. Unvoiced reading demonstrates that language has a spiritual dimension quite apart from the bodily one, which the spoken voice emblemizes and which Augustine’s own rhetorical career, which lures both students and women, demonstrates.⁴¹ At the end of book 5 Augustine admits to a predilection for the bishop’s words, one that subsequently leads him to knowledge of Christian doctrine. The author has encountered and studied pagan myths and Manichean doctrines, which he now concludes signify only falsehoods—that is, a form of discourse where word does not correspond to the thing it signifies; in contrast, Ambrose’s words make meaning and truth present in such a way that the word-thing dichotomy is denied, ‘together with the words which I was enjoying [*diligebam*], the subject matter, in which I was unconcerned, came to make an entry into my mind. I could not separate them. ‘Ambrose’s language cannot be distinguished from its message for a specific reason. The bishop expounds the Old Testament ‘figuratively’; he employs allegorical reading such that the literal text is given a spiritual meaning and such that words are liberated from an otherwise constraining physicality (5.14.24). As an exegetical methodology, Christian allegorical reading allows for pagan literature to be reinterpreted and reread so that it has its uses. Thus, the temple-veil presented by Virgil’s *Aeneid* at *Confessions* 1.9 can be drawn back in such a way that Aeneas’ travels anticipate or foreshadow the metaphorical wanderings of Augustine on his path to conversion.

The description of Ambrose reading silently to himself produces a particular model of Christian social interaction, with

the bishop communing with God and God's words and laity standing by as observers to this event. The structure of community is one that mirrors the ideal structure of the church, one that stands against the more conventional communities constructed by pagan or by, say, Manichee discourse and letters.

VII

Libraries and the reading of written texts are important social forces: they offer a focus for sociality in the Greco-Roman world beginning with the Hellenistic period. It is also the case that exclusion from the ancient library signifies an individual's exclusion from society. The individual who most emphatically demonstrates this is the Roman poet Ovid. Ovid's career is one that ends in exile on the Black Sea at Tomi, and, as he recounts in the *Tristia*, one of the works of his exile, it is *carmina*, his poetry,⁴² and a mistake (*error*), that have caused him to be exiled. 'Poem and transgression (*carmen et error*) are the two crimes that led to his downfall. He declares that he will remain silent about the transgression (*error*), for it is the 'base poem (*turpe carmen*)' that has caused him to be known as the 'doctor of obscene adultery' (*doctor obsceni adulterii*), (*Tristia* 2.207–12). Ovid's defence is that there is no *crimen* in his poetry, not even in the erotic *Ars Amatoria* (240), which he admits is unworthy reading material for Caesar (241–2) and for Roman gentlewomen (252–8): he has intended this work for prostitutes alone (cf. *solis meretricibus*) (303). He writes, as he claims at 249–50, only of what is legitimate and of what are permitted trysts (cf. *legitimum concessaque furta*; also cf. *non facinus causam, sed suus error habet*, *Tristia* 3. 1. 52). He rejects the accusation that he named individuals, or, as he puts it, used actual, literally 'naked', names (cf. *nomina nuda*) in his *liber* (408): *nuda* suggests an equation between licence and the immoral (cf. Apuleius *Apology* 10–11).

Literary history is an important strategy of literary self-authorization for Ovid. At *Tristia* 2.361 ff. he notes in defence of the *Ars Amatoria* that there is a whole prior tradition of writing about erotic matters with impunity. He cites the attention to love given by Greek epic and lyric poets, whom he catalogues at vv. 364–80, by Greek tragedians (381–409), and then by Roman poets, who are also mentioned by name (421–70). It is amongst

this third group that Ovid explicitly locates himself as the successor to Tibullus and to Propertius (467–8). He justifies this earlier, normative licence by arguing that the effect of a poem depends on the reader's mind-set and perceptions: if one reads his poetry with the right mind (*recta si mente legatur*) it is evident that it cannot harm anyone (275–6). Without this liberal attitude, all books will have *crimen* (265); the circus, where men and women sit squashed together, will no longer be safe (cf. *non tuta licentia Circi est*, 283).

Augustus banishes Ovid to the outer edges of the Roman Empire regardless of the protestations that the poet makes, and the offender's writing makes evident his sense of isolation in exile. The experience of being cast out of Rome, out of the privileged cultural and political centre, is so extreme that he states that his Latin fails (*Tristia* 3.14.4552), but the utter desolation of exile is represented above all by Ovid's exclusion from the imperial libraries.⁴³ His books have been denied a resting place in the Augustan libraries in the Temple of Apollo (*Tristia*. 3. 1. 63–4), in the Octavian portico near the theatre of Marcellus (67–9), and in the library founded in the temple of Liberty by Asinius Pollio (71–2)—exclusion from this last library is intentionally ironic, for Ovid's work is barred from the shrine of *Libertas*, or Freedom.⁴⁴ *Tristia* 3 has been sent as the poet's representative to make a case in his defence, and the case to be made is not to admit Ovid as reader, but rather to admit him as a book that might be read by others, especially those in the inner circle of the *princeps*. Horace had articulated the political and social privilege that proximity to the *princeps* offered in his poems (cf. esp. *Satire* 1.10 and *Epistle* 2.1), and now *Tristia* 3.1 presents the author's banishment from Rome as a separation from the privilege that the favour of the imperial ruler-judge can grant and this separation as a mode of censorship. A. J. Marshall writes that inclusion of one's works in imperial libraries would ensure the status of a work as a 'classic as in the case of Vergil and Livy (cf. *Suetonius Gai* 34. 2), while exclusion ought to determine the work's demise, such that the imperial library had become an indirect strategy of censorship.⁴⁵ The scholarly community in its turn reinforced the critical function of the book collection and its canonizations, for Augustus prompted commentaries on the works of the Greek poets whose busts he placed in his library (cf.

Suetonius *Tiberius* 70).⁴⁶

The work of Quintilian, Rome's latter-day librarian and judge under the patronage of the emperor Vespasian, emphatically underscores the relationship between literary and political judgement⁴⁷. The rhetorician enunciates the coincidence of literary language and power in terms of authorial discrimination. He rehearses his critical authority in terms of roles established by the Alexandrians, this time of the scholar-critic rather than of the poet⁴⁸. Like his North African predecessors, the imperial librarian is a priest of the Muses. In the *Institutio Oratoria*, his long treatise on the training of the ideal orator, he observes that, if Aratus had invoked Zeus (*in the Phaenomena*) as a starting point, then he will invoke Homer as his beginning as he embarks upon his catalogue of texts that are to be canonical specifically for the future orator at 10.1.46. His self-fashioning as literary priest is reinforced in his comparison of Ennius to a sacred grove (*sacros... lucos*) and to his attribution of *religio* to his poetry at 10.1.88, and in his description of himself as someone who cherishes 'sacred scriptures' (*sacra litterarum*, 10.1.92). To the urbane prosewriter Calvus, significantly an author who engages in rigorous self-criticism (cf. *nimia contra se calumnia* and *castigata*), he attributes 'holy speech' (*sancta... oratio*, 10.1.115). Through Calvus Quintilian extends the idea of the scholar-priest to the professional teacher of rhetoric (cf. Apuleius *Florida* 1).

Finally, if Ovid recognizes the power of the library, his recognition takes the form of an attempt to interrogate the institution's authority. The poet sets himself up as an alternative critical presence, challenging the Augustan library system as a critical institution, and, with it, the position of the emperor as divinely ordained ruler—literary judge. The poet manages to give his poetry a voice and to resist the silence of exile to some degree. If he himself has been physically banished from Rome, it is the case that he maintains his other privileges and rights as a citizen (*Tristia* 4.9.12). Despite his physical exclusion from the city, he has the means to construct a virtual presence for himself in the imperial city through the continued circulation of his writings, both the poetry written before his exile and his subsequent *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto*. Elizabeth Block has observed that in *Epistulae ex Ponto* the poet intrudes himself into the poem less as a poet and more as a critic.⁴⁹ In making this

remark, Block points perceptively to Ovid's strategy for self-authorization in the exile poetry. The poet fears that his reputation and name will not survive in his absence (cf. *Tristiae* 3.10.1–2); however, he has the means to grant his writing a presence at Rome. At *Tristiae* 3.3.77–80 he makes it plain that his books are his memorial. Accordingly, at 3.14.8–10, he tells an unnamed friend to retain his body (*corpus*) of books in the city, since his own exile does not also require the exile of his works. The noun *corpus* plays on the idea of the physical, literary text as a representative of the physical, human body. Furthermore and finally, it is the case that the physical distance from Rome and its emperor-critic ironically entail a greater freedom for the poet. While Ovid is careful not to incriminate his intimates by mentioning their names in his poetry (cf. esp. 3.6 and 3.14), he is able to mention Augustus frequently in his poetry, and his subject is powerless to prevent this (4.4.14–16).

VIII

I want finally to suggest that the library can create a community that exists only in the imagination. I refer here to the gathering of scholars in Athenaeus' *Deipnosophistae*, eminent and famous scholars or their mere namesakes, who come together for the sake of expounding on texts. Athenaeus brings together a Plutarch from Alexandria, who evokes by his name the famous and prolific author Plutarch of Chaeronea. Is this Plutarch the author of the moral works, or is he not? This is not the only enticing name. As I have noted earlier, there is a problem of chronology that raises uncertainties about who 'Galen' and 'Ulpian' are. If they are the medical writer and the Roman jurist, Athenaeus' chronology is ahistorical, for the former died by the first decade of the third century AD and the latter in AD 228.⁵⁰ The author imagines the texts as having the ability to draw together the eminent literati of the age and so as having the power to fabricate associations that could not otherwise exist.

It would appear that these famous and celebrated individuals authorize the amalgam of texts they cite and read and that these texts in turn also authorize these individuals. The fact that Plutarch or Galen reads and can discourse on a work grants that text a particular status: it is work worthy of note from someone

who himself is deserving of recognition. But it is also the case that Plutarch or Galen reading such and such a text affirms that this work is worthy of a reader and author's attention, and such an eminent individual can be summoned to attend the text. The library thus shows itself to be an institution that has the power to fabricate socialities even when these socialities may exist only in the realm of make-believe. The gathered texts that constitute a library can in turn prompt the gathering of scholars who will revere and honour this entity.

CONCLUSION

If the library might be described as a community of books, I have suggested in this chapter that libraries themselves collect their own communities of people. The ancient library is by and large not a place where individuals retreat to read and study in peace and quiet; rather it is a space of socialities, where people come together around texts to talk, to discuss, to form themselves, and be formed into communities that are distinct and alternative to those in the external, non-literary worlds, as in the case of the Alexandrian Museum-Library. Even if people turn to books as a retreat from their other lives, as in the case of Cicero or in the case of Ambrose, they form different social realities through their texts, treating them as 'friends' and having all that friendship implies—similarity of character, freedom to speak and think—as Cicero does, or using texts as a means of realizing a relationship with God, as Ambrose does through silent reading in the presence of students and followers who mill around his reading room. The point, then, that this chapter makes is that book collections shape and reform how people live their lives, with each other, with the books themselves, with God such that the existence of literary texts is a potent social and political force. So potent is the ancient library that being physically kept from it isolates an individual from its and any other normal socialities, as in the case of the poet Ovid, whose exile is both represented and realized by the exclusion of his poetry from the collections of the imperial libraries of Augustan Rome.

Concluding Thoughts

In this book I have been thinking about the library in the ancient world. Now that I have come to the end of my deliberations, it is apparent to me that libraries for the most part are their own worlds, possessing their own socialities, which sometimes overlap with the external world. In addition, I am not sure that we can speak of *the* library, because there are after all many libraries in the ancient world and these libraries can, moreover, take the form of book collections, individual works, and individual people. And, furthermore, perhaps the library is not after all an institution, because ‘institution’ suggests an authorized foundation with a particular aim. Certainly, the library is an institution when founded by rulers of the Greek and Roman worlds to contain the literary knowledge of these societies, but it is also much more than an institution: it is a foundation of and by empowered individuals.

It is apparent that library in the ancient world is a multiple signifier, referring to power, to knowledge, to memory and recollection, to plenitude, but at the same time occasionally acknowledging its own deficiencies of knowledge, of memory. Library is a space on which we and antiquity can write our notions of the world, different and differing as they might be, and our intellects, differing and differing as they might be too. Library is also an evolving idea, changing with time to include developing notions of textuality and learnedness. It has an enormous capacity to be transformed as it refers, so that this study will in turn become something of a historical artefact.

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¹ See Canfora (1989: 109–14).

² See *Record of Speeches* (1990) for the speeches given by a host of world leaders and academics commemorating the founding of the new library.

³ See Alexander Stille, 'Resurrecting Alexandria', *New Yorker* (8 May 2000), 90–9; also www.unesco.org/webworld/alexandria_new/aswan.html and www.baltimoresistercities.org/egypt/library.htm + intro.

⁴ See Canfora (1989: 187–9).

⁵ Whitmarsh (2005: 13) and Henderson in Goldhill (2001: 30).

⁶ See, e.g., Baratin and Jacob (1996); Bloch and Hesse (1993); Chartier (1994), and R. Chartier, *Forms and Meanings: Texts, Performances, and Audiences from Codex to Computer* (Philadelphia, 1995); and Nunberg (1996).

⁷ Canfora (1989: 77–8, 134) points out that βιβλιοθήκη denotes ‘shelves’ or ‘repository’ rather than the building that houses the book collection; also Isidore *Etymologies* 6.3.3.

⁸ For the issue of power and literacy, see, e.g., Thomas (1989, 1992); Bowman and Woolf (1994).

⁹ For instance, S. Goldhill and R. Osborne (eds.), *Art and Text in Ancient Greek Culture* (Cambridge, 1994) and J. Elsner (ed.), *Art and Text in Roman Culture* (Cambridge, 1996).

¹⁰ Nunberg in Bloch and Hesse (1993: 13), although he admits that the bookless library is a 'very unlikely prospect' (p. 19).

¹¹ See P. Bazin, 'Toward Metareading', in Nunberg (1996: 158).

¹² Bloch and Hesse (1993: 8).

¹³ See Bloch and Hesse (1993: 9–10).

¹⁴ ‘Encyclopedism, yes—but by what means? It is not a question of having everything about everything: that would clearly be impossible’, Grunberg and Giffard, in Bloch and Hesse (1993: 83), writing of the Bibliothèque Nationale.

¹ Holford-Strevens (2003: 21).

² See Pfeiffer (1968: 7).

³ See Pfeiffer (1968: 7).

⁴ ‘Dehinc magnus Alexander vel successores eius instruendis omnium librorum blibliothecis animum intenderunt; maxime Ptolemaeus cognomento Philadelphus omnis litteraturae sagacissimus, cum studio bibliothecarum Pisistratum aemularetur, non solum gentium scripturas, sed etiam et divinas litteras in bibliothecam suam contulit’ (*Etymologies* 6. 3. 5). Isidore aimed to etymologize and encyclopaediaze, intending his work as a storehouse for the education of his reader; see Barney et al. (2006).

⁵ Davison (1962: 228).

⁶ Cf. also Pausanias 7.26.12; Aelian *VH* 13.14; *Anth. Pal.* 11.442; *Homeri vita* 4 and 5.

7 Καὶ τελευτᾷ ἐκεῖσε διαθήκην ἔγγραφον καταλιπών, ἣ φέρεται παρὰ τε Ἀνδρονίκου καὶ Πτολεμαίου μετὰ τῶν πινάκων τῶν αὐτοῦ συγγραμμάτων, ἐπὶ παισὶ μὲν Νικομάχῳ καὶ Πυθιάδῃ, γνησίοις δὲ μαθηταῖς Θεοφράστῳ Φανίᾳ Εὐδημῷ Κλυτῷ Ἀριστοξένῳ Δικαιάρχῳ συντάγμασι δὲ χιλίοις τὸν ἀριθμόν... (*Vita Marciana* 43–5 = During (1957), 105–6) and ‘Et mortuus est in Calchide dimittens testamentum scriptum quod fertur ab Andronico et Ptholemo cum voluminibus suorum tractatum. dimisit autem filium Nicomachum et filiam Pithiada, proprios autem discipulos Teofrastum, Phaniam, Eudimium, Clitum, Aristexenum et Dicearchum, tractatus autem mille numero’ (*Liber de vita et genere Aristotilis* 46–8 = During (1957), 157). See also Ptolemy Philosopher apud Eliam in Aristot. categ. p. 22, 11 Br. Ex. *fragmenta Aritot.*, ed. V. Rose (Leipzig, 1886), 2.

⁸ Gottschalk (1972: 336).

⁹ See Gottschalk (1972: 336).

¹⁰ See Dueck (2000: 155).

¹¹ Canfora (1989: 26).

¹² Dueck (2000: 160).

¹³ See Barnes in Barnes (1995: 10).

¹⁴ Lindsay (1997: 292–3).

¹⁵ Lindsay (1997: 298).

¹⁶ Grayeff (1955: 105) and Gottschalk (1972: 339).

¹⁷ See J. Randall, *Aristotle* (New York, 1960), 23.

¹⁸ On how to understand what Porphyry might mean by his description of Plotinus' organization of the Peripatetic corpus, see During (1957: 415–16), and for other late ancient discussions of Andronicus' edition, see During (1957: 416 ff.).

¹⁹ Barnes in Barnes (1995: 10–11).

²⁰ Gottschalk (1972: 342).

²¹ See Grayeff (1955).

²² Ellens (1993: 3). Some scholars have wanted to make links between the Alexandrian collection and the libraries and archives of Babylon and Assyria, but, as Rudolf Pfeiffer (1968: 126) notes, whether these links actually exist is difficult to determine.

²³ Davison (1962: 228–9) and Fraser (1972: i. 325).

²⁴ Tanner (2000: 79).

²⁵ Pfeiffer (1968: 95). Pfeiffer suggests that Callimachus fragments 403–66 show Aristotelian influence.

²⁶ See Diogenes Laertius 5.78 and also Pfeiffer (1968: 96).

27 Πτολεμαῖος ὁ πρῶτος συναγαγὼν τὸ μουσεῖον.

²⁸ Pfeiffer (1968: 96).

²⁹ Pfeiffer (1968: 97 n. 4).

30 *περὶ δὲ βιβλίων πλῆθους . . . καὶ τῆς εἰς τὸ Μουσεῖον συναγωγῆς.*

³¹ See text cited at Fraser (1972: ii. 481) and cf. also the concern with authentication at Vitruvius *De Architectura* 7, pref. 5–6. Cf. also Too (1998: 130).

³² e.g. *Iliad* 8.284, 371–2, 385–7, 557–8; 9.416, 694; 10.240, 253, 497; 11.13–14, 78–83, 179–80, 356; 12.450; 14.376–7.

³³ Cf. *Dionysius* of Halicarnassus *Dinarchus* 9

(εἴτ' ἀντιτεθῆναι αὐτά), *Diogenes Laertius* 7.34 (εἴτ' ἀντιτεθῆναι αὐτά), cf.

3. 66; *Cic. Ep. ad Atticum* 6.9.3, where ἀθέτησις has the metaphorical sense of the rejection of an idea.

³⁴ Ellens (1993: 2–5).

³⁵ See El-Abbadi (1992: 169–79).

³⁶ Grube (1965: 124); the source is Aphthonius
Progymnasmata 12 (Walz 1935–7: ii. 107) and Ellens (1993: 6).

³⁷ Parsons (1952: 291). Ellens (1993: 41) states that as many as 50,000 volumes were lost in the fire of 47 BC.

³⁸ See J. C. Rolfe (trans.), *Ammianus Marcellinus*, ii (Cambridge, MA, and London, 1937), 303; also see Rawson (1985: 39) and Fraser (1972: i. 334–5), who seem to accept the destruction.

³⁹ Cited Parsons (1952: 306).

⁴⁰ Pfeiffer (1968: 236–7).

⁴¹ Parsons (1952: 303–4).

⁴² See Parsons (1952: 318).

⁴³ See, e.g., M. Cary, *History of Rome* (London, 1954), 420 n. 5, and the summary of the views in Parsons (1952: 312–19).

⁴⁴See Cicero *Ep. ad Atticum* 2.6.1 and Lindsay (1997: 295).

⁴⁵ Rawson (1985: 40).

⁴⁶ Kenney and Clausen (1982: 11).

⁴⁷ Kenney and Clausen (1982: 123) and Conte (1994: 73–4).

⁴⁸ Duff and Duff (1960: 76).

⁴⁹ Fantham in Kennedy (1989: 230).

⁵⁰ Rawson (1991: 59).

⁵¹ Fantham in Kennedy (1989: 230–1).

⁵² See Conte (1994: 74) and Kenney and Clause (1982: 259–62).

53 ‘offendes dissignationem Tyrannionis mirificam librorum meorum, quorum reliquiae multo meliores sunt quam putaram. et velim mihi mittas de tuis librariolis duos aliquos quibus Tyrannio utatur glutinatoribus...’

⁵⁴ See Nagy (1996: 204).

⁵⁵ Talbert (2004).

⁵⁶ See Nicholls (2005) for an account of public libraries at Rome.

57 'atque ex immensa diffusaque legum copia optima quaeque et necessaria in paucissimos conferre libros; bibliothecas Graecas Latinasque quas maximas posset publicare, data Marco Varroni cura comparandarum ac digerendarum.'

⁵⁸ Fantham in Kennedy (1989: 244).

59 ‘C. Iulius Hyginus, Augusti libertus, natione hispanus—nonnulli Alexandrinum putant et a Caesare puerum Romam adductum Alexandria capta—studiose et audiit et imitatus est Cornelium Alexandrum, grammaticum Graecum quem propter antiquitatis notitiam Polyhistorem multi, quidam Historiam vocabant. (2) praefuit Palatinae bibliothecae—nec eo secius plurimos docuit—fuitque familiarissimus Ovidio poetae et Clodio Licino consulari historico, qui eum admodum pauperem decessisse tradit et liberalitate sua quoad vixerit sustentatum...’ (Suetonius *de grammaticis et rhetoribus* 20.1–2). See discussion of this passage in Kaster (1995: 208–9).

⁶⁰ Tiberius created Greek and Latin libraries; see Suetonius *Tiberius* 70.

⁶¹ See Quinn (1982: 126–7).

⁶² Platthy (1968).

⁶³ Canfora (1989: 45); Quinn (1982: 222); see also F. G. Kenyon, *Books and Readers in Ancient Greece and Rome* (Oxford, 1932), 81–2, and Nisbet (1961: 186–8).

⁶⁴ Whitmarsh (2005: 13); see also Henderson in Goldhill (2001: 30, 39).

¹ Camessa (2003: 722).

² See E. Donato, 'The Museum's Furnace: Notes toward a Contextual Reading of Bouvard and Pecuchet', in J. V. Harari (ed.), *Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism* (Ithaca, NY, 1979), 213–38.

³ Lerner (1998: 15).

⁴ See Oliver (1951: 243) and Carl Wendel, *Die griechisch-römische Buchbeschreibung* (Halle, 1949), 24 ff.

⁵ Oliver (1951: 243).

⁶ Kenyon (1932: 60).

⁷ Pfeiffer (1968: 126–7).

⁸ Oliver (1951: 243).

⁹ Pfeiffer (1968: 128); also Hopkinson (1988: 83) and Blum (1991: 182 ff.).

¹⁰ Pfeiffer (1968: 128–9).

¹¹ Pfeiffer (1968: 129).

¹² Pfeiffer (1979: i. 349).

¹³ Blum (1991: 1, 244) attributes the invention of ‘biobibliography’ to Callimachus; also Mansfeld (1994: 60). The assumption that biographical detail might be a strategy that assists the authorial designation of works has a much earlier basis. There was a tradition of writing ‘lives’. The research on Homer by the sixth-century bce Theagenes of Rhegium may be the first example of this, while there was also biographical writing of a kind in the classical period. See Momigliano (1971: 25–32).

¹⁴ Pfeiffer (1968: 133).

¹⁵ Pfeiffer (1968: 133).

¹⁶ Kennedy (1989: 207–8).

¹⁷ Kenyon (1932: 65).

¹⁸ Roberts and Skeat (1983: 50).

¹⁹ See also [Chapter 6](#), on mnemotechnic strategies.

²⁰ Nicholls (2005: 220).

²¹ J. M. Wells, *The Circle of Knowledge* (Chicago, 1968), 2, and R. Collison, *Encyclopaedias: Their History throughout the Ages* (New York and London, 1966), 21.

²² König and Whitmarsh (2007: 35).

²³ A. Doody, 'Finding Facts in Pliny's Encyclopaedia: The Summarium of the *Natural History*', *Ramus*, 30 (2001), 1–22.

²⁴ Rigsby (2007: 88).

²⁵ See Camessa (2003: 722).

²⁶ J. Henderson, *Pliny's Statue* (Exeter, 2002), 80–.

²⁷ Rigsby (2007: 101).

²⁸ See [Chapter 6](#) on the related issue of metadata as a means of identifying works.

²⁹ Holford-Strevens (2003: 29).

³⁰ Holford-Strevens (2003: 165–6).

³¹ See again Camessa (2003: 722).

³² Critics have viewed *oratio obliqua* in Thucydides' text as an indication of incompleteness in the writing of the text: the indirect speech is to be regarded as shorthand, which the historian intended to expand at a later date. Indeed, books 5 and 8 are thought to be less complete than the other books because they have no speeches in *oratio recta*. See, e.g., Westlake, 'The Settings of Thucydidean Speeches' in Stadter (1973: 104).

³³ See [Chapter 6](#), for the role of metadata, which write *about the work*, in Photius' *Bibliotheca*.

³⁴ Kenyon (1932: 21).

³⁵ See Pelling (1979: 93); also Reynolds and Wilson (1991: 2).

³⁶ Pelling (1979: 91–2).

³⁷ Ong (1982: 101).

³⁸ Roberts and Skeat (1983: 24, 28).

³⁹ Kenyon (1932: 110, 114–15) and Roberts and Skeat (1983: 37).

⁴⁰ Harris (1991: 78–9).

⁴¹ Harris (1991: 73–4).

⁴² Kenyon (1932: 63).

⁴³ König and Whitmarsh (2007: 34).

⁴⁴ Kenyon (1932: 97); Roberts and Skeat (1983: 49–63); Harris (1991: 83). D. N. Marshall (1983: 68) notes that non-Christians did not take to the codex.

⁴⁵ Interestingly, Trevor Murphy (2004: 20) argues that Pliny's *Natural History* is a map of the world; see also Talbert (2004).

⁴⁶ See Fischer (1932: 12).

⁴⁷ Grant (1980: 83).

⁴⁸ Grant (1980: 41).

⁴⁹ Grant (1980: 63).

¹ Hesse in Nunberg (1996: 21).

² See Too (1995: 119 V.).

³ See K. Bassi, 'Orality, Masculinity, and the Greek Epic', *Arethusa*, 30 (1997), 315–40.

⁴ Robb (1994: 164).

⁵ Cf. Nagy in Kennedy (1989: 8).

⁶ e.g. Hermeias expresses his doubts about the authorship of the *Eroticus* at 12.26, ο ΛυΨίας ητοι ο λόγος αὐτοῦ, but insists that it comes from the pen of Lysias at 35.19 V.; also Diogenes Laertius 3.25; W. C. Helmbold and W. B. Holther (‘The Unity of the *Phaedrus*’, *University of California Publications in Classical Philology*, 14/9 (1952), 412–13) think the speech is by neither Lysias nor Plato; H. Richards (‘The Platonic Letters-II’, *CR* 14 (1900), 342–3) thinks the idea belongs to Lysias but that the words are supplied by Plato.

⁷ As the philosopher declares, the rhapsode is either a cheat, deceiving his audience about his knowledge, or else a ‘divine’ — Ion unsurprisingly opts for the latter description of himself (542b1–2). As far as Plato is concerned, memorization is an irresponsible mode of textual transmission, for it does not constitute true learning or understanding. In the *Phaedrus* Phaedrus is taken to task as the unthinking mouthpiece of an unthinking speech, the Lysianic *Eroticus*: Socrates’ *interlocutor* has paid insufficient attention to the content of the speech and failed to recognize its inadequacies.

⁸ See Nagy (1996: esp. p. 78).

⁹ See J. A. Davison, 'Peisistratus and Homer', TAPA 86 (1955), 1–22, and Too (1995: 37, 143–4).

¹⁰ Thomas (1989: 33).

¹¹ See Snell (1953: 248, 321 n. 9) for the prototype of the story in Cicero re the wise man Bias, who declares *omnia mea mecum porto*. For a divergent view of this passage, see Jaeger (1944: 2.70).

¹² See Thomas (1989: 21).

¹³ For a discussion of this passage, see Horsfall (1989: 81–2) and also Coffey (1989: 187–8).

¹⁴ I am grateful to Spencer Cole for this reference.

¹⁵ See Richardson (1963: 68–71) for the existence of ‘memory libraries’ in the ancient world.

¹⁶ Cf. Chapter 1.

¹⁷ See J. W. Duff and A. M. Duff, *A Literary History of Rome from the Origins to the Close of the Golden Age* (New York, 1960), 462. Some scholars think that the Latin of *De Architectura* is typical of later Latin; the author apologizes for his flawed language (*cf. ut si quid parum ad regulam artis grammaticae fuerit explicatum ignoscatur, 1.1.17*). J. L. Ussing (*Observations on Vitruv. De Archit.*, trans. from Danish, London, 1898) argues that Vitruvius translated from Athenaeus' *Peri Mēchanēmaton*, following C. F. L. Schultz, *Untersuchungen über d. Zeitalter des röm. Kriegsbaumesiters M Vitruvius* (1856).

18 'Itaque silentio facto docuit unum ex his eum esse poetam, ceteros aliena recitavisse; oportere autem iudicantes non furta sed scripta probare. Admirante populo et rege dubitante, *fretus memoriae* certis armariis infinita volumina eduxit et ea cum recitatis conferendo coegit ipsos furatos de se confiteri' (*Vitruvius De Architectura* 7, pref. 5–6).

¹⁹ See Chapter 2.

ἦν γὰρ ὁ Λογγίνος μακρῶ τῶν τότε ἀνδρῶν τὰ πάντα ἄριστος, καὶ τῶν βιβλίων τε αὐτοῦ πολὺ πλῆθος φέρεται, καὶ τὸ φερόμενον θαυμάζεται καὶ εἴ τις κατέγνω-
τινὸς τῶν παλαιῶν, οὐ τὸ δοξασθὲν ἐκράτει πρότερον, ἀλλ' ἡ Λογγίνου πάντως ἐκράτει
20κρίσις (VS 456).

²¹ Literature is Apuleius ‘ witness on other points. The discussion of the defendant’s use of mirrors involves numerous literary and historical exempla—Hagesilaus refusing to allow himself to be sculpted (15), Socrates and Demosthenes using mirrors in the service of self-knowledge (15), Epicurus on images (15), and Archytas on katoptrics (16)—while Plato features prominently again in the discussion of the orator’s statue of Mercury (64–5). To establish scientific research as merely curious activity, the orator cites Vergil (19–20 =; Eclogue 8.64ff.) and Laevius (30.3540 =; Baehrens, p. 292) on vegetation, while he signals his familiarity with the Greek poetic corpus by declaring that he might have recalled (*memorassem*) in his defence portions of Theocritus, Homer, Orpheus, and much from the Greek comedians, tragedians, and historians (‘*memorassem tibi etiam Theocriti paria et alia Homeri et Orphei plurima, et ex comoediis et tragoediis Graecis et ex historiis multa repetissem*’, 30.29–30; cf. 30.30; 31.7 =; *Iliad* 12.741; 31.9–10 =; *Odyssey* 4.455 ff., 12.25 ff.; 31.13 =; *Odyssey* 11.91 ff., 234 ff., 31.14 =; *Iliad* 23.214).

²² On the autonomy of textual identity in Apuleius, see Stephen Harrison, 'The Speaking Book: The Prologue to Apuleius *Metamorphoses*', CQ 40 (1990) 507–13.

²³ More or less contemporary with Apuleius' speech are the apologies of Lucian, Dio of Prusa, and of Philostratus' Apollonius of Tyana.

²⁴ In chapter 37 of the oration he recalls how Sophocles read his *Oedipus at Colonus* before judges (*iudicibus* 37.6, 9), so that they could determine whether or not he was mad. The play is forced to function both as a literary text and as a forensic apologia, not unlike Apuleius' own: hence, the *iudices* of this work become at once the audience of a dramatic and a legal agôn.

²⁵ The *Apology* provides a second judge-figure, Lollianus Avitus, who is no less learned than Maximus. With the latter, he shares a literary style, which speaks to their textual kinship, on the assumption that similar ways of writing and speaking attest to similar characters (94.16–18; 95.18–20; cf. Seneca Ep. 114).

²⁶ See T. D. McCreight, 'Invective Techniques in Apuleius' *Apology Groningen Colloquia on the Novel 3* (Groningen, 1990), 43.

²⁷ On the symposium as emblematic of order and civilization, see, e.g., W. Burkert, 'Oriental Symposia: Contrasts and Parallels', 7–24, esp. p. 7; O. Murray, 'War and the Symposium', 83–103; A. Booth, 'The Age for Reclining and its Attendant Perils', 105–20 in W. J. Slater (ed.), *Dining in a Classical Context* (Ann Arbor, 1991).

²⁸ See Relihan (1992: 215–16); also Skidmore (1996: 110–11), who lists among other sources: Plutarch 712d (for the reading of New Comedy); Athenaeus 382a and Plutarch 711d (for the reading of Plato); Aulus Gellius 3.19.1 (for the reading of grammatical works, see Gavius Bassus, *On the Origins of Verbs and Substantives*); Aulus Gellius 2.22.1 (for lyric poetry and history).

²⁹ Wilkins in Braund and Wilkins (2000: 26) views food and talk to be of equal importance in the work; also Romeri in Braund and Wilkins (2000: 271).

³⁰ Lukinovich (1990: 268–9).

³¹ On Larensis as a synonym for Herodes Atticus, see Anderson (1997: 2174) and C. Wright, *Philostratus and Eunapius* (Cambridge, MA, 1922), p. xxxiv.

³² Jacob in Braund and Wilkins (2000: 89).

³³ Nicholls (2005: 251).

³⁴ Braund in Braund and Wilkins (2000: 7).

³⁵ Cf. Chapter 2.

³⁶ Gulick (1927–41: i. 17).

³⁷ Anderson (1997: 2174).

³⁸ See Seneca *De Tranquillitate Animi* 9.5: ‘sicut plerisque ignaris etiam puerilium litterarum libri non studiorum instrumenta sed cenationum ornamenta sunt’ . The philosopher criticizes the ‘innumerable books and libraries’, which no one person can thoroughly read, advocating knowledge of a few texts instead (cf. 1.9.4).

³⁹ Canfora in Baratin and Jacob (1996: 265).

⁴⁰ Baldwin (1976: 24).

⁴¹ K. Dover (ed.), *Plato: Symposium* (Cambridge, 1980), 9.

⁴² Baldwin (1977), p. 41.

⁴³ See also Nagy (1996: 218).

44πολλοὶ πολυμαθεὲς νοῦν οὐκ ἔχουσιν.

ἑτάδε λέγει Δημόκριτος ὁ γράφωντος. ναὶ μὲν καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ <σχ. γράφει>, ἦι
σεμνυνόμενός φησὶ πού ἐπὶ πολυμαθία. ἔγω δὲ τῶν κατ' ἑμαυτὸν ἀνθρώπων τῇν
πλείστην ἐπεπλανησάμην ἱστορέων τὰ μήκιστα καὶ ἀέρας τε καὶ γέας πλείστας εἶδον
καὶ λογίων ἀνδρῶν πλείστων ἐπήκουσα καὶ γραμμέων συνθέσιος μετὰ ἀποδείξεως
οὐδέις κώ με παρήλλαξεν οὐδ' οἱ Αἰγυπτίῳν καλεόμενοι Ἀρπεδονάπται σὺν τοῖς
45δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐπ' ἕτα οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐπὶ ξείνης ἐγενήθην' ...

πολυμαθίῃ νόον ἔχειν οὐδιδάσκει· Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἄν ἐδίδαξε καὶ Πυθαγόρην αὐτὶς
46 τε Ξενοφάνεά τε καὶ Ἑκαταῖον.

πολυμαθίῃ κάρτα μὲν ὠφελεῖ, κάρτα δὲ βλάπτει τὸν ἔχοντα· ὠφελεῖ μὲν τὸν δεξιὸν
ἄνδρα, βλάπτει δὲ τὸν ῥηϊδίως φωνεῦντα πᾶν ἔπος κῆν παντὶ δῆμῳ. χρὴ δὲ καιροῦ
μέτρα εἰδέναι; σοφίης γὰρ οὗτος ὄρος. οἱ δὲ ἔξω καιροῦ ῥῆσιν αἰεῖδουσιν, κῆν
47 πεπνυμένην αἰεῖδωσιν, οὐ τιθέμενοι ἐν σοφίῃ γνώμην αἰτίην ἔχουσι μωρίας.

⁴⁸ In his discussion of *Republic* 392c–8b ff. Else (1958: 84) gives the adjective παντοδαπαί the sense of ‘indiscriminate’ and observes that ‘we want only the simplest and most uniform kind of imitation, that of a good man’.

⁴⁹ Pfeiffer (1968: 138 n. 1).

⁵⁰ Pfeiffer (1968: 135–6).

⁵¹ Grube (1965: 127).

⁵² See Daniel (1980). Editors have emended the reading of H, *tres*, to II.

⁵³ See Smith (1975: 130–1).

⁵⁴ For commentary on this remarkable fabrication, see Smith (1975: 165).

⁵⁵ Relihan (1992 : 220).

⁵⁶ Coffey (1989: 12–14).

⁵⁷ At the beginning of book 13, which concerns itself with women and love, Athenaeus invokes the Muse Erato to come to the aid of his memory (cf. εἰς μνήμην) before he embarks on his ‘erotic catalogue’ (τον ἐρωτικὸν ἐκεῖνον κατάλογον, 555A).

⁵⁸ Dalechamps suggests the reading *ἀνομοιότης*, ‘dissimilarity’; see Gulick (192741: vii. 62).

⁵⁹ Baldwin (1977: 38).

⁶⁰ Anderson (1997: 2175).

⁶¹ Swain (1996: 50–1).

⁶² For the identity of Ulpian, see Baldwin (1976).

⁶³ Brunt (1994: 37, 46).

⁶⁴ Brunt (1994: 38); see also Bassi (1997).

⁶⁵ J. Zetzel, '*Emendavi ad Tironem*: Some Notes on Scholarship in the Second Century ad', HSCP 77 (1973), 225–43.

⁶⁶ See Anderson (1989: 140) for the point that Second Sophistic culture provides access to the past in ‘dislocated literary artistry’.

⁶⁷ Ray Bradbury, *Fahrenheit 451* (New York, 1950), 135.

¹ Chartier (1994: 88).

² See Chartier in Bloch and Hesse (1993: 39–41) for a discussion of this book phenomenon in the early modern period.

³ On the Hesiodic quality of the *Library*, see, e.g., Heinrichs in Bremmer (1988: 249).

⁴ D tienne (1986: 1).

⁵ Carrière and Massonie (1991: 16).

⁶ See Svenbro (1993: 30) for these examples (Pfohl, nos. 158 (Methana) and 15 (Thasos)), and (1993: 26–43) on the phenomenon of the self-dramatizing inscription.

⁷ See S. J. Harrison, 'The Speaking Book: The Prologue to Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*', CQ 40 (1990) 507–13.

⁸ e.g. Svenbro (1993: ch. 3) and Chartier (1994: 2); on the written status of ancient Greek law, see also, e.g., Thomas (1989: 32).

⁹ See Heinrichs in Bremmer (1988: 244).

¹⁰ For a list of parallel passages between the *Library* and the scholia, see Diller (1935: 297).

¹¹ References at Laur. XXII.9 (cf. *Library* 2.148–60), which refers to the ‘Library of Apollodorus’ in place of offering a hypothesis and a scholion on *Antigone* 981 (cf. *Library* 3.200), see Diller (1935: 303) and also van der Valk (1958: 104–6).

¹² Diller (1935: 296).

¹³ Frazer (1921: p. x).

¹⁴ Diller (1935: 296).

¹⁵ Christ (1898: 571).

¹⁶ Carriere and Massonie (1991: 11).

¹⁷ Carrière (1998: 47).

¹⁸ Frazer (1921: p. xvi). Van der Valk (1958) proposes that the earliest date that may be ascribed to the work is one later than the Wrst half of the Wrst century BC.

¹⁹ Veyne (1988: 109–10).

²⁰ See R. Cribiore, 'The Grammarian's Choice: The Popularity of Euripides' *Phoenissae* in Hellenistic and Roman Education' in Y. L. Too (ed.), *Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity* (Leiden, 2001), 241, for the view that the *engkeklios paideia* was an encompassing education and pp. 241–59 for her overall rejection of this understanding of it.

²¹ Fraser (1972: i. 325) and Davison (1962: 228–9).

²² Cf. Callimachus *Aetia* fr. 1.11–12.

²³ For the phrase, see Plato *Menexenus* 239c; *Laws* 669d; Philodemus *Mus.* p. 97 K; for the sense of unsupported speech, see Plato *Phaedrus* 262c.

²⁴ Pfeiffer (1968: 128); also Hopkinson (1988: 83) and Blum (1991: 182 ff.).

²⁵ Pfeiffer (1968) 128–9.

²⁶ On the bio-and bibliographical concerns of the *Pinakes*, see Blum (1991: 1,244) and Mansfeld (1994: 60). For the totalizing aspirations of the catalogue, see Pfeiffer (1968: 128) and Hopkinson (1988: 83).

²⁷ Calame in Calame (1988: 7).

²⁸ For the negative valorization of myth in the fifth century, see D  tienne (1986: 44–6, 59–61).

29 ‘Dehinc magnus Alexander vel successores eius instruendis omnium librorum blibliothecis animum intenderunt; maxime Ptolemaeus cognomento Philadelphus omnis litteraturae sagacissimus, cum studio bibliothecarum Pisistratum aemularetur, non solum gentium scripturas, sed etiam et divinas litteras in bibliothecam suam contulit’ (Isidore *Etymologies* 6.3.5).

³⁰ Carrière (1998: esp. p. 66).

³¹ Carrière (1998: 78).

³² Hard (1997: p. xvii).

³³ Carrière (1998: 47–8).

³⁴ See also 3.12.3, where the author refers to a story told (cf. Ἱστορία δε ἡ περὶ τοῦ παλλαδίου τοιάδε φέρεται) about the Palladium, or image of Pallas, in which Pallas is wounded by Athena while practising the arts of war and Athena makes an image out of grief. For other supplementary gestures in the *Library*, see 3.6.8 (on the death of Parthenopaeus); 3.6.8 (on the disappearance of Amphiaraus); 3.7.7 (on the fate of Alcmeon's children); 3.8.2 (for the cause of the flood during the time of Deucalion); 3.8.2 (on Callisto's parentage); 3.8.2 (on why Artemis killed Callisto); 3.10.3 (on Hyacinth); 3.10.4 (on the line of Perieres).

³⁵ Veyne (1988: 22–3).

³⁶ Veyne (1988: 5, 59).

³⁷ Other instances of alternative literary attribution in these books include 1.3.5; 1.5.2; 1.9.21; 2.1.5; 2.2.1; 2.3.1; 3.1.1; 3.5.5; 3.5.8; 3.6.7; 3.8.2; 3.10.2; 3.10.4; 3.10.7; 3.11.1; 3.12.3; 3.12.6; 3.13.8; 3.14.4; 3.14.6 (x 2); 3.15.5.

³⁸ Heinrichs in Bremmer (1988: 247).

³⁹ Veyne (1988: 59).

⁴⁰ Cf. Le Goff (1992: 134–5) for the view that myth is a form of narrative that explains the origins of a society through a ‘fossilized memory’.

⁴¹ Carrière and Massonie (1991: 14).

⁴² See Detiënne (1988: 49–50); see also Matthews (1974).

⁴³ Détienne (1986: 74). Green in Cartledge, Garnsey, and Gruen (1975: 43) notes that, in so far as the central function of myth was to validate genealogies and territorial claims, it was an important part of a Greek city state's self-concept.

⁴⁴ Fornara (1983: 4) observes that Acousilaus was said by Clement of Alexandria to have turned Hesiod's poetry into prose and published it as if it were his own (*FGrH* 2T5). Josephus takes the view that Acousilaus corrected Hesiod, to be corrected in his turn by Hellanicus of Lesbos (*FGrH* 2T6).

⁴⁵ See Frazer (1921: i. 340–1 n. 1). Cf. also 3.8.2 for the offspring of Lycaon.

⁴⁶ This story is found at, e.g., Eratosthenes *Cataster.* 25; Pausanias 1.33.7 ff.; Hyginus *Astron.* 2.8; cf. Frazer (1921: ii. 25 n. 1).

⁴⁷ Cf. Plutarch *Theseus* 13.

⁴⁸ See, e.g., Aristotle fr. 635; Plato *Gorgias* 491a; Dem. 21.204; Aeschines 3.48; 3.22; Isocrates 12.231.

⁴⁹ See Too (1998: 137).

⁵⁰ Ong (1982: 67).

⁵¹ Carrière (1998: 66).

⁵² Svenbro (1993: 187).

⁵³ Svenbro (1993: 61).

⁵⁴ Svenbro (1993: 122).

⁵⁵ Svenbro (1993: 188–9).

⁵⁶ Svenbro (1993: esp. 191–4).

⁵⁷ See Too (1998: esp. 213–15) for the argument that the sublime retrojects its reading audience back into the past.

⁵⁸ Svenbro (1993: 79).

⁵⁹ From Calvino, 'Literature as Project of Desire' in Calvino (1982: 60–1).

⁶⁰ Frazer (1921: i, pp. xli-xlii).

⁶¹ There are two supplementary references that do not fit into the overall Herodotean themes: 5.22, where the compiler declares that people say the sons of Theseus went to Troy, and 6.15a, where the reader learns Guneus went to the Cinyrs river in Libya and settled there, as Apollodorus and others say. The second passage is actually supplied from Tzetzes *Schol. in Lycophronem* 902, and is not part of the *Epitome*.

⁶² See also Plato *Phaedrus* 242e–243b and *Republic* 586c; Isocrates *Helen* 64; Dio Chrysostom 11.40; Aristeides 45.54 and 13.131; and Tzetzes ad. *Lyc. Alex.* 113.

¹ See Diodorus Siculus 1.4.4.

² See also Aulus Gellius NA pref. 6–10, where there is a similar critique of such works as indiscriminating collections of details.

³ Canfora (1989: 77).

⁴ See Chartier (1994: 89).

⁵ Of the forty books the first five and eleven to seventeen are preserved; fragments of the books exist in other authors, in particular Eusebius and Byzantine excerptors. See Oldfather (1933: pp. xiv-xvi). Sacks (1990: 26) observes that the *Library of History* is the largest Greek history to survive from antiquity.

⁶ Robbins (1993: 182–4); see also McCready (1966: 131–47).

7ἐρωτηθεὶς πόθεν εἶη, ᾿κοσμοπολίτης᾽ ἔφη...

Cf. οὐχ εἷς πάτρας μοι πύργος, οὐ μία στέγη,
πάσης δὲ χέρσου καὶ πόλισμα καὶ δόμος

8 ἔτοιμος ἡμῖν ἐνδαιτᾶσθαι πάρα.

⁹ Schofield (1991: 143–5) for discussion of the texts attesting to Diogenes' cosmopolitanism. See also John Moles, 'Cynic Cosmopolitanism' in R. Bracht Branham and M. O. Goulet-Caze, *The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and its Legacy* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1996), 105–20.

¹⁰ Cf. Dio Chrysostom 36.20; Cicero *De Nat. Deorum* 2.3, 154; Arius Didymus in Eusebius *Praep. ev.* 15.15; and Schofield (1991: 57–84).

¹¹ See Schofield (1991: 61–3). Schofield also states (1991: 92) that rational beings are a *sine qua non* of a Stoic city. See also F. H. Sandbach, *The Stoics* (London, 1975), 25. Plutarch parodies this idea of a heavenly city at *Moralia* 826, when he makes the stars its citizens and the sun the councillor; see also comments of D. Russell, *Dio Chrysostom. Orations* VII, XII, XXXVI (Cambridge, 1992), 223.

¹² Long and Sedley (1987: 349–50). Cosmopolitanism is also evident in later Stoic writers, namely Epictetus (*Diatriba* 2.10.3), Seneca (*De vita beata* 5), and Marcus Aurelius (4.4 and 6.44).

¹³ A. A. Long, 'Roman Ethics' in Becker (2003: 38).

¹⁴ See Rawson (1985), who disputes the view that Diodorus' Stoicism goes very deep; in her view, Stoicism reinforces the author's 'wide views'.

¹⁵ Sacks (1990: 64).

¹⁶ See Sacks (1990: 64).

¹⁷ See Rawson (1985: 223). Fornara (1983: 41, 53) observes that Greek historiography was centred on the city state, while Roman history was concerned with the Roman state and only incidentally with the world, as the Roman state went to war for the sake of conquest.

¹⁸ Fornara (1983: 42).

¹⁹ Sacks (1990: 77) sees the influence of Alexandrian cataloguing in Diodorus' reference to various historians in the course of his work.

²⁰ Burton (1972: 1–2).

²¹ Geer (1984: pp. vii-viii).

²² Geer (1984: p. viii).

²³ Rubincam (1989: 52–3).

²⁴ The verb showed up at Isocrates 12.17, where the rhetorician complains that rival sophists have pulled his speeches to pieces, failing to observe their structural units:“

*Ἔως μὲν οὖν τοὺς λόγους μου ἐλυμαίνοντο, παραναγιγνώσκοντες ὥς δυνατὸν
κάκιστα τοῖς ἑαυτῶν καὶ διαιροῦντες οὐκ ὀρθῶς καὶ κατακνίζοντες καὶ πάντα τρόπον
διαφθείροντες.*

²⁵ Sacks (1990: 12).

²⁶ See C. H. Oldfather, *Diodorus of Sicily*, i (London and Cambridge, MA, 1968), 22.

²⁷ See M. Schofield 'Stoic Ethics', in B. Inwood (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics* (Cambridge, 2003).

²⁸ See the examination of cross-references in Rubincam (1989), which may be seen as reinforcing the sense of the work's integrity. On occasion the *History* shows curious gaps in its chronology, as at 18.15–43, where the events of 322 should follow mention of the archon for that year at 18.26 but where the narrative goes straight to the burial of Alexander the Great in 321. The next archonship to be mentioned is that of 319/18 at chapter 44. Geer (1947) speculates that one or more lacunae occur between sections 28 and 44 of book 18.

²⁹ See François Hartog, *The Mirror of Herodotus: The Representation of the Other in the Writing of History*, trans. J. Lloyd (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1988).

³⁰ See, e.g., Thucydides 1.22.4; 2.48.3; Ephorus FGrH 70 F 42; Polybius 1.1.2; Sallust Jug. 4.5; *Livy pref.* 10; Dionysius Halicarnassus AR 1.6.4; 5.75.1; 11.1.4; Dio Chrysostom 18.9; sources cited from Burton (1972: 35).

³¹ See Pfeiffer (1979: i. 55–6), and C. A. Trypanis et al., *Callimachus. Aetia, Iambi, Hecale and Other Fragments* (London and Cambridge, MA, 1978), 38–9 with notes. Busiris is treated at 1.67.11 (cf. Strabo 17.80.2) with a rationalization at 1.88.5. In Diodorus Busiris seems to be both a person and also a place—namely, the site of Osiris’ tomb: 1.85.5 with comments by Burton (1972: 14–15).

³² In his encomiastic work *Busiris* Isocrates makes no mention of this aspect of the Egyptian leader's reputation.

³³ The tyrant Agathocles creates a torture similar to that of the bull of Phalaris, which enables those who are being roasted to death to be seen; cf. 20.71.3.

³⁴ Cf. 14.32.1 for the Thebans welcoming the exiles from the Thirty Tyrants at Athens.

ὁξυτέραν γὰρ καὶ μείζονα μεταβολὴν τύχης καὶ περιπέτειαν οὕτως ἀνέλπιστον

35 οὐκ ἂν τις ἑτέραν ῥαδίως εὕροι

(31.18.3 = Const. Exc. 4, p. 375).

³⁶ See Jerry Daniel, 'Anti-Semitism in the Hellenistic-Roman Period', JBL 98/1 (1979), 61, notes that the Jews are presented as hating mankind also in Philostratus VA 5.33; Tacitus *Histories* 5.5, and Juvenal 14.102–4. See also Peter Schafer, *Judeophobia: Attitudes toward the Jews in the Ancient World* (Cambridge and London, 1998), 22–3.

³⁷ Contrast with [Longinus] 9.9, where the book of 'laws' of Moses is characterized as lawful and pious.

³⁸ Cf. the treatment of the Jews in books 34–5 with 40.3.1 ff., which comes from Photius *Bibliotheca* 380–1b, and which explains the origins of Jewish isolationism in a tone that is not anti-Semitic or virulently hostile.

³⁹ Plutarch *Aemilius* 37 attributes this action rather to L. Aemilius Paulus.

⁴⁰ König and Whitmarsh (2007: 11).

⁴¹ Sacks (1990: 187–8) doubts that, as a figure who stood outside teaching circles and without any social connections, Diodorus would have had access to personal libraries at Rome and imagines that the historian would have purchased his books.

⁴² Cf. Athenaeus 104B for the Wgure of the ‘metropolis’.

⁴³ Canfora (1989: 10–11).

¹ See text cited at Fraser (1972: ii. 481) and cf. also the concern with authentication at Vitruvius *De Architectura* 7, pref. 5–6. Cf. also Too (1998: 130).

² J. de Romilly, *The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens* (Oxford, 1992), p. xiii.

³ See R. Sorabji, *Aristotle on Memory* (London, 1972), 22.

⁴ See Yates (1966).

⁵ Wilson (1994: 261).

⁶ Guillory (1993: 15).

⁷ Guillory (1993: 56).

⁸ Guillory (1993: 17).

⁹ I would like to thank Ruth Cameron, archivist at the Burke Library at Union Theological Seminary in New York, for this reference.

¹ In Barthes (1977: 32).

² Elsner (1996: 1).

³ Nicholls (2005: 161). I am especially grateful to Matthew Nicholls for allowing me to see a copy of his excellent dissertation.

⁴ According to Paul Zanker, the representations of the tragedians present them not so much as dramatic poets or intellectuals but as models of citizenship—the politically active but responsible citizen in the case of Sophocles, the quiet citizen in the case of Aeschylus, and the contemplative old man in the case of Euripides. Zanker suggests that the Lycurgan images were tied to the leader's politically conservative programme. See Zanker (1995: 43–59).

⁵ Diodorus Siculus notes that adjacent to the ‘sacred library’ of the Egyptian Osymandyas there are statues of all the gods of Egypt to whom the king makes suitable offerings, while next to the library is a hall containing couches for twenty, and statues of Zeus, Hera, and the king (Diodorus 1.49.2–4). See also Nicholls (2005: 300).

⁶ Zanker (1995: 90 ff.).

⁷ Pollitt (1986: 13–15).

⁸ Pollitt (1986: 84, 101–7).

⁹ Richter (1965: 46).

¹⁰ Pollitt (1986: 204) and K. Weitzmann, *Illustrations in Roll and Codex*, Studies in Manuscript Illumination 2 (Princeton, 1947; 1970, with addenda); the addenda summarize the qualifications to the speculation that illustrated rolls may have influenced narrative reliefs on the basis that evidence for the former is scanty.

¹¹ Pollitt (1986: 235).

¹² See Robertson in Green (1993: 73–4).

¹³ Jerome Pollitt states: 'The [statue] collection of Asinius Pollio, for example, one of the most avid Roman collectors, seems to have been housed in the library that he built into the Atrium Libertatis when he reconstructed it' (Pollitt in Green 1993: 109).

¹⁴ See Marshall (1976: 263) for bust collecting. Marshall cites Pliny Ep. 1.16.8; 3.7.8; 4.28.1; 8.18.11; Cicero *Ep. ad Atticum* 4.10.1 for this phenomenon.

¹⁵ Marshall (1976: 263), who also points to Tacitus *Annals* 2.37 and Horace Sat. 1.4.21. See also Nicholls (2005: 224, 226; also 214, 232, 250).

¹⁶ Nicholls (2005: 160, 167).

¹⁷ Pollitt (1966: 5–6).

¹⁸ See Too in Elsner (1996) for a fuller discussion of this issue and relevant passages.

¹⁹ Also see Porphyry *Plotinus* 1 for Plotinus' prohibition on paintings or sculptures of oneself in preference to mental images; see Pollitt (1966: 216–17).

²⁰ Nicholls (2005: 263).

²¹ See Porter (1993: 274).

²² For this argument, see A. Nehemas, 'Plato on Imitation and Poetry in Republic 10', in J. Moravcsik and P. Temko (eds.), *Plato on Beauty, Wisdom and the Arts* (Totowa, MJ, 1982), 53.

²³ Frischer (1982: 80–1).

²⁴ See Stewart (1997: 213).

²⁵ Frischer (1982: 132).

²⁵ Zanker (1995: 114).

²⁷ Frischer (1982: 78).

²⁸ Pollitt (1986: 66–7).

²⁹ Nisbet (1961: 186–8).

³⁰ Gigante (1995: 47–8), with Pandermalis (1983).

³¹ See Too (1998: 51–81).

³² Nicholls (2005: 166; also 204, 214).

³³ I would like to thank Michael Mordine for this most apropos reference.

³⁴ Nicholls (2005: 267–8).

³⁵ Nicholls (2005: 334).

³⁶ Quotation from Zanker (1995: 208); see R. Neudecker, *Die Skulpturenausstattung römischer Villen in Italien* (Mainz, 1988), 64 ff.

³⁷ Esp. 'Itaque eis, qui hanc partem ingeni exercerent, locos esse capiendos et ea, quae memoria tenere vellent effingenda animo atque in eis locis conlocanda; sic fore, ut ordinem rerum locorum ordo conservaret, res autem ipsas rerum effigies notaret atque ut locis pro cera, simulacris pro litteris uteremur' (2.354).

³⁸ See, e.g., Bergmann (1994) and Favro (1993). I would like to thank Herica Valladares for these references and her stimulating conversation.

³⁹ Bergmann (1994: 225–6).

⁴⁰ Fantham (1996: 202).

⁴¹ Nicholls (2005: 215, 225).

⁴² See Fantham in Kennedy (1989: 231).

⁴³ Rawson (1985: 97); see also, e.g., Cicero *Acad. Post.* 1.9; *Brutus* 60; *Ep. ad Atticum* 13.18.2; Valerius Maximus 8.7.3; Quintilian 1.95; Plutarch *Romulus* 12 (Varro as βιβλιακωτατον).

⁴⁴ See *GRF* 182, no. 23.

⁴⁵ ‘bibliothecas Graecas Latinasque quas maximas posset publicare, data Marco Varroni cura comparandarum ac digerendarum’ (Suetonius *Iulius* 44.2; cf. Isidore *Etymologies* 6.5.1).

⁴⁶ Rawson (1985: 114).

⁴⁷ Blum (1991: 227–8) and Mansfeld (1994: 60).

⁴⁸ Mansfeld (1994: 6, 178).

⁴⁹ The formula ‘Homer from Homer’ appears first in Porphyry *Quaestiones Homricae ad Iliadem pertinentes* 297.16–17. See Mansfeld (1994: 178) and Schaublin, ‘Homer ex Homero’, *MH* 34 (1977), 221–7, although Pfeiffer (1968: 276 ff.) disagrees.

⁵⁰ For biographical fictions, see J. Fairweather, 'Fiction in the Biographies of Ancient Writers', *Ancient Studies*, 5 (1974), 231–75; also D. A. F. M. Russell, 'Plutarch's Life of Coriolanus', *JRS* 53 (1963), 21–9 at 23.

⁵¹ On Varro as the only living person to be memorialized in a library, see Nicholls (2005: 26).

⁵² See Nicholls (2005: 262).

⁵³ Rawson (1985: 44 and 198); also Richter (1965: 21).

⁵⁴ See Rawson (1985: 44).

⁵⁵ Bloomer (1992: 18).

⁵⁶ See Nicholls (2005: 263).

⁵⁷ Nicholls (2005: 55–6).

¹ N. P. Pérez, 'La Figure du poète tragique dans la Grèce ancienne', in N. Loraux and C. Miralles (eds.), *Figures de l'intellectuel en Grèce ancienne* (Paris, 1998), 169–70.

² Fantham in Kennedy (1989: 230–1).

ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν βυβλίων δύνатаι πολυπραγμονεῖσθαι χωρὶς κινδύνου καὶ κακοπα-
θείας, εἴαν τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο προνοηθῇ μόνον ὥστε λαβεῖν ἢ πόλιν ἔχουσιν ὑπομνημάτων
3πλῆθος ἢ βυβλιοθήκην που γειτνιώσαν.

⁴ Sacks (1990: 77) sees the influence of Alexandrian cataloguing in Diodorus' reference to various historians in the course of his work.

⁵ See Fornara (1983: 48, 146, 160).

⁶ See, e.g., the work of S. Goldhill, especially 'The Great Dionysia and Civic Ideology', *JHS* 107 (1987), 58–76.

⁷ D. Cohen, *Law, Violence and Community in Classical Athens* (Cambridge, 1995), 23.

⁸ Bloomer in Habinek and Schiesaro (1997: 199).

⁹ Beard in Graf (1993: 56).

¹⁰ Bloomer in Habinek and Schiesaro (1997: esp. 200, 210–13).

¹¹ See R. Kaster, 'Controlling Reason: Declamation in Rhetorical Education at Rome', in Y. L. Too (ed.), *Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity* (Leiden, 2001), 317–37.

¹² Beard in Graf (1993: 54, 62).

¹³ Dupont in Habinek and Schiesaro (1997: 48).

¹⁴ Dupont in Habinek and Schiesaro (1997: 45).

¹⁵ Dalzell (1955: 21).

¹⁶ ‘nec recito cuiquam nisi amicis, idque coactus, | non ubivis
coramve quibuslibet’ (*Sermo* 1.4.73–4). Cf. Dalzell (1955: 22).

¹⁷ Dalzell (1955: 26–7).

¹⁸ Dupont in Habinek and Schiesaro (1997: 46, 48).

¹⁹ Nicholls (2005: 193–4).

²⁰ Casson (2001: 88).

²¹ See W. V. Harris, *Ancient Literacy* (Cambridge, MA, and London, 1989), 323–37, who argues that it is difficult to determine how many people were literate, since it is impossible to establish what is meant by ‘literate’ and because levels of literacy were probably not as high as have previously been thought.

²² See J. Derrida, 'Plato's Pharmacy', in *Dissemination*, trans. B. Johnson (Chicago, 1981).

23 Πτολεμαῖος ὁ πρῶτος συναγαγὼν τὸ μουσεῖον.

²⁴ Pfeiffer (1968: 96).

²⁵ Pfeiffer (1968: 97 n. 4).

26περὶ δὲ βιβλων πλήθους . . . καὶ τῆς εἰς τὸ Μουσεῖον συναγωγῆς.

²⁷ Fraser (1972: i. 132) and Thompson in Bowman and Woolf (1994: 67).

²⁸ See Lewis (1986: 4) and the excellent discussion of Koenen in Bulloch et al. (1993: esp. 50 ff.).

²⁹ Pelikan (1992: 110).

³⁰ See e.g. Pfeiffer (1968: 87).

³¹ Zanker (1995: 90 ff.).

³² Cf. Pfeiffer (1968: 97).

³³ Nicholls (2005: 93).

³⁴ Nicholls (2005: 96).

³⁵ Nicholls (2005: 109).

³⁶ See above, [Chapter 1](#).

³⁷ See J. Burnet (ed.), *Plato: Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, Crito* (Oxford, 1924), 235.

³⁸ For οἱ πολιτικοί or ‘politically influential or active members of society’ as addressees of rhetorical handbooks, see Swain (1996: 56).

³⁹ Knox (1968: 422); see also the fascinating discussion by Ferguson in Hexter and Selden (1992: 85).

⁴⁰ Too (1998: 232–3) and Mazzeo (1962: 192).

⁴¹ See Too (1998: 226–8).

⁴² This description of poetry (*carmen*) as crimen invokes the literary constraints in Augustan Rome and, before them, the historical prohibition on injurious *carmina* in the Twelve Tables.

⁴³ Nicholls (2005: 18, 225).

⁴⁴ A. J. Marshall (1976: 262) suggests that the *Ars Amatoria* was banished from all three libraries during Ovid's lifetime.

⁴⁵ A. J. Marshall (1976: 262–3).

⁴⁶ A. J. Marshall (1976: 263).

⁴⁷ See Woodside (1942).

⁴⁸ Kennedy has suggested that book 10 of the *Institutio Oratoria* offers a means of understanding the project of Hellenistic criticism; see Kennedy in Gless and Herrnstein Smith (1992: 225).

⁴⁹ Block (1982: 22).

⁵⁰ Baldwin (1976: 24).